TULLY'S
OFFICES,
IN
Three Books.

Turned out of
LATIN
INTO
ENGLISH.

By Sr. *Ro. L'Estrange.*

The Fourth Edition Corrected.

To which is Added a TABLE.

LONDON,
Printed for *R. Bently*, *J. Hindmarsh* and *J. Tonson*. 1688.

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

London Printed For R: Bentley: J: Hind: marsh: and J: Tonson: 1688

BRITISH MUSEUM

TO THE READER.

TIS hard, me thinks, that a Man cannot Publiſh a Book, but he muſt preſently give the World a Reaſon *for't; when yet there's not* One *Book of* Twenty *that will* bear *a* Reaſon; *not* One Man *of a* Hundred, *perhaps, that is able to* Give *One; nor* One Reaſon *of a* Thouſand *(when they* are *given) that was the* True Reaſon *of Doing it. The* True Reaſon *(I ſay) For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a* Good Reaſon, *for the doing of a thing, and the* True Reaſon *why the thing was done. The* Service *of* God *is a very* Good Reaſon *for a Man's going to* Church; *and yet the meeting of a* Miſtreſs *There, may, perchance, be the* True Reaſon *of his* Going. *And ſo likewiſe in Other Caſes, where we cover our* Paſſions *and our* Intereſts *under the*

Semblances of Virtue, *and* Duty. But however, *ſince* Cuſtom; (*the* Plague *of* Wiſe men, *and the* Idol *of* Fools) *ſince* Cuſtom (*I ſay*) *will have it ſo, that a Man had as good go to* Court *without his* Cravat, *as ſhew himſelf in* Print *without a* Preface; *I ſhall e'en Content my Self to play the Fool too, in ſo* Much, *and in ſo* Good *Company*, (General Dedications *being no Other, than* Faſhionable Fopperies.) *For what can be more* Ridiculous *than for a Man to Treat* Princes, *and* Tinkers; Coxcombs, *and* Philoſophers; *Men of* Honour, *and* Raſcals; *promiſcuouſly*, all in a Stile?

Now as it is no Eaſie Matter to give a Good Reaſon *for* Writing at all; *ſo it is yet more Difficult to give* That Reaſon *in an* Epiſtle; *which, at beſt, ſtands in need of* another very good Reaſon, *for* its own ſupport. *But* Prefaces, *at the Ordinary rate of* Prefaces, *are wholly* Inexcuſable; *Only an Idle Deal of* Fiddle-Faddle *betwixt the* Writer *and the* Reader, *made* worſe, *by* Care, *and* Peins;

and

and Digeſted, out of Vulgar *and* Pedantique Common-Places, *into one Maſs of* Putid *and* Elaborate Folly. *This Liberty of* Prefacing *againſt* Prefaces, *may ſeem a little* Unreaſonable; *but* Common Scriblers *are allow'd the Priviledges of* Common Strumpets. *One of the Frankeſt* Proſtitutes *that ever I knew ſince I was born, had Theſe Words the oftneſt in her Mouth:* Lord! *(ſays ſhe)* to ſee the Impudence of ſome Women!

To come now to the Reaſons *that induced me to the* Tranſlating *of* This Little Book; *I ſhall* Begin *with the* Excellency *of the* Work it ſelf; *which has ever been Eſteemed, both for the* Method, *and* Matter *of it, as one of the moſt Exact Pieces of the Kind that ever was written, and the moſt* Inſtructive *of* Humane Life. *In ſo much that* Cicero himſelf *valu'd himſelf upon This Tract of* Morals, *as his* Maſter-piece, *and accordingly recommended the Study of it to his Beloved Son, under* That *Illuſtrious Character.* Secondly, *as it was Compoſed in a* Looſe,

and Troublesome Age, *so was it accommodated also to the Circumstances of* Those Times; *for the asserting of the* Force, *and Efficacy of* Virtue *against the utmost* Rigour, *and* Iniquity *of* Fortune. *Upon which Consideration likewise, I have now turn'd it into* English, *with a regard to a* Place, *and* Season, *that extremely* needs *it. I do not speak This, as if at any time it would have been Superfluous; but that* Desperate Diseases *require the most* Powerful Remedies.

To give you the Sum of it in a few Words; It is a Manual of Precepts *for the Government of our selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Human life; and tending, not only to the Comfort of Men in* Society, *but to the Conducting of* Particulars *also, into a State of* Felicity, *and* Virtue. *It is a Lesson that serves us from the very* Cradle, *to the* Grave. *It teaches us what we Ow to* Mankind; *to our* Country; *to our* Parents; *to our* Friends; *to our* Selves; *what we are to do as* Children; *what, as* Men; *what,*

as

as Citizens: *It* ſets, *and it* keeps *us* Right *in all the Duties of* Prudence, Moderation, Reſolution, *and* Juſtice. *It Forms our* Manners; *Purges our* Affections; *enlightens our* Underſtandings; *and leads us, through the* Knowledge, *and the* Love *of* Virtue, *to the* Practice, *and* Habit *of it.*

This Treatiſe of Offices, *I find to be one of the Commoneſt* School-Books *that we have*; *and as it is the* Beſt *of* Books; *ſo it is apply'd to the* Beſt *of* Purpoſes; *that is to ſay, to the Training up of* Youth, *in the* Study *and* Exerciſe *of* Virtue. *The* Foundations *of an* Honourable, *and a* Bleſſed Life, *are laid in the very* Cradle; *and we ſuck in the Tincture of* Generous *or* Perverſe Inclinations, *even with* our Mothers Milk: *Inſomuch that we may date the greater part of our greateſt Miſcarriages, from the* Errors, *and* Infelicities *of our* Firſt Inſtitution, *and* Education. *But tho', upon the whole matter, I do highly approve of the* Uſage *of* This Book *in* Schools, *I muſt confeſs yet, with Submiſſion, that I am*

not at all ſatisfy'd in the ordinary way *of uſing it. For the cutting of it out into* Particles, *here and there a* Chop, *makes it a* Leſſon, *to the Boys, rather of* Syntax, *than* Morality; *beſide the* prejudice *that it ſuffers under the Trivial name of a* School-Book; *and the* diſguſt *which naturally continues with us, even when we are* Men, *for that which we were* whipt *for, when we were* Boys.

Now the Matter *of this Book being ſo* Excellent; *and truly the* Latin *of it hardly* Ciceronian; *it ſhould be our buſ'neſs rather to inculcate the* Doctrine *than the* Stile; *and yet in* ſuch manner *too, that the* One *may be* Attended, *without* Neglecting *the* Other. *And This may be effected to the Common Benefit of the* Scholar, *in* Both Kinds; *by, Firſt* Reading, *and* Expounding *Theſe Offices*, Whole *to him, in* Engliſh, *before he be put to Hack, and Puzzle upon them by* Snaps *in the Original; the* One Facilitating, *and* Preparing *him for the* Other. *Let him be*, Firſt, *and in his* Mother-Tongue,

inſtructed

inſtructed in the Principles *of* Moral Duties; *and he ſhall then with the more* Eaſe, Profit, *and* Delight, *take the ſame Notions down in* Latin, *and Digeſt them. Whereas in beginning with the* Latin, *the* Pupil *has little more to do, than to bring together the* Nominative Caſe *and the* Verb, *without either* Underſtanding, *or* Heeding *the main* Scope, *and* Intent *of the* Book.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the Interruptions *I have met with, in the Courſe of* This Tranſlation; *how it has been only the Work of* Broken Hours; *and I might plead* Theſe Diſtractions *in excuſe of all its* Inequalities, *and* Defects. *But ſuch as it is,* Plain, *and* Simple, *I do here preſent it to the* Publique, *without either* Vanity, *or* Complement: *and, I hope, without giving unto any ſort of* Reader *any Juſt Cauſe of* Complaint. *For* He that does not like it, may let it alone; *and there's no Hurt done.*

TULLY's OFFICES.

The First BOOK.

ALTHOUGH, after Twelve Months ſpent in the School of *Cratippus*, and That at *Athens* too, you cannot (my Son *Marcus*) but be abundantly inſtructed in the Precepts and Inſtitutions of Philoſophy, by reaſon of the Great Authority of the *Maſter*, as well as of the *Place*; the One, for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you ſhall do well, nevertheleſs, to take the ſame Courſe in *Your* ſtudies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle your *Latin* with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Conducing to the Buſ'neſs, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philoſopher*: Beſide, that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In this Particular, I am perſwaded that I have done my Countrey-men no ſmall Service; and that

'Tis a great advantage, Good Inſtitution, *and* Good Example.

Greek *and* Latin, Rhetorick *and* Philoſophy, *do well together.*

that not only thoſe who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themſelves will acknowledge, that I have in ſome ſort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*. Wherefore, as you have the greateſt Philoſopher of this Age for your Maſter, you ſhall alſo Learn of him as long as you pleaſe: and ſo long, certainly, you ought to deſire to learn, as you find your ſelf the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will ſee a great deal in them of the *Peripatetique*, (for I am a Follower of *Socrates*, and of *Plato* both.) As to the Matter it ſelf, you are at liberty to uſe your Own Judgement; but yet the Acquainting of your ſelf with my Stile, will undoubtedly be of ſome Uſe toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in This be thought arrogant neither; For, allowing my ſelf the meaneſt of many *Philoſophers*, I have yet ſome Right, me thinks, after an Age ſpent upon This Study, to value my ſelf upon all the Partsof an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perſpicuity*, and the *Flowers*, and *Ornaments* of *Well-ſpeaking*. Wherefore I muſt Earneſtly recommend unto you the Peruſal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewiſe of my *Philoſophical Diſcourſes*, which are now ſwell'd almoſt to the Bulk of the Other: and that

Cicero half a Peripatetique.

A better Orator, than Philoſopher.

that you will read them with Intention and Care: for tho' there may be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This ſmooth, and temperate Mixture is not to be neglected. Among the *Greeks*, I have not found any Man that has Succeſsfully apply'd himſelf to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unleſs I ſhould reckon *Demetrius Phaleræus* for one: who was indeed a *ſubtle Diſputant*, no very powerful *Orator*; but then ſuch a Vein of Sweetneſs with him, that a Body might imagine *Theophraſtus* had been his Tutor. For my own part I have labour'd in both Theſe Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato* I believe, would have made a *Ready*, and a *Weighty Pleader*, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demoſthenes*, a *Queint*, and a *Polite Philoſopher*, if he would but have treated of, and ſtuck to what he had from *Plato*. And this was the Caſe alſo, of *Ariſtotle*, and *Iſocrates*: they were both of them fond of their Own Way, and ſlighted one another.

None of the Greeks *Excellent in Both Kinds.*

BUT being reſolved to Write ſomewhat to you at preſent, and more, hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon that Subject, which I look upon to be moſt accommodate to your *Age*, and

His Reaſons for the Choice of This Subject.

and best becoming the Authority of a *Parent*. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philosophy, which have been accurately, and copiously handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greatest Latitude, falls under the Head of *Offices*, or *Duties betwixt Man and Man*; whereof we have many *Precepts* and *Traditions* transmitted to us from our Fore-fathers. For there is no Condition of Life, either *Publick*, or *Private*; from *Courts of Justice*, to *Particular Families*; either *Solitary*, or in *Society*; but there is still a place for *Humane Duty*: And it is the *Well*, or *Ill discharging of This Office*, that makes our *Character* in the World, either *Glorious*, or *Shameful*. And this is the Common Theme too of all Philosophers; for who shall dare to Usurp that Sacred Name, that never prescrib'd Rules for the Government of Life? But there are some Doctrines yet, that render these Offices wholly vain and Useless; upon a Mistake concerning the *Ends* of *Good*, and of *Wicked-men*: For whosoever fancies any possibility of separating the *Supreme Good*, from *Virtue*, that Man can never be either a *Friend*, or a *Just*, or a *Generous Person*, upon *That Foundation*. (That is to say, so long as he agrees with himself, and without attending to the

He taxes the Epicureans.

the Dictate of a better Nature.) Can any man be *Brave*, that makes *Pein* the worſt of *Evils?* or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleaſure* the *Soveraign Good?* This is ſo clear, that it is not worth a Diſpute; beſide that I have expreſly diſcours'd upon it in another place. The Patrons of theſe Poſitions muſt contradict themſelves, if they will pretend, in any ſort, to intermeddle in this matter: For there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty erected upon any other Foundation, than This; That *Virtue is Only, or, at leaſt, Chiefly deſirable, for its proper ſelf.* Wherefore the *Stoicks*, *Academicks*, and *Peripateticks* were much in the Right, in This Particular; as the Whimſies of *Ariſto*, *Pyrrho*, and *Herillus*, are long ſince out of Doors: Not but that They had as much Right as Other People, to a Freedom of *Debate*, if they had but left us in a State, or Capacity of *Election*; without Cutting off the very Means of any Correſpondence at all with *Humane Duties*. Therefore at this Time, and in this Queſtion, I ſhall follow the *Stoicks*; not as an *Expoſitor*, but (after my Uſual Cuſtom) I ſhall draw as much Water at their Well as I think fit, and then make u e of it according to my own Diſcretion.

Nothing deſirable for it ſelf but Virtue.

BEING

BEING in this Book to treat of the Offices or Duties of Mankind, it will be proper, in the Firſt place, to define what is intended by the Word *Office*; (a thing omitted by *Panætius*, which I wonder at:) For *all Reaſonable Propoſitions ought to be introduced by a Definition*; for the better underſtanding of the Point in Debate.

All diſputes ſhould begin with a Definition.

OF *Duties*, or *Offices*, there are *Two Kinds*; the *One* reſpects the *Ends of* good *men*; the *Other* conſiſts in certain *Rules*, and *Precepts* to be apply'd to the *Uſe* and *Conduct of Humane Life*. Under the Former, are Theſe Queſtions: *Whether all Offices be perfect or not? Whether one Office be Greater, or leſs than Another?* And *What Offices are found to be of the ſame Sort, and Degree?* But thoſe Offices which are deliver'd to us by Precept, tho' they have a regard alſo to the Life of Good Men, yet it does not ſo much appear; becauſe they ſeem to be rather a Proviſion for the Ordering of Life in *Society*. Theſe are the Offices which we ſhall Diſcourſe of in this Book. There is alſo *another Diviſion* of *Offices*; ſome are call'd *Middle*, and *Imperfect*, others *Perfect*; We may call the *Latter*, a *Right*, (according to the *Greek* word Κατόρθωμα) and the *Other*, a *Common Office*, (Καθῆκον) defining

A Diviſion of Offices.

That

That to be *Perfect* which they call *Right*, and *That* to be a *Middle Office*, *when a Man may give a Reasonable Account for the doing of it.*

IT is Natural to *Deliberate*, before we *Resolve*; and *Panætius* reduces the subject matter of *Deliberation* into *Three General Heads*. The *First* Question is, Whether the thing *deliberated* upon, be *Good*, or *Evil?* Wherein several Men are many times of several Opinions. The *Second* Enquiry or Consult refers to the *Ease*, *Pleasure*, or *Convenitnce* of *Life*; as *Estate*, for the purpose; *Wealth*, or *Power*; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our selves, and our Friends: Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or *not?* And this Question is carry'd by the Appearence of *Profit*. The *Third* Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Case, where the *Honest* and the *Profitable* come in *Competition*. For when *Utility* drives *One way*, and *Virtue* invites us *Another*, there follows a *Distraction of* Mind, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought*. It is a great failing to leave out any thing in a Division; and yet there are Two things omitted in This. For the question is not only, Whether a thing be *Honest*, or *not?* but where there are *Two things Honest*, before us, which is the *Honester?* and

Deliberation according to Panætius, under three Heads.

Cicero *makes five.*

and of *Two Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable?* So that his *three Branches* must be *extended* to *Five*: *First*, the *Concurrence* of *Two Good things*; *Secondly*, that of *Two Profitables*; and *Lastly*, *Both* of them in *Comparison*. Of which in Order.

Self-love is Natural.

ALL Living Creatures are Originally mov'd by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of *Self-preservation*: As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies*; the *Avoidance* of things *hurtful* to them; the *search*, and *provision* of all *Necessaries* for Life; as *Food*, *Shelter*, and the like. It is likewise Common to them All, the Appetite of Propagating and Continuing their *Kind*; with a certain Care, and Tenderness for their *Issue*. Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently this Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *sense*, and to That only which is *present*; with little or no regard to what is either *past*, or to *come*: whereas the *Other*, by the Benefit of *Reason*, sees the *Consequences* of Things; their *Rise*, and their *Progress*; and couples together, *Causes* and *Effects*; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions* and *Events*; tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*, and so taking in his whole Life at a View, he prepares all things for the Use, and Comfort of it.

The Difference betwixt Instinct *and* Reason.

It

It is by force of the same *Reason*, that *Nature* makes one Man a *Friend* to another; that she moves us to the Love of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Affection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us the *Necessity*, of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for Food, and Clothing; and not for our selves alone, but for our Wives, our Children, our Friends, and for all those that are under our Protection. This Impression raises great Thoughts in us; and fits us for Action: but there is nothing so *Appropriate*, and *Peculiar* to *Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Faculty* of Tracing out the Truth. Insomuch, that we are no sooner at Liberty from Common *Cares* and *Business*, but our Heads are presently at work upon something to be either *seen*, or *heard*, or *understood*: accounting upon the knowledge of things *wonderful*, and *hidden*, as a *necessary Ingredient* into a *Happy*, and a *Virtuous Life*. From whence may be drawn this Conclusion, That *Whatsoever is* True, Simple, *and* Sincere, *is most congruous to the Nature of Man*. This love of *Truth* is accompany'd with a desire of *Rule*; so that a *Generous and Well qualified Mind*, will never be brought into *Subjection*, unless either for *Learning*, or *Instruction* sake; or in Submission

The Seeds of Justice.

Liberality.

Prudence.

Magnanimity.

Submiſſion to a *Juſt*, and *Lawful Governour*, for the *Common Good*. This Elevation begets a Contempt of Fortune, and a Dignity of Spirit. And it is no ſmall matter neither, the power of Reaſonable Nature even in this reſpect: that *Man alone* underſtands *Order*; the Bounds of *Decency* in *Words*, and *Actions*, and the Terms of *Moderation*: That *only Man* is affected with the *Beauty*, the *Gracefulneſs*, and the *Symmetry* of *Viſible Objects*. Now if *Nature*, and *Reaſon*, take ſuch Care to convey the *Images*, even of *Senſible Things*, from the *Eye* to the *Mind*; how much a greater Value muſt ſhe ſet upon the *Grace*, and *Conſtancy* of our *Manners*; and the keeping ſuch a guard upon all our *Words*, and *Deeds*, that no *Unmanly* thing, not a *looſe Syllable*, or *Thought* eſcape us? This is the Compoſition of that *Honeſty* we look for, which is never the leſs Venerable, for being little Eſteem'd: For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole Earth cannot yet hinder it from being praiſeworthy in its own Nature. Oh! my Son, *Marcus*, we may faſhion to our ſelves ſome faint *Idea* of *Virtue* or *Wiſdom*; but if it could be preſented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Luſtre*, how ſhould we be *tranſported* (ſays *Plato*) with the Love of it?

Modeſty and Temperance.

THERE

THERE is not any Virtue whatsoever but arises from *One*, or *Other*, of *these four Heads*; and consists either, First, in the *search*, and *perception* of the *Truth*, or, Secondly, in the Conservation of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*, and *keeping faith* in all *Promises*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatness*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly, in the *Order* and *Measure* of all our *Words* and *Actions*; according to the Rules of *Modesty*, and *Temperance*.

The Four Cardinal Vertues, and the subject matter of each.

NOW though these *four Virtues* may be *Complicate*, and *Linkt* together, there are yet certain *distinct Duties*, that issue severally from each of them: As the Scrutiny and Bolting out of a *Truth*; from *Prudence*, which is a *Faculty* particularly appertaining to *That Virtue*: For he that makes the best judgment of the *Truth* of Things; he that most readily finds the *way* to't; and gives the best account of the *Reason* of it, we conclude him, without all dispute to be the wisest Man. So that effectually, the proper *Subject* of This Virtue, is *Truth*: But the Business of the *Other three Virtues*, is, To procure and maintain *Necessaries*, for the Commodity of *Life*; the upholding

Distinct Duties in a Complication of Virtue.

Prudence searches the Truth of Things.

Justice shews it self in Society.

Fortitude in the Contempt of difficulties.

holding of *Communities*, and *Society*; and to ſhew the Dignity of the *Mind*, as well in the *Communicating* of our *Fortunes*, as in the *Acquiring of them*; and more yet (if there ſhall be occaſion) in the *deſpiſing* of them. But *Order*, *Conſtancy*, *Moderation*, and the like, require ſomething of *Action*, in concurrence with the Operations of the *Mind*: And he that would acquit himſelf in the Courſe of his Life, with *Reputation* and a good *Grace*, muſt obſerve *Order*, and *Meaſure*.

Temperance in Order and Meaſure. A decorum in the Congruity of all.

Prudence is a Natural Virtue.

OF theſe *Four Parts*, into which we have divided the *Nature*, and the *Power* of *Virtue*; that which concerns the diſquiſition of *Truth* holds moſt affinity with the *Soul* of *Man*. We are all of us, both *drawn*, and *led*, to a deſire of *Knowledge*; and every man values himſelf upon being *wiſer* than his *Neighbour*; but on the other ſide, to *Fail*, to *Wander*, to be *Ignorant*, and to be *deceived*, we look upon as a wretched, and a reprochful thing.

Have a care of two miſtakes: Credulity, and

IN the purſuit of this moſt Natural Virtue, we muſt take heed of *Two Miſtakes*: *Firſt*, the taking up of Things upon *Truſt*; and flattering our ſelves, that we *know more*, than effectually we *do*. He that would keep clear of this Rock (as every man ſhould endeavour it) muſt

must diligently attend his Business, and allow himself time to consider of it. The *Other* is the bestowing of more *Pains* and *Study* upon things that are *obscure*, *hard*, and *superfluous*, than the Matter is *worth*: whereas by avoiding these Errors, and employing the same application upon profitable Knowledge, and the study of Virtue, a Man gains to himself deserved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Astrology*; of *Sextus Pompeius*, for his *Geometry*; and of other persons eminent for *Logique*; and *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exercised in the Investigation of *Truth*; and yet for a man to divert himself, by these Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Business*, is against the *Nature* of *Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of Virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals, for we must Work, and Rest, by Turns. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but still in a Constant Agitation of *Thought*, even when the *Body* is most at *Repose*: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and advising upon things *Honest*, and tending to a *good* and *happy life*; or upon the Acquiring of *Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*. And so much for *Prudence*, which is the *first Fountain* of *Virtue*. *Curiosity.*

OF

Juſtice and Liberality.

OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find That to be of the largeſt extent, which directs the Ordering of Men in *Society*: and in a kind of *Community* of Life. Of This, there are *Two parts*; *Juſtice* which is the more *Glorious Virtue*; and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good Men*; and *Beneficence*, which we may otherwiſe call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*. The firſt Duty of *Juſtice* is *This*; *That we hurt no man*, unleſs provoked to it by an *Injury*, and in our Own *Defence*. We are then to *diſtinguiſh* betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular*; and to uſe them accordingly: Not that any thing is *Private* in its *Own Nature*; but as it becomes ſo, either by *Ancient poſſeſſion*, as *appropriated* by the *firſt Occupant*, or by *Conqueſt* upon the right of *Arms*; or elſe by *Law*, *Agreement*, *Condition*, or *Lot*. From hence comes the Field *Arpinas*, to be called *Arpinatium*, and *Tuſculanum*, to be called the Field of the *Tuſculanes*; and in like manner is it of *Private Poſſeſſions*. Now ſince *Cuſtom* and *Uſage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common*; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot*; and be reputed an Enemy to the *Publique*, if he attempt any thing *beyond* it. But becauſe (as *Plato* ſays ſingularly

The duties of Juſtice.

The bounds of it by the Civil Law.

larly well) *we are not born for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends:* and with the *Stoiques*, that the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were Created for the Use of *Man*; and *Man* only for *Mans sake* begotten; that one might be helpful to another: What can we do better than to *follow*, where *Nature* is our *Guide?* To lay *Common Benefits* in *Common*; and by an *Intercourse* of *Good Offices*, as *Giving*; and *Receiving*; by *Arts*, *Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind* into One *Society*.

THE Foundation of *Justice*, is *Faith*; That is to say, a *Firmness*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promises*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are great *Etymologists*, will have *Fides* to be as much as *Fiat*. And that it is therefore called *Faith*, *quia fit quod dictum est*; because that which is said, is done. This may seem to be far fetch'd; but however we have taken the Freedom to apply it.

A forced Etymology of Fides.

THERE are Two sorts of *Injustice*: *One* is the *Immediate* doing of an *Injury*; and the *Other* is, the *not protecting*, or *defending* the *Injur'd person*; for so much as in us lies. For he that *Injuriously* offers Violence to any man, either in his *Rage*,

Two sorts of Injustice.

The injurious Aggressor.

or any other Paſſion whatſoever, may be taken to be in ſome degree, conſtructively, *a Murtherer*; and he that does not his beſt, to *ſave* his Neighbour from *harm*, and to keep off the *Blow*, is as well to blame (tho' not ſo much) as the Deſerter of his *Parents*, his *Friends*, his *Country*, or his *Companions*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpoſe* to *hurt* us, which ariſe yet from Fear; as when he that watches to do another man miſchief, does it upon prevention, for fear the Other ſhould hurt him. But the greater Part of Injuries are done with a deſign to compaſs ſomething we have a mind to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great ſhare. As to the Matter of *Riches*, they are deſir'd, partly for our *Neceſſities*, and partly for our *Pleaſures*. The deſire of *Money* in *great Minds*, is to make an *Intereſt* by it: and to get into our Power, the means of obliging. It was the ſaying of *Craſſus*, that *He that would be Uppermoſt in a Common-wealth, could never have money enough, till he Was able to maintain an Army at his own Charge*. There is a *pleaſure* alſo, in a *Splendid*, and *Magnificent Appearance*; *Rich Furniture*; and Men take delight to live in *Reputation*, *Glory*, and *Plenty*; which begets an Inſatiable Thirſt of *Money* to *maintain* it. And yet we are not for-

And the Deſerter.

An injury out of fear.

Avarice.

Magnificence.

Ambition.

Luxury.

forbidden to *advance*, or *encreaſe* our *Fortunes*; provided it be done without *wrong* to *Another*; and by *Fair means*. But men are apt to forget the *Rules*, and *Meaſures* of *Juſtice*, when they come once to be tranſported with the deſire of *Empire*, *High Places*, and *Titles*. It goes a great way, that ſaying of *Ennius*. *There is no Faith, or Fellowſhip in Empire.* 'Tis a hard matter to preſerve *Friendſhip*, and *Agreement*, in a Caſe where there are *many Competitors*, and but *one* can *ſucceed*: which manifeſtly appeared in that Tempeſt which *C. Caſar* lately brought upon the Government: who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all Laws Divine, and Humane, for the compaſſing of that Power which he vainly propounded to get wholly to himſelf. And great pity it is, that this inordinate deſire of *Honor*, *Dominion*, *Power*, and *Glory*, does for the moſt part infeſt the moſt Famous Wits, and the largeſt Minds: ſo that an Error in this Caſe, is the more to be avoided.

Difference of Injuries.

NOW in all *Injuries*, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the *Sudden*, and in *Hot Bloud* (which is Commonly but Short, and Tranſient) and that which is done upon *fore thought*, and *Council*, for thoſe in a *heat*, are

much lighter than those upon *preparation*, and this shall suffice of *Injuries offer'd*, or *done*.

Injuries of Omission; and the Causes of them. Expence. Fear. Sloth. Bus'ness.

NOW why do we not *Protect* and *Defend* the *Oppressed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be several Reasons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge*, or *Trouble*: we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent*, *lazy*, *sluggish*, taken up with *particular Studies*: or hinder'd by *Bus'ness*, and This makes us leave those expos'd to Ruine, whom it is our Duty to preserve. Wherefore we must take heed, not to rest upon that which *Plato* observes of the *Philosophers*: as if the *studying* and *endeavouring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *despising* of the things that most Men vehemently *desire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them presently to the Character of *Honest Men*: Not considering, that while they are so *just* on the *One side*, as to *wrong no Body*, *themselves*: they are yet so *unjust*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other people* to *do* it: And so rather than quit their *studies*, they forsake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore (says he) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it self, if they were not compell'd by Force: A thing which ought rather to be done,

by

by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never so *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are some, that either for *saving* of their *Own stake*, or out of an *Averseness* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Bus'ness*; *I meddle with no Body*: And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmless people*. These Men, while they *shun one Injustice*, they fall into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labor*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publique*, is a *Deserter* of the *Community*. Now these *Two sorts* of *Injuries* being laid down, together with the *Causes* of them; and having stated beforehand the *Bounds* of *Justice*, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every *Person*, and *Occasion*, its *proper Duty*, if we be not over-partial to our selves: but in another bodies Case, it is quite Another matter: Although *Terence*'s *Chremes* will have every *Individual* to be concern'd in the *Common Interest* of *Mankind*: But yet being more sensible, and quicker sighted in our Own Concerns, than for the Good, or Evil that befals others; (which we look upon as more Remote) we pass upon the One, and the Other, (tho' in the very same Case) a quite Different Judgment. It is good advice therefore, to forbear

Do nothing with doubting.

coming to a *Reſolution*, where we *doubt* whether the thing be *good* or *bad*. For the *Right* is as Clear as the *Sun*; but a *wavering* implies the *deliberation* of an *Injuſtice*.

Faith is not always to be kept.

BUT it often falls out, that the ſame thing which at *one time* would become a Man of *Honor*, and *Juſtice*, would at *another time* not only vary, but prove the Clear *Contrary*. As the delivering up of a *Truſt* to a *Mad man*; or keeping *promiſe* with him: nay in matters of *Faith*, and *Truth*, it is *juſt*, in ſome Caſes to *deny*; and in others, not to keep *Touch*; for all muſt refer to thoſe Fundamentals of *Juſtice* already propounded. As *Firſt*, to *wrong* no Man; and *ſecondly*, in all Caſes to conſult the *Common Good*. So that the *Duty* is not always the *ſame*; but changes with the Occaſion. Suppoſe ſuch a Promiſe or Contract paſt, as if it were performed, would manifeſtly tend to the damage, either of the Party promiſing, or of the perſon to whom the Promiſe was paſſed to have it perform'd. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his Promiſe to *Theſeus*, his Son *Hippolytus* had been ſav'd. The Story goes, that of *Three wiſhes*, the *Laſt* was in his *Paſſion* the *deſtruction* of *Hippolytus*: and the *Grant* of that requeſt, caſt

The Duty changes with the Occaſion.

caſt him into Inconſolable Sorrows. So that neither are we to *keep* thoſe *Promiſes* that are *unprofitable* to the *Promiſed*: or *more hurtful* to the *Promiſer*, than *advantageous*, to the *Other*. Of *Two Evils*, we are to chuſe the *Leſs*: As if I promiſe to plead any man's Cauſe, and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerouſly Ill; it is no Breach of Faith, or Duty in me, not to appear, but rather the contrary: and it were yet worſe, in him to whom the Promiſe was made, to complain of ſuch a diſappointment. And now in matters where a man is under *Violence*, or over-aw'd by *Fear*, or *outwitted*, and *over-reach'd* by *Fraud*, every body knows that *Thoſe promiſes* are not *Binding*: many of them being diſcharg'd in Form, by the *Prætors* Court: and ſome by the very *Law it ſelf*. *Of Two Evils the Leſs.*

THERE are ſeveral *Injuries*, that are meerly matter of *Cavil*, and only advantages taken; by a *Crafty* and *malitious Interpretation* of the *Law*. From whence comes that ſaying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme wrong*. The Proverb is now worn Thred bare. Of this Sort, there have been many Practices, even upon a Publique Score: One agreed upon a *Truce* with the Enemy for 30 *days*, and afterward made Incurſions upon him, *Injuries of Fraud and Cavil.*

and deſtroyed his Country by *night*: becauſe the Ceſſation was for *days*, not *nights*. Neither can I juſtifie our Countryman, if it be true: *Q. Fabius Labeo*, or ſome body elſe (for I have it only upon *Hearſay*) was by the Senate Conſtituted *Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries* of *Nola* and *Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the Commiſſioners apart, and adviſed them in private, not to do any thing greedily, or to preſs too much; but rather to abate of their Pretenſions, than to demand more: and prevailed ſo far upon them, that there was a good ſpace of ground left betwixt them; ſo that when they had marked out their Bounds, according to agreement, that which was left in the middle, was adjudg'd to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* than a *Judgment*; and this Indirect, and Crafty way of Impoſing, ſhould be avoided in all Caſes. There are certain *Duties* to be obſerv'd alſo, even to thoſe that do us the greateſt *wrong*; for there muſt be a *Mean* in the very *Puniſhment*, and *Revenge* and I do not know, whether it may be ſufficient, for the *Aggreſſor* barely to *Repent* of his Injury, without ſome *Penalty* over and above: both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example* of *Others*.

THE

THE Laws of *War*, among all Nations, ſhould be ſtrictly and Punctually obſerv'd. For ſince there are but *Two ways* of *Contending*, *One*, by *Diſpute*, the *Other*, by *Force*; the *One*, *Humane*, and the *Other Brutal*: we muſt of neceſſity have recourſe to the *Latter*, where the *former* will not take place. Wherefore the end of *War* is to ſecure our ſelves from *Violence*, in a ſtate of *Peace*: and in caſe of *Victory*, we ſhould preſerve thoſe that behaved themſelves with *Honor*, and *Generoſity* in the *Action* of the *War*: As our Anceſtors receiv'd into the very *Privileges* of the *City*, the *Tuſculans*, the *Æqui*, the *Volſci*, the *Sabines*, the *Hernici*: but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they wholly *ras'd*. I could wiſh they had ſpar'd *Corinth*: but they had a reſpect, I ſuppoſe, to the ſtrength, and ſituation of the Place, and ſo deſtroy'd it: that for the future it might not, ſometime or other, prove an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion, *Peace* ſhould be always conſulted, where it may be had without *Treachery*: and if my advice had been hearkned to in this matter, we might yet at this day, have had *ſome* ſort of a *Republique*, though not the Beſt; whereas now we have juſt none at all. We ſhould provide likewiſe; not only

The Rules of War.

The End of War.

The Roman Generoſity to their Enemies.

for thoſe that are *Overcome* in the *Field*, but for thoſe alſo that threw down their Arms, and caſt themſelves upon the Faith of the General. Nay I would have an Enemy receiv'd, even after the *Battery* is begun, and the *Breach* made; In which point, we have been ſo ſcrupulouſly Juſt, that according to the Cuſtom of our Predeceſſors, thoſe that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegeance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of what they took. And the Rights of *War* are ſet forth with exact ſolemnity in the Proviſions of the *Fecial Law*; wherein we are given to underſtand that no *War* can be *Juſt*, and *Warrantable*, unleſs it be grounded upon ſome matter of *Claim*, or *denounced* beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Pompilius* (the General) held a Province: and a Son of *Cato*'s liſted himſelf a Soldier under his Command. *Pompilius*, finding it convenient to diſcharge *one Legion*, *Cato*'s Son, ſerving in *That Legion*, was alſo diſmiſt; but he continuing ſtill in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Pompilius*, *Requeſting him, that if his Son continu'd with him in Arms, he would give him the* Military Oath, over again, *becauſe his former Sacrament being diſſolv'd, he could not otherwiſe juſtifie his putting*

And to thoſe that yielded.

Upon what Terms to undertake a War.

A Conſcientious inſtance.

putting himſelf into the Quarrel. Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the *Conſcience* of *making War!* There is extant, an *Epiſtle* of *Marcus Cato* the *Elder*, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the *Perſian War.* Wherein he tells his Son, that *he heard the Conſul had diſmiſt him; and charges him not to engage in any Combat, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier to fight an Enemy.* It is remarkable, the changing of the word *Perduellis* (a *publique Enemy*) into *Hoſtis*; to ſweeten the Foulneſs of the Thing, by the ſoftneſs of the Term. For *Hoſtis* (with our Forefathers) was as much as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) as appears by the *Twelve Tables. Aut ſtatus dies cum Hoſte.* And then, *Adverſus Hoſtem Æterna Auctoritas.* What can be Gentler, than to Treat an Enemy in this eaſie Language? Although *Cuſtom*, I muſt confeſs, has made it *harſher*, by transferring the ſignification of it, from That of a *Stranger*, to the proper Denomination of one that *bears Arms againſt us.* Nay in the Caſe of a War for *Honor*, or *Dominion*, there muſt yet be the ſame *Cauſes*, and *Grounds* beforementioned, to make it Juſt: but ſtill all Conteſts of This kind muſt give fairer Quarter: for (as in *ordinary differences*) we diſtinguiſh betwixt

betwixt an *Enemy* and a *Rival*, our *Title*, and *Dignity* lies at Stake in the *One Case*; but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the *other*. The War we had with the *Celtiberi*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *Enmity*: and the question was not, who should *Govern*, but who should *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*; and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *cruel*; but the Rest more Honourable. It was a Glorious Declaration, that of *Pyrrhus*, about the discharge of some Prisoners, as we find it in *Ennius*.

A Brave Resolution of Pyrrhus.

Let Mercenaries Truck, *and Treat for Gold*;
Honor's a thing not to be Bought or Sold.
Courage, *and* Steel *must end this Glorious Strife*:
And in the Case of Victory, or Life,
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance of War:
And what Brave man soever she shall spare
With Life; *depend upon't*; *I'll set him* Free:
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods, and Me.

This was a Royal Speech, and Resolution, and well becoming the Bloud of *Æacus*.

BUT

BUT even in the Case of a private promise: and upon what pinch, or necessity soever; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Prisoner in the first *Punique War*, and sent to *Rome* to solicite the exchange of some Prisoners, upon his Oath to return: so soon as ever he came There, he advised the Senate against himself, and that they should not agree to the *Exchange*. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, than to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy. In the *second Punique War*, after the Battel of *Canna*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to *Rome*, under an Oath of returning; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp by *Hannibal*'s permission, but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath: and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was in *Words*, but not in *Effect*: for in all *promises*, the *Intention* is to be consider'd, not the *Letter*. The *Censor*, set a Fine during life, upon all their Heads that were forsworn: and upon His, among the rest, that

Faith must be kept with an Enemy.

A noble example of Regulus.

A glorious piece of Justice.

The Romans a generous Enemy.

that invented this *ſhift*. But the more Generous Inſtance of *Juſtice* to an *Enemy*, was that of our Anceſtors in the Caſe of *Pyrrhus*: There was a Fugitive that made a Propoſal to the Senate, for the Poyſoning and diſpatching of *Pyrrhus*: but the *Senate*, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Maſter: Such was the deteſtation they had for Treachery, that they would not make uſe of it, tho' to the deſtruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And ſo much for *Military Duties*.

Of Juſtice to Inferiors.

WE muſt not forget neither, that toward the meaneſt of men alſo, there is a Juſtice to be obſerv'd; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves: and it is good Counſel, to adviſe the uſing of them as *Hirelings*: and for their *Work*; to allow them their *Reward*. Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man an *Injury*: the *one* is by *Force*, the *other* by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*: but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the Two: and *of all Injuſtices, That is the moſt Abominable, and Capital, which impoſes upon us, under the colour of* Kindneſs *and* Good meaning: and this ſhall ſuffice for *Juſtice*.

TO

TO pursue my purpose, I shall now handle the Point of *Liberality*, or *Bounty*: than which there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many Limitations. It should be our *first* Care to see, that what we *Give*, may not be to the disadvantage of the person we would *oblige*, or of any other body: and that it be not above our *Proportion*. *Secondly*, that it be suited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*, for This is the Foundation of Justice, to which all the Circumstances of it are to be referr'd. He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *damage*, than to his *Benefit*, is so far from deserving the Reputation of being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the most pernicious of Flatterers. And Those also that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the same Injustice, with them, that take Mony out of their Neighbors Pockets, to put into their Own. There are may people that look big, and set up for men of Honor, that yet have this humor of *taking* from *one*, and *giving* to *another*; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a Friend, upon what Terms soever. But This is so far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*. Let us therefore so

Of Liberality.

How to give, How much, and to Whom.

Whom to Oblige.

so govern our Favors, that we may oblige those we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Cæsar*, the Translation of so many Estates from the right Owners, into the possession of Strangers? There can be no *Liberality* in a Case of *Injustice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our Bounty within *Compass*: and not to *give* beyond our *Ability*: for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those Bounties to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humor of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no Scruple of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or Injury, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken Bounty. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful*; and This, only upon a Score of Vanity, without any Frankness of Heart; which is rather a flash of *Ostentation*, than an act of *Generosity*, and *Virtue*. The *third Caution* is, the making Choice of a worthy Person: wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition towards us; our entercourse with him in a Community, and Society of Life, and the good

Give in Proportion.

Consider the intent of the Giver.

The Choice of the Person.

good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these: but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight.

HOWBEIT, since we do not live with Men absolutely *Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom*; but with those that acquit themselves very well, if they can but arrive at some faint resemblances of Virtue: let This be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign or Glimmering of Goodness. But still we are to set the greatest Value upon him, that we find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*; is commonly more *forward*, and *eager*, perhaps, than is *Convenient*. The *Other* are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for our *Manners*.

There is no Stoical Perfection.

Whom to value most.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any Man bears us: it is, *First*, our Duty to do *much Good*, where we are *much Belov'd*: but then we are not to express that

How to return Benefits.

that Affection, in a Childiſh Ardor, and Fondneſs of Paſſion: but in a Conſtancy, and Firmneſs of Mind.

Benefits to be repaid with intereſt.

IN the Caſe of an *Antecedent Merit*, where we are not now to *Enter* into an *Obligation*, but to *Acknowledge*, and *Requite* it: there muſt be a more than Ordinary Care taken. For *Gratitude is the moſt Indiſpenſable of all Duties.* If *Heſiod* bids us, *Reſtore what we borrow; if we can, in a Larger Meaſure:* what ought we to do in the Caſe of a *Prior Obligation?* Are we not to imitate Fruitful Lands, that ſtill Return more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige thoſe that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How ſhould we behave our ſelves then, toward ſuch as we are the Better for already? Since ſo it is, that there are *two ſorts* of *Liberality*, the *One*, of *Beſtowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it: it is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: But an Honeſt Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it: provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to diſtinguiſh alſo betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*: and the *Greater* the *Benefit*, the *Greater* is the *Obligation*. Now the *Obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the

the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without either *Judgment*, or *Measure*. They Squander away their Donatives, indifferently upon all; carry'd on by suddain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with Steadiness, and Consideration. As to the Placing of our Bounties, and Returning of Acknowledgments, (supposing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *First*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

Rash Bounties.

Whom to Requite first.

FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*: and to give *most* to those that are *our nearest Friends*. But for those principles of Nature, which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it: which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Disputing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another,

Reason and Speech are the Bond of Humane Society.

another, and cement the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are farther remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*, but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them: and the business is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of *one* Man with *another*, and of *All*, with *All*: This *Society*, (I say) *General*, and *Particular*, is of a large extent: and herein there must be a Community preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men: provided always, that such things as are limited by Laws, and Civil Ordinances, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest; they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,
Is but to light One Candle with Another:
I've ne'er the less, for what I Give—

FROM this one Case we may learn, that

that whatsoever we may part with to another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of this sort, we reckon many things to be in *Common*; as *Water from a River*, *Fire from Fire*, *Good Counsel to a Man that is in doubt, or distress.* All these things are profitable to the *Receiver*, without any loss, or burthen to the *Giver*. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the Common good. But in regard that particular persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost infinite; Common Liberality must have a respect to that End of *Ennius*. We must keep wherewithal to give Light to our selves, that we may have the Means of being bountiful to our own. *Benefits in Common.*

TO descend now from *Humane Society* in the *Latitude*, of which there are many degrees; there is a nearer Bond yet, betwixt people of the same *Province*, the same *Nation*, and the same *Language*: And it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same *City*: For among Citizens, there are many things in Common: As Courts of Justice, Temples, Walks, Ways, Lanes, Customs, *Degrees of Communities.* *Common Privileges.*

ſtoms, Judgments, Suffrages; beſide frequent Meetings, and Familiarities, Common Bus'neſs, Commerce, and Contract. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and That is the Society of Kindred, which is Contracted into a narrow place, apart from the vaſt Society of Mankind. It is by Nature, Common to all living Creatures, the appetite of producing the Kind: And the Firſt Society is in Wedlock, the next, in Children; it comes then to a Family, and a Community of all things. And this is the Original of a City, and as it were the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Relation of Brothers comes next; and after That, of Brothers, and Siſters Children; who, when they are too many for one Houſe, are tranſplanted into Others, as into Colonies. And then follow Matches, and Alliances, with increaſe of Kindred; and their Off-ſpring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but Relation of Bloud, and the Kindneſs that ariſes from it, muſt neceſſarily endear Men to one another. For it is a great matter to have the ſame Pedigree: to exerciſe the ſame Religion, and to depoſite their Aſhes in Common Sepulchres: But of all Aſſociations, there is none ſo Firm, none ſo Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correſpon-

Marriage, Children, Families.

Kindred.

Friendſhip.

Coreſpondency of Manners; and a Freedom of Converſation. For ſuch is the Charm of That Honeſty which we have often ſpoken of, that the very Encounter of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Poſſeſſor of it, where ever we find it. Now tho' all Virtue whatſoever, is of it ſelf, Amiable, and Attractive; inſomuch that we cannot but have an Eſteem for thoſe that we find poſſeſs'd of it; yet *Juſtice* and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity*, and *Agreement* of *Good Manners*. For where there are the ſame Inclinations, the ſame Deſires, and the ſame Will, the one cannot chuſe but be delighted with the other, as with its proper ſelf: and it effects that which *Pythagoras* requires in Friendſhip: the making *one*, of *many*: And it is a great Obligation that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that paſs Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being mutual, and grateful; muſt needs, upon the *Entercourſe*, produce firm and extraordinary Friendſhip. But when you ſhall have lookt over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reaſon can carry you: you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, than that by

Similitude of manners.

Exchange of Benefits.

by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents*, *Children*, *Kindred*, *Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our ſingle Country* is more than *all the Reſt*: and every honeſt man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that ſacred Intereſt. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of thoſe people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all ſorts of Villany: and who not only have been, but are at this inſtant, conſpiring the deſtruction of it, by a final deſolation? But if there ſhould be any diſpute or Compariſon, where to pay our duty, in the firſt place, our *Country* and our *Parents* are the *Principals*; to whoſe Benefits we are the moſt *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and our *Families* are next: as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *Theſe*, our *Friends* and *Relations*: which are commonly of our own Rank, and Condition. Wherefore we owe the neceſſary helps of Life to theſe before-mentioned: But for Converſation, Table-Society, Counſels, Exhortations, Conſolations, and (upon Occaſion) Reproofs: Theſe things are found moſt amongſt Friends: and let me tell you over again: *The pleaſanteſt Friendſhip is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.*

Our Duty to our Country.

Our Kindred and Friends.

NOW

NOW in the Exercise of all these Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what without our help, he cannot attain: and in some cases there is a respect to be had to *Times*, and *Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are some Offices that we should rather pay to *one* than to *another*: as I would sooner help a *Neighbour* in with his *Harvest*, than either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*: but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman* or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these Circumstances, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By Custom, and Exercise, we shall become good Accountants: For it is by *Adding* and *Subtracting*, that we come to know *what Remains*: and consequently, in all Cases, the Bounds, and Limits of our Duty: But as neither Physicians, nor Commanders; nor Orators, tho' never so well instructed in the Rules of their Profession, shall ever be able, without Use, and Practice, to make themselves Eminently famous: to the same end, are the Precepts of Humane Duties deliver'd us; that we should put them in exercise: but yet the difficulty, and condition of the thing does over and above require it.

Duties vary with Circumstances.

Now in what manner that Virtue is deriv'd, and whence that Duty arises, which falls under the Consideration of *Sociable Rights*, and *Common Justice*; we have almost said enough already.

Magnanimity.

IN the propounding of *Four General Heads*, from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow; That which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind; a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things: that Virtue, I say, ought to be reputed the most Glorious: and therefore that Reproach of *Ennius*'s is always at hand upon Occasion:

Young Men, *in* shew, *but* Wenches, *in your* Hearts:
While Clælia *plays the* Brave, *and acts your Parts.*
You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor Blood, &c.

And on the other side, with what Transport and Rapture do we extoll the humor of Brave and Generous Actions? From hence comes that Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon*, *Salamis*, *Platea*, *Thermopilæ*, *Leuctra*, *Stratocles*; and from hence it is, that our *Cocles*, the *Decii*, the two *Scipio*'s, *Marcellus*, and a world of others, especially the

the *Romans* themſelves, are grown ſo famous, for the greatneſs of their Minds. And their ambition of Military honor, may appear in This, that almoſt all the Statues they have left us, are dreſs'd up in Armor.

AND yet that Elevation of Courage which is ſeen in Hazzards, and Adventures, unleſs accompanied with Juſtice, and contending rather for the Publique, than for it ſelf: That Courage (I ſay) is ſo far from being a virtue, that it is a Fault, and a brutal Ferity, inconſiſtent with the Tenderneſs of humane nature. Wherefore the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling *Courage*, *a Virtue contending for Equity*. Nor did any man ever gain the Reputation of *True Valour*, by *Treachery* or *Malice*. Nothing can be *Honeſt*, but what is Juſt: and therefore it was notably ſaid of *Plato*. *As that knowledge* (ſays he) *which is divided from* Juſtice, *is rather* Craft, *than* Wiſdom; *ſo That* Courage, *which is* Bold, *and* Adventurous, *is rather* Temerity, *and* Foolhardineſs, *than* Valor; *if it be carryed on by* Paſſion, *or* Intereſt, *rather than for a* Common Good. Wherefore all Men of Valor, and great Undertakings, ſhould be likewiſe Men of Goodneſs, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of *Truth*: *Courage defined.*

which are all Inſeparable from Juſtice. But the Miſchief is, that this Tumor and Elation of Mind: breaks out many times into a *Pertinacy*, and an ambitious deſire of *Rule*. For as *Plato* has it, the *Lacedemonians*, were Naturally inflam'd with an Ardent deſire of Overcoming. So that whoſoever has the greateſt Soul, is the moſt addicted to aſpiring Thoughts: And to ſet himſelf above all; or in Truth rather to ſtand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a man to obſerve the Tenor of *True Equity* (which peculiarly belongs to Juſtice) in the Inordinate Appetite of *Superiority*, and *Dominion*. From whence it comes to paſs, that ſuch men will not be govern'd, either by *Reaſon*, or any *Publique*, and *Lawful Conſtitution*. This humor ſtarts Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes: whoſe buſineſs it is, rather to make themſelves Greater, by *Violence*, than to keep themſelves in a Station of *Equality* by *Juſtice*. But the harder any thing is, the fairer it is: nor is there any Time, or Seaſon, that can diſpenſe a man from Juſtice. Wherefore Thoſe are Truly *Brave*, and *Magnanimous*, that *keep off* an *Injury*, not Thoſe that *offer* it. He that is truly *Wiſe*, and *Stout*, places That Virtue

Pertinacy and Ambition.

Virtue which is most consonant to Nature, in *Action*, and not in *Glory*: and in *making* himself more Considerable than other men, rather than *appearing* so. No man can be said to be truly *Heroique*, that depends, for his Reputation, upon the Opinion of the Multitude. But every man the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honor, the more easily is he transported to do Unjust things. He stands upon a slippery place: For where is the Man, who after all his hazzards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures?

True Magnanimity.

YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *Courage*, chiefly by these *two Marques*. First, he despises *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is Becoming and Honest; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The *Other* is a disposition of Mind (as is said before) that spurs a man to attempt things *Great* and *Profitable*; but *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self, as in other Conveniencies that belong to't. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me say, the *Profit* also) of These two Things rests in the *Latter*: but the

Cauſe, and the *Motive* is in the *Former*: For there is the Riſe, and Spring of great Reſolves, that carry men even above the Conſideration of any thing that is below. The thing it ſelf is ſeen in *Two particulars*: *Firſt* in Judging That onely to be *Good* which is *Honeſt*; and, *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it muſt be confeſt to be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Thoſe, as Little Things, which, many Account to be Great, and Glorious; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a firm, and ſetled Judgment. It is likewiſe the part of a Conſtant, and Invincible Mind, ſo to bear all ſorts of Calamity, and Affliction, as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to deſcend below the Dignities of a Wiſe man. How incongruous is it for a man that ſtands the ſhock of *Danger*, to be broken with *Luſt*? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labor*; and then to be overcome with *Pleaſure*? This muſt therefore be avoided; and ſo muſt the greedy deſire of *Mony*. There is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and Wretched Mind, than to dote upon *Pelf*: Nothing more humane, and honourable, than to deſpiſe it, if we have it not; and to employ it generouſly, and do good with

Contempt of Mony.

with it, if we have it. And so for the Affectation of *Glory*: We must beware of it (as is said already) for it bars a man of his *Liberty*, which a Brave Man will rather dye, than part with. We should not be solicitous neither for *Power*; which in some Cases, we should not receive, and in others, we should lay down. We must deliver our selves from all disorders of mind; either by *Fear* or *Appetite*: and likewise from all *Sowrness*, and *Transport*, either of *delight*, or of *Wrath*: that we may be Calm, and secure: In which State, we shall find both Steadiness, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repose, have wholly withdrawn themselves from Publique Business: Among these, the noblest, and most eminent of Philosophers; and men truly, of great Severity, and Weight; who could neither endure the People, nor Government: and so retired into Desarts, and Retreats, to live privately with Themselves. And these men, in this Recess had the same Design with Princes (whose privilege is to live as they list) that they might want nothing, but enjoy their Freedom, without Controll. Wherefore, since both Those that affect Power, and the other Idle people that I speak of, aim at the

Affectation of Glory.

A Retired Life.

ſame thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One thinks they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little: They may be Both, (for ought I know) in ſome meaſure, in the Right. But it muſt yet be allowed, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Eaſier and Safer: And leſs Importune, and Troubleſome to Others. But the life of Thoſe that apply themſelves to Publique buſineſs, is more profitable to Mankind: and more conducing to the Acquiſition of Honor, and Reputation in the World Wherefore there is ſomething to be ſaid for thoſe Excellent Wits that dedicate themſelves to Letters; without medling in Publique affairs: and alſo for ſuch Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps ſome more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations, being well ſatisfi'd, that others ſhould enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for thoſe that have none of this Pretence, to talk of deſpiſing Government, and Offices, which moſt people have in great eſtimation; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I diſallow of their Judgment, in the little Conſideration

tion they ſeem to have for Glory; but becauſe they are manifeſtly afraid of the Labors, Troubles, Repulſes, and Diſpleaſures that they are to encounter. For there are many that behave themſelves *Unequally* in *Contrary Caſes*: Severe Contemners of *Pleaſure*, but they ſink under *Pain*; Regardleſs of *Fame*, but dejected with *Scandal*. Nor are they Steady, even in theſe very caſes: But for thoſe that are by nature, fitted and qualified for civil buſineſs; I ſhould adviſe Theſe people to apply themſelves to it without delay: and to take ſome Commiſſion in the Government. For this is Neceſſary, both as to Publique Adminiſtration; and to ſhew the Greatneſs of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philoſophers themſelves, (if not more) ſhould be affected with a general diſdain of External things, (as I have often ſaid) and ſtated in an Immoveable Tranquillity, and ſecurity of Mind; which will deliver them from all Anxiety for things to come; and eſtabliſh them in a life of Conſtancy, and Honor. Now this Point is by ſo much eaſier, for a Philoſopher to gain, by how much his Life is leſs expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune: For there are not many things that he ſtands in need of: beſide, that in caſe of any diſaſter, his

Fall is not ſo dangerous. It is but reaſonable therefore to conclude, that Men in Great and Publique places, are expoſed to greater perturbations of Thought, than thoſe that live in privacy and Repoſe. So that a greater Stock of courage is there neceſſary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and care. But for him that puts himſelf into *Buſineſs*; let him firſt conſider the *Honeſty* of the Employment; and then, his Own *Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither, raſhly deſpair, out of heartleſneſs, and ſloth: nor be over-confident neither, in the Opinion of himſelf. But in all matters of Buſineſs, a man ſhould diligently prepare himſelf before he goes about it.

A Compariſon of Military Virtues with Civil.

BUT ſince moſt Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Conſideration than *Civil*, This Opinion ſhould be a little qualifi'd; For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themſelves to that courſe of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and this happens moſt frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Eſpecially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Diſpoſition* carries them to the Profeſſion of *Arms*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the

the *Senate*, than in the *Field*: for although *Themiſtocles* be worthy of all honour, and his Name, and Memory more Illuſtrious than that of *Solon*, *Salamis* being ſtill mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is ſtill preferr'd before the Counſel of *Solon*, for the Inſtitution of the *Areopagites*. This muſt not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once*, deliver, preſerve, and help the City; but the *Other* will *ever* do it. This Council preſerves the Law of *Athens*, and Conſtitutions of their Anceſtors. *Themiſtocles* cannot ſay that ever he help'd *Areopagus*, but the other may truly boaſt of ſerving *Themiſtocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate which manag'd the War: And ſo for *Pauſanias*, and *Lyſander*. It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarg'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws of *Licurgus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Conſideration, their Armies were both *Readier* and *Bolder*. It was my Opinion, even when I was a Boy, that *Marcus Scaurus* was not inferiour to *Cajus Marius*; and when I came afterwards into Publique Buſineſs; I lookt upon *Q. Catulus*, not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what ſignifie *Armies*, *Abroad*, without *Counſel at home?*

home? Neither did *Africanus* (tho' an Excellent *Man*, as well as a great *Captain*) do the Common-wealth a Nobler Service in the Raſing of *Numantia*, than *Pub. Naſica* (a private Man) did at the ſame time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now this Inſtance is not purely *Civil*; but in ſome reſpect *Military*, becauſe it was done by a *Violent hand*: But ſtill it was done by a *Civil Council*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable ſaying of mine, that is ſo often caſt in my Teeth, by a ſort of Malitious, and Envious people,

Let Swordmen *to the* Gown *give place,*
And Crown the Orator *with Bayes.*

To paſs over other Inſtances. Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Common-wealth was under *My Adminiſtration?* Never was there a more malitious Conſpiracy; and yet by the Influence of our Diligence, and Counſel, how quickly was it cruſh'd? Inſomuch, that the very Arms themſelves fell out of the hands of the moſt Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Triumph Comparable to it? This Boaſt, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honor of my Actions, and

and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boaſt, to You, (I ſay) may be allowed me. Nor is it any more than *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden with Military honors) aſcribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (ſays he) *would have been to little purpoſe, if* Cicero, *by preſerving the* Common-wealth, *had not left me a place wherein to* Triumph. So that *Domeſtique*, and *Civil Reſolution*, is not Inferior to *Military*. And it requires more Pain, and Study, to be employ'd upon it. That Virtue without diſpute, which we look for from a High, and Illuſtrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is ſtill to be kept in Exerciſe; and ſo affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counſel and Reaſon, in the diſpatch of Buſineſs, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honeſty* here in queſtion is wholly plac'd in the Care and Conſideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe*, in *Civil Adminiſtration*, bring no leſs advantage to the *Publique*, than Thoſe that bear *Arms*: For War is many times, either not begun, or otherwiſe finiſh'd, by their Advice: Nay, and ſome brought on too: as the *Third Punique War* of *M. Cato* was: where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead.

Wherefore

Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining*, is more desirable than that of *Contending*. Always provided that we steer not our Course rather by an *Aversion* to *War*, than a *Consideration* to *Benefit*. In the Undertaking of a War there should be such a prospect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace*. It is the part of a Valiant and Resolute Man, not to be discomposed in disasters, or to make a bustle, and be put beside himself; but to maintain a presence of mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reason. And this is the Marque and Effect of a great Courage: so is the other, of an Excellent understanding, to forecast in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh beforehand the Good and the Bad; and what's to be done when it happens, without being put to the fooliſh Exclamation of *who would have Thought it?* These are the Works of an Elevated Soul, that supports it self upon Prudence, and Judgment: but he that rashly thrusts himself into Dangers without fear, or wit: and engages an Enemy hand over head: this is only Brutality, and Outrage: But yet when the time comes, and necessity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand, and rather lose his Life, than his Honor and Freedom.

IN

IN the Case of *Rasing* or *Demolishing* of *Cities* there should be great care taken, that nothing be done either *Headily*, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a Great man, in Publique Broyles, to punish the *Guilty*; but still to spare the *Multitude*; and in all conditions, to adhere to that which is Right, and Honest. *Clemency to the Conquer'd.* *Spare the multitude.*

THERE are some that esteem *Feats of Arms* above *Civil Administrations*: (as is aforesaid) and there are Others that think it more estimable, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Crafty*, than in *Quiet* and *Considerate Counsels*. We must never in such manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *faint-hearted*: And we must likewise have a care, on the other side, not to thrust our selves into *Unnecessary hazzards*: which is one of the greatest Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult cases, we should do like Physicians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diseases*: but in cases of *Extremity, a desperate disease must have desperate Cure*. None but a Mad man will wish for a Storm in fair Weather. But it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And the honor is so much the more, *Courage with Discretion.*

more, if the advantage of the ſucceſs be greater than the Miſcarriage.

Danger; Publique and private.

ACTIONS are dangerous, partly to the *Undertakers*, and in part to the *Common-wealth*. Some run the hazzard of their Lives: Some of their Good names; and Others of the Love of the people: Now we ſhould more frankly venture our ſelves, than the Publique: and more chearfully expoſe our ſelves for Honor, and Reputation, than for other Commodities. Some there are that make no ſcruple of hazzarding their Lives, and Fortunes in the defence of their *Country*: and yet are ſo nice and ſcrupulous in the matter of *Reputation*: that rather than run any riſque of their *Honor*, they will leave their very *Country* in danger. As *Callicratidas* the *Lacedemonian General*, in the *Peloponneſian War*; after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at laſt, by not removing the Navy from the *Arginuſæ*, and making his Retreat without giving the *Athenians* Battel, as he was advis'd to do; to which he made This anſwer, that *if the Lacedemonians loſt one Fleet, they might ſet out another; but that if he quitted his Ground, his Honor was loſt for ever.* But the *Lacedemonians* however might have born this Loſs, whereas the

A miſtake in point of Honor.

Other

Other Blow was mortal; when *Cleombrotus*, for fear of an ill Report, unadvisedly engaged with *Epaminondas*, where the whole power of the *Lacedemonians* was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the conduct of *Q. Fabius Maximus*, of whom *Ennius*,

Fabius *was* slow, *but* sure, *and his Delay*
Restor'd the tottering State. Now 'twas his way
To mind his Bus'ness, *not what people* said:
He liv'd a Great *man, but he's Greater* dead.

This is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided also in civil matters. For there are many that dare not speak their Opinions, tho' for the best; for fear of falling under Evil Tongues.

Plato's *advice to Magistrates.*

THERE are two Precepts of *Plato* to be observ'd by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in some sort to assert and defend the Publique Interest, that all their Actions should refer to That, without any regard to their Own advantage. The other is, to attend the service of the whole, in such sort, that while they are serving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Administration of a

a *Government*, as in the case of a *Ward*: The *Commission* has a regard to the benefit of those that are deliver'd up in *Charge*: and not those to whom such a charge, or care is *Committed*. But they that provide for One part of the people, and neglect another, bring into a City the most pernicious things in the World; That is to say, *Discord*, and *Sedition*: and when they are split into parties, some side with the people; others with the Nobility: but none mind the Whole. This wrought great Mischiefs among the *Athenians*: and in *our Republique* not only *Sedition*, but the most pestilent *Civil Wars*. A course not to be endur'd by a Sober, and valiant Patriot; or any man that deserves a place in the Government: For such a man will apply himself wholly to the care of the *Publique*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it: Neither will he bring any man into *Envy*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*, or *Subornation*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die than desert the aforesaid Duties.

The danger of Factions.

AMBITION

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honor is a wretched thing: Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republique*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us farther, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Arms* against the *Common-wealth*; and not such as with *Honesty*; and *Judgment* labour to *defend* it. This was the Controversie betwixt *P. Africanus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness. *Of Ambition.*

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be violently *Angry* with an *Enemy*: For there is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous person, than *Clemency* and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should joyn a *Facility* with That which we call *height of Courage*, lest if we should accustom our selves to Transports upon Unseasonable Addresses, or shameful Importunities, we should fall into a humor of Morose and unprofitable sourness: Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use severity also, where the Publique requires it; for without That, a City can never be kept in order. *Against Anger.*

ALL

Of Reproof and Correction.

ALL *Reproof*, and *Correction*, let it be without *Contumely*, as being directed only to the profit of the *Common-wealth*, without regard to the gratifying of his *Paſſion*, or *Intereſt* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the *puniſhment* likewiſe ſhould be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjuſt that one man ſhould have *Blows*, and another, not ſo much as a *Check*, for the ſame tranſgreſſion. But above all things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in Paſſion will never obſerve the due mean betwixt the two Extremes of too *much*, and too *little*: wherein the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right; if they would not alſo approve of *Anger* given us by Nature for our Advantage. But I am for the avoiding of it in all Caſes; and I could wiſh that *Magiſtrates*, like the *Laws Themſelves*, would never proceed to *puniſh*, in *Wrath*, but only in *Equity*.

Moderation in both Fortunes.

LET us alſo in *Proſperity*, and when we have the World at will, as much as poſſible, avoid *Pride*; *diſguſting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the *ſame Levity* to be Tranſported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to obſerve an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have ſtill the

the ſame humor, and the ſame countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Lælius*. *Philip* of *Macedon*, was outſtript by his Son, in *Glorious Atchievements*, and *Military Executions*, but in *Gentleneſs*, and *Humanity* of manners, *Alexander* came ſhort of him: So that the *One* of them was *always Great*, and the *Other* was *many* Times *Intemperate*, and *Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the more *Humble*. *Panætius* tells us of *Africanus* (his Diſciple, and Familiar Friend) how he was wont to ſay, that as we put out Horſes of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for uſe, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmanageable, by being chaf'd, and heat by the Action of the Battel; ſo ſhould we commit Men, that are Tranſported with Proſperity, and over-confident in themſelves, to ſome Guide that ſhould keep them, as it were in the Ring; or within the bounds of Reaſon, and good Government, to make them underſtand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Proſperity, that we ſhould chiefly conſult our Friends; and allow them more Authority over us than at other times: but we muſt have a Care

of

of Entertaining Flatteries, and of being impos'd upon by Fair words, wherein we are too eaſie to be Miſtaken. For ſuch is the conceit we commonly have of our ſelves; that we think no Commendation more than we deſerve. From this weakneſs there ariſe Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praiſes, and high Opinions of our ſelves, we do but ſerve to make ſport for Others, and labour under grievous Miſtakes. And ſo much for this Point.

Greatneſs of mind in a private Life.

THEIR Buſineſs that Govern Common-wealths, muſt of neceſſity be of the greateſt moment, and require the largeſt Souls; becauſe it has the largeſt proſpect, and concerns moſt people. This is to be given for granted; and yet it muſt not be deny'd neither, on the Other ſide, that great Generoſity of Mind has been many times ſhew'd in a private Life; either in the ſearch, or attempt of Great Matters; and the people yet keeping themſelves within their own Bounds, or elſe mingling with Philoſophers, and Men in Publique Bus'neſs; contenting themſelves in their Private Condition: Neither ſcraping together Eſtates, by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the uſe of what

what they had; but rather dividing with Them, and with the Republique where there was Occasion. Now for *This Estate*, let it be, First, *well gotten*, and neither by *Shameful*, nor by *Odious ways*: Let a man next do *good* with it to as many as he can; (so they be worthy) let him encrease it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Husbandry*: and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, than *Luxury*, and *Lust*. He that observes These Rules may live Soberly, Splendidly, and Generously; and no less Candidly, Faithfully and amicably with all Men.

We are now to speak of the remaining part of Duty; wherein *Bashfulness*, and a certain *Gracefulness* of Life, *Temperance*, *Modesty*, the Composure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be consider'd. Here it is that we find that same *Decorum*, or as the *Greeks*, πρέπον; which is of so Excellent a Nature, that it is Inseparable from Virtue. For whatsoever is *Decent*, is likewise *Honest*; and whatsoever is *Honest*, is *becoming*. But still there is a difference betwixt this same *Honesty*, and *Decorum*; which may be better understood, than explained: For that which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honesty is gone before*.

Honesty *and* Decorum.

NOW

A Decorum in Prudence.

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in the Virtue now in queſtion, but alſo in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent uſe of Reaſon, and Speech; the doing of every thing Conſiderately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other ſide to be deceived, to Miſtake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming, as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And ſo whatſoever is *Juſt*, is alſo *Graceful*: and whatſoever is *Unjuſt*, or *Diſhoneſt*, is likewiſe *misbeſeeming*. And the ſame Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For whatſoever is done *Generouſly*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*. Wherefore the *Decorum* I here ſpeak of, appears likewiſe in all other Virtues; and does in ſuch manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no Myſtery to the finding of it out. There is in all Virtue, ſomewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *ſeparable* from Virtue, by *Imagination*: As the Gracefulneſs, and Beauty of the *Body* cannot well be ſeparated from *Health*: And ſo it is with the *Gracefulneſs* here in *queſtion*. It is a *Decorum* that is in a manner ſo confuſed with Virtue, that it is Incorporated with it; but;

And in all Virtues.

but in the Mind and Conception, it may be diſtinguiſh'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts.* The *One* is a certain *General Decorum*, that ſhines in all Virtues; and there is *Another* that is ſubject to This, or dependent upon it, which reſpects *every Virtue* in *particular.* The *Former* is Commonly defined to be *a Decorum congruous to the Excellency of Man, in that which differences Man, from Other Living Creatures.* But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the General, they define to be *a quality ſo Congruous to Nature, that Moderation and Temperance appear in it, with the very image of a Generous Soul.* This we may judge to be the *Decorum*, which the Poets obſerve; whereof we have ſpoken more in another place. But we are then ſaid to obſerve the *Strict Decorum* of the *Poets*, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and *Condition* of the *Perſon.* As what could be more Improper, and Unſeemly than to bring in Theſe juſt Judges, *Æacus*, and *Minos* with theſe words in their Mouths, *Let them hate, ſo they Fear:* Or, *the Father is the Grave of his own Children.* And yet when *Atreus* ſays it, what Acclamations are there, becauſe the expreſſion Suits with the Perſon! But Nature her ſelf, as to us, has given every man

A Decorum General and Special.

The Decorum of the Poets.

his Part, with great Excellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. So that the Poets will ſee to the accommodating of all parts to the variety of Perſons, even the Obſerving of a *Decorum*, toward the worſt of men, as well as the beſt. But ſince Nature has aſſign'd us our parts of Conſtancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modeſty; and the ſame Nature teaches us not to be wholly careleſs, how we demean our ſelves toward one another; it is clear to us, how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs to every Virtue, and every kind of Honeſty. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt diſpoſition of the Parts, proves the Eye; and delights us in the very Correſpondence; Symmetry and apt diſpoſition of the Parts; ſo this *Decorum*, that Illuſtrates Life, gains upon all thoſe we converſe with, by the Order, Steadineſs, and Moderation of all our Works, and Deeds. Wherefore there ſhould a Certain reverence be uſed toward all men, both high, and low; for 'tis the humor of an Arrogant and diſſolute Man, not to care what the World ſays of him. But there's a great difference betwixt *Juſtice*, and *Modeſty*, upon all accounts. It belongs to *Juſtice* not to *wrong* men; and to *Modeſty*, not to *offend* them: Where-

The Decorum of Order, Steadineſs and Moderation.

in

in the Power, and Virtue of a *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call a *Decorum*.

A Decorum in a Conformity to Nature.

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is chiefly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature; A Guide that will never mislead us; but conduct those that follow her, to all acuteness, and perspicacity of Understanding; to the best means of Uniting men in Society; to That which is strong, and manly. But the mighty power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon: For not only the motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be allow'd, but the Motions of the mind likewise much more.

From the Appetite arise Perturbations.

THE *Force*, and *Nature* of the *Mind*, is *Two fold*: *One part* is plac't in the *Appetite*; the *Greeks* call it ὁρμὴ; that carries a man hither and thither: The *Other*, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to doe, and what to *avoid*, by which means, our Appetite shall be kept obedient to our Reason. In all Cases, we should have a care of Rashness and *Negligence*; and doe nothing but what we can give a fair

Account of. This is in some degree, the Image and Description of Duty; But then we must so order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reason*, so as neither *rashly* to *outrun* it, nor out of *Heaviness*, and *Sloth* to *desert* it; but keep it *quiet*, and *calm*, and free from all *Perturbation*. This will make us Eminent for *Constancy* and *Moderation*: For *Those Appetites* that wander from the *Rule*, and Skip from one thing to another, either by *Covering*, or *Avoiding*: *Those Appetites*, I say, for want of being govern'd by *Reason*, will without all question pass *Bounds* and *Measure*; for they relinquish and cast off their *Allegiance* to *Reason*, which they ought to obey by the Law of *Nature*: and their Ill-effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but also visibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Transports of *Wrath*, *Lust*, *Fear*, *Pleasure*; What an Alteration is there of *Countenance*, *Voice*, *Motion*, *Gesture*? from whence we may Collect, how necessary it is to moderate, and govern our Passions; and so to keep our selves upon a Guard, that we doe nothing heedlessly, as it were by Chance, without Care, or Consideration. For man was never made for Levity and Pleasure, but rather for the severity of Grave, and weighty Studies.

Passion disorders both Mind, and Body.

Not

Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of Froliques, and Divertiſements; provided that we uſe them only as Sleep, and ſuch other ways of Repoſe; after the diſcharge of our Serious and more Important Duties. And our very Liberties in Diſcourſe muſt not be Profuſe neither, nor Immodeſt; but only Candid, and Facetious: For as we do not allow our Children all ſorts of Games; but only ſuch ſports as hold ſome proportion with honeſt Actions; So in *Raillery* it ſelf, there muſt be a mixture of *Candor*, as well as *Underſtanding*. *The Bounds of Mirth.*

THERE are two ſorts of *Raillery*, or *Mirth*; the One is *Courſe*, *Petulant*, *Criminal*, and *Foul*; the Other, *Cleanly*, *Gratious*, *Ingenious*, and *Facetious*: In which kind, not only *Plautus*, and the *Greek Comedians*, but the Followers of *Socrates*, have written much; and ſtuffed their Books with a great many of their *Sayings*, and *Conceits*; As *Cato*'s Collection of *Apothegm*'s, &c. Now 'tis an eaſie matter, to diſtinguiſh betwixt a *Courſe*, and a *Cleanly way* of *Jeſting*. The *One*, is *a word for a ſeaſon*, only for *Recreation*, and worthy of a man of Honor. The *Other*, not fit for an *Honeſt man*; eſpecially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in as *Unclean Words*. *Two Sorts of Raillery, ſcurrilous and facetious.*

Honest and manly pleasures.

NAY in our very *Recreations*, we should keep within Compass; and have a Care that we do not lash out into Excesses, and pass the Limits of Modesty, in the Transports of our Pleasures. The Chase of Wild Beasts, and the Military and Manly Exercises that are Practis'd in our Field, or *Campus Martis*: These I reckon to be Honourable pleasures; and we need never want these ways of Diversion.

The Excellency of Man.

BUT whatever we doe, it should be always in our Thought, the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above that of *Brutes*; which are only push'd on by *Violent Appetites* to *Sensual pleasures*: Whereas the Entertainment of a mans Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation*; which is never Idle, but still employed either upon Enquiry, or Action; and charmed with a delight that arises from what we hear, or see. Nay the very man himself, that is most addicted to his Pleasures: (if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* (for such there are) Though he may be overcome by his *Lusts*, he yet stands so right, as to be *asham'd of*, to *conceal*, and to *disguise* his *Love* of Those *pleasures*, even for *Modesty* sake;

Brutal Pleasures.

ſake; which ſhews that *Pleaſures* of the *Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity* of the *Soul*; but rather *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man ſhall be found to have a great Regard for Pleaſures, let him be ſure to uſe them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloathes*, and *Dyet*, we ſhould ſtill keep an Eye rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, than to the humouring of the *Phanſie*, or *Palate*; and if we ſhall but duly weigh, and examine the Dignity, and Excellency of Nature; we ſhall quickly find how ſhamefull a Thing it is to diſſolve in a Luxurious ſoftneſs, and Delicacy: And how becoming, on the other ſide, to live Frugally, Temperately, Gravely, and Soberly.

Man has Two Capacities.

EVERY man muſt be underſtood to be inveſted with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common* to *Mankind*, as endu'd with *Reaſon*; and in a preference to *Beaſts*, from whence we do not only derive the Knowledge of Decency, and Virtue; but the very means of finding out our ſeveral Duties. The Other is a Propriety that has a reſpect particularly to *Individuals*. There is a great difference in *Bodies*: One man is better for a *Courſe*, Another for a *Scuffle*; and ſo in *Beauties*; *One Beauty* is *Imperious* and

A great Diverſity both in Minds and Bodies.

Several Humors.

Majeſtical; *Another Charming*. Now there are at leaſt as great *diverſities*, and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. L. *Craſſus*, and L. *Philippus*, were both of them of a *Nature*, Wonderfully Gentle, and Gratious; and Both theſe qualities were yet more Eminent; and more Labour'd too, in *C. Cæſar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was a ſtrange Auſterity of Humor, in *M. Scaurus*, and *M. Druſius*; and in the ſame Time, and as yet in their Youth too. *C. Lælius* was *Gay*, and *Pleaſant*; his Friend *Scipio* more *Ambitious*, and *Reſerved*. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a Gentle and a pleaſant Companion; a Wit that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an Excellent faculty of ſpeaking his Mind, under an agreeable Diſguiſe. *Pythagoras*, on the other ſide, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themſelves, without any Gayety of Humor at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among *our Own Commanders*, *Q. Maximus* have the Name of men extremely *Cloſe*, *Secret*, *Silent*, *Diſſembling*; notably good at *Strategems*, or ſetting Spies upon an Enemy, and diſappointing their Counſels. Thoſe that the *Greeks* have the greateſt eſteem of, are *Themiſtocles* the *Athenian*, and *Jaſon* the *Pheræan*. But above all, they magnifie that profound,

and

and politique Fetch of *Solon*: who, for the advantage of the Commonwealth, and for his Own ſecurity, counterfeited himſelf *Mad*. There are others now, ſo far from This Artifice, that they are *Simple* and *Open*: to the degree of not enduring any thing but what's done above board; They will not ſuffer any thing that looks like Treachery. Theſe men are the Servants of *Truth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and crouch to any man, for their own Ends; as *Sylla*, and *M. Craſſus*: The *Lucedemonian Lyſander* is ſaid to have been a great Maſter of his Art in This kind; and yet *Callicratides*, that ſucceeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humor. And we find diverſity, as well in the *Stile*, and *Faſhion* of *Speaking*, as in the *difference* of *Manners*. As you ſhall ſee men of great Authority, and Parts, that yet wont themſelves to the Phraſe and Language of the Common people: As the *Two Catulus*'s, Father and Son, and the like *Q. Mutius Mancinus*, which I my ſelf am a Witneſs of. Nay I have heard old men ſay, that *P. Scipio* of *Naſica*, had that way with him, but his Father the clean contrary, and no Grace of Speech in the World.

I speak of him that reveng'd the Commonwealth, upon the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the severest of Philosophers; and yet Famous and Eminent for that very Sourness. There are a world of *Other dissimilitudes*, both of *Nature*, and *Manners*, which are not yet to be despised. So that every man should doe well to stick to that Inclination that nature has given him in particular; provided that it be not Vitious: and by so doing, we shall more easily discover and attain the *Decorum* which we look for in this place.

Nature is the best Mistress.

BUT yet we are so to behave our selves, that without opposing *Common Nature*, we follow the *Dictates*, *every man* of his *Own Genius*; and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier, and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the bent of our Own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature; or to pursue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Gracefull*, that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short, there is nothing more *becoming*, in humane life, than an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions*: which,

which, if ever we depart from, and pass to the *Affectation* of *another man's Nature*, we lose *our Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing foreign Words into it (as some people do) and make themselves only ridiculous for their pains) so should we in our LIVES, and *Actions*, make our selves all of a piece.

The same thing Good in one, and Ill in another.

NAY, so sensible is This difference of Natures, that one man shall be *honor'd* for *destroying of himself*, and another *condemned* for it, all in the same Case: as it was with *Marcus Cato* that *kill'd himself*, and the rest that *rendred themselves* up to *Cæsar* in *Africa*. This might perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they had laid violent hands upon themselves: For an action so heroical would have born no proportion with the softness and facility of their Ways and Manners, but rather have introduc'd an *Incongruity* betwixt their *Lives*, and *Deaths*. But for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and *Severe*, (even to a Miracle) and hardn'd to it by a long habit of Constancy: a man unalterably *Firm* to his *purpose*, and *resolution*: it made for the *dignity* of his *Humor*, and *Character*, rather to support *death* it self, than the *frown* and *Dominion* of a *Tyrant*.

How

How many miſeries did *Ulyſſes* ſuffer, in that tedious Ramble of his, enſlaving himſelf to Women, (if a body may give *Circe* and *Calypſo* that name) and a Complaiſance upon all Occaſions to all ſorts of people? Nay at his own houſe, how patiently did he put up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meaneſt of his Servants there? Whereas *Ajax*, according to the report we have of him, would have born a thouſand deaths, rather than thoſe Contumelies. This Contemplation ſhould make every man look into himſelf, to ſee what he has of his *Own*, and to make his beſt of *That*, without diſguiſing himſelf, to act the part of *Another*. *That which every man has Peculiar to himſelf, is the thing which beſt becomes him.* Wherefore every man ſhould make a true eſtimate of what he is, and impartially examine his Abilities, and Defects; What he can doe, and what he cannot. That we may be, at leaſt, as wiſe in our *Lives*, as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage*: who make *choice*, not ſo much of the *Beſt Parts*, or *Plays*, as of the *fitteſt* for their *diſpoſition*. He that has the ſtrongeſt Voice, chuſes the Tragedy of *Epigonus*, or *Medea*: The beſt Actor prefers *Melippe*: or *Clytemneſtra*. *Rutilius* (whom I remember) always acted *Antiope*: and ſometimes

Let every man Act his own Part.

ſometimes *Æſopus* play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Stageplayer* now take more care of himſelf in a *Comedy*, than a *Wiſe Man* in his *Life*? Let every man ſee in the *firſt* place, *which way* his Talent Lies, and in the *next*, let him indeavour to *improve* it. But if we ſhould be forc'd at any time, by neceſſity, to play a Part that we were never made for: let it be our Care, Study, and Thought, ſo to behave our ſelves, that at leaſt we may not *loſe* our Credit, where we cannot *get* any. So that the beſt of this Caſe will be to avoid *Shame*, without pretending to get a *Reputation*, by the forcing of our *Nature*.

NOW to thoſe *two parts* already ſpoken of, that is to ſay, of *Common Nature*, and *particular Inclination*, there is a *Third*, that is caſt upon us either by Time or Chance, and yet a *Fourth*, which we accommodate according to our own Judgment. For Kingdoms, Empires, Dignities, Honors, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. Now it is wholly at our own Choice, what part we will Suſtain. Wherefore One man takes to *Philoſophy*, another to the *Civil Law*, a Third to *Rhetorique*, and a Fourth affects

Let every man chuſe his own Study.

affects an Excellency rather in *One Virtue* than in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading in Their Steps: as *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law*: And *Scipio Africanus* emulated his Father in Feats of *Arms*. Some again are not content with the honor they derive from their *Predecessors*, unless they add somewhat to it of their Own. As *Africanus* did yet Augment and Illustrate the Honor of his *Military Knowledge* by his *Particular Eloquence*. And so did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon* who being a *Captain* not inferior to his *Father*, made himself yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and *Understanding*. But it happens sometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himself rather to some Course, or design of his own; which is a thing often found in men of large minds, that are descended from obscure Parents. All these Circumstances must be taken into Consideration, in the question of *This Decorum*.

Some Course of Life must be pitched upon.

THE First point in Deliberation is This, what it is that we design either to *Be*, or to *doe*; and what Course of Life to take

to.

to. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to resolve, and pitch upon the Condition we propound; at which time, we are least able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in some certain purpose of Life, before we are able to distinguish betwixt a Better and a Worse. For although (according to the Report of *Prodicus*, out of *Xenophon*) so soon as ever *Hercules* came out of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chuse what course of Life he will Steer) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One* of *Virtue*, and the *Other* of *Pleasure*, he sat a long time considering with himself, which of the Two ways he should take: Yet this might doe well enough for *Hercules*, that was the son of *Jupiter*, but not for us, I fear, that commonly follow those men still that we like best; and take up an affection for their ways, and Studies. And yet for those that are trained up under the Institution of their Parents; they do commonly and insensibly contract an Affection for the Methods and Customs of their Education. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular practice; esteeming That still to be the Best, that pleases the *most*. And yet some there are, that lead

lead the Courſe of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by Providence; a certain Felicity, or Goodneſs of Nature; a Virtuous Inclination, or ſome particular advantage of their Inſtitution: But it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of Eminent Wit, and Learning; or to find Either of them, with ſo much Time for deliberation, as is needfull for the Election of a profitable Courſe of Life. In this deliberation, a regard muſt be had to That which is moſt proper, and Natural to every particular: For (as is already ſaid) ſince in whatever we doe, we muſt enquire into every mans particular *Genius*, before we can ſay what becomes him; ſo we muſt be more Carefull yet, in the Eſtabliſhment of our own Lives, to ſee that we maintain an Equality in the main; and that we never differ from our ſelves, or falter in our Duty.

Nature and Fortune to be conſulted what courſe of Life to fix upon.

BUT ſince *Nature* has the *greateſt* power in *This Caſe*; and *Fortune*, the *next*; we muſt conſult them *Both*; what Courſe of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the *firſt place*: For ſhe is much firmer, and more conſtant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*: Whoſoever there-

therefore ſhall Conform in the Ordering of his Life, to the Inclinations of an uncorrupted Nature, muſt keep conſtantly to that Tenor, which is the *Decorum* of Life; unleſs he find himſelf miſtaken in his Choice. And in that Caſe (for it is a Caſe to be put) there muſt be a Change admitted of Purpoſes and Manners. And that change will be more eaſily and commodiouſly wrought, under the favor of Times and Occaſions: But where the Seaſon is not favourable, it muſt be Introduc'd by Little and Little; as Wiſe men ſay of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendſhips; 'tis better to unſtich than to tear them all to pieces on a ſuddain. But when we have once alter'd our Courſe, we muſt be infinitely Carefull to make it appear, that we have done it upon good and weighty Reaſons. Now whereas I have, (in what is aforeſaid) propounded the Imitation of our Predeceſſors; let me not be thought to adviſe an Imitation of them in their Vices: beſide that there are many things wherein Nature is not to be Imitated. As the Son of *Africanus the Elder*, (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Æmilius*.) It was not poſſible for him, by reaſon of the Crazineſs of his body to be ſo like his Father, as the Other was like His.

Wherefore

Let every man doe all the Good he can.

Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to *Harangue* the People in *Publique Assemblies*, or to *lead Armies*, there are some Duties yet in his Power, which he is obliged to perform: as the *Offices* of *Justice*, *Faith*, *Liberality*, *Modesty*, *Temperance*, which Benefits will fairly supply the want of the Other. The best of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation* of *Great*, and *Virtuous Actions*, and *Ancestors*; and the Son that does not uphold the Renown of his Father, is a Shame, and a Scandal to it.

NOW in regard that there are *several Duties* properly belonging to *several Ages*; and many things that becoming a *Young* man, would be ridiculous in an *Old*; we shall say something also under That distinction.

The Duty of a Young man.

IT is the duty of a *Young man* to Reverence his *Elders*, and to make his Choice of the Best, and most approved among them, for his Directors and Governors: For the Ignorance, and Folly of Youth should be ordered, and instructed, by the *prudence* and *experience* of the *Aged*. But above all things, he should be restrained from *Loose* and *Wanton pleasures*: and trained up rather in *Laborious exercises*: and in the

Youth should be Temperate and industrious.

Fatigues,

Fatigues, and *Toyles*, both of *Body*, and *Mind*. For it makes men *Vigorous*, and *Industrious*, as well in *War*, as in *Peace*: and even in the Intervals of Liberty, and Refreshment, young Men should have a Care of *Intemperance*: and not to pass the Bounds of *Modesty*, which will be the more Easily attained, if they be often in the Eyes of their *Seniors* and *Tutors*.

The Business of Age is Wisdom.

WHEN we come to be in *Years*, the labors of the body must be abated, and we should encrease those of the Mind: but striving still, by all means to be serviceable to our Friends, and to our Juniors, by our Advice, and Wisdom: but principally to the Commonwealth. But above all things, have a Care of a Drowsie, a Languishing, and a Lasie Old Age; and so likewise of a Luxurious: which, as it is reproachfull and dishonorable, in this Case it is most of all. But if the Intemperance of *Lust* be added to it, the Mischief is Double. *First*, the *Infamy* which it reflects upon *Age it self*: and *Then*, the *Ill Example*, in Authorizing young men to be more Shameless and wicked.

Beware of Sloth and Luxury.

The Duty of a Magistrate.

IT would not be impertinent, here to speak something of the Duties of *Magistrates*,

giſtrates, *Private Citizens* and *Strangers*. The *Magiſtrates* part, is to conſider himſelf as the *Repreſentative* of the *City*: and to uphold the *Honor*, and *Dignity* of it: to obſerve the *Laws*, and *Cuſtoms*, to doe *Juſtice*, and to remember, that all theſe things are committed to his *Charge*. *A private man.* It is the part of a *Private man*, to live with his *fellow Citizens*, under *one Common Bond* of *Legal Duty*; neither falling ſo Low, as to make himſelf deſpicable, nor too much exalting himſelf: And never to entertain any Thought, but to the Glory and Peace of the Commonwealth. This is the man that we eſteem, and pronounce to be a worthy Citizen. *And a Stranger.* As to the Duty of a *Stranger*: let him mind his own buſineſs, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himſelf within his Compaſs. By theſe means it will be underſtood, when it ſhall come to be diligently examin'd what is moſt becoming us, under the ſeveral Circumſtances of *Perſons*, *Times*, and *Ages*: But there is nothing ſo Gracefull; as to behave our ſelves equally, and ſteadily, in all our Actions, and Counſels.

The Decorum of the Body. BUT this Gracefulneſs ſhews it ſelf in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and Poſtures, of the body: and conſiſts principally in Beauty, Order, and

and a kind of Air, or Agreement ſuitable to every thing we doe. 'Tis a hard matter to expreſs This, but it ſhall ſuffice, that it may be eaſily underſtood. In the Obſervance of Theſe three Points, we render our ſelves Acceptable in our Converſation with all People. And ſo much for This too.

The Seeds of Modeſty are in Nature.

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care in the forming of Mans Body, expoſing only Thoſe parts to ſight, that are Beautifull, Comely and Agreeable to the Eye: and keeping Thoſe parts conceal'd, and Cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View: and ſerve us only for Unclean, and Common Neceſſities. There is no queſtion, but the Modeſty of the Mind conforms it ſelf, in this particular, to the exquiſite fabrique of the Body: For whatſoever Nature has conceal'd all men in their right Wits, do naturally keep out of ſight, and as private as poſſible, in compliance with their very Neceſſities. Now for Thoſe parts of the body which are of moſt neceſſary uſe to man: we neither call the part, nor the uſe of it, by the proper name: and that which may be honeſtly done, (if ſecretly) we cannot ſo much as honeſtly name. Inſomuch, that thoſe things

things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor ſo much as mention'd without Obſcenity. Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Cyniques*, or to the *Old Stoiques*, (which are almoſt *Cyniques*) that blame and laugh at us, for reckoning thoſe things to be *foul*, in *Words*: which are *not ſo*, in *Truth*. And yet Thoſe things which we *all agree* to be *foul*, we can yet call by *Their own names*. As *Theft*, *Couſenage*, *Adultery*, are all *diſhoneſt* in the *Deed*: and yet we uſe the *Words* without *Scruple*. To beget Children is an honeſt Action: but it wears a Courſe name. And we find a great deal more to this purpoſe, againſt Modeſty, in their Diſputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatſoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modeſt man. Nay, in our very Poſtures, and Geſtures: as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying: in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there muſt a regard be had ſtill to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two things* we ſhould *beware* of. The *One*, not to doe any thing that is *Looſe*, *Nice*, and *Effeminate*: The *Other*, to *void* things that look *Harſh*, *Rough*, and *Uncivil*. For why ſhould That which *becomes* an *Orator*, or a *Comedian*, *misbeſeem us?* The Diſcipline

The Obſcene humor of the Cyniques.

A Decency in Geſtures and Poſtures.

Diſcipline of the *Theatre* has a long time had ſuch a regard to *Modeſty*; that no man enters upon the Stage, without *Drawers*, leſt ſome part of the body ſhould come to be diſcover'd by Chance that ought to be Conceal'd. The *Roman Cuſtoms* will not allow Sons, when they are Men grown, ſo much as to Bath, with their Fathers: Or Sons in Law, with their Wives Parent. In theſe points of Virtuous Modeſty, Nature is both our Miſtreſs and our Guide. *The Modeſty of the Romans.*

OF *Beauty*, or *Agreeableneſs*, there are *Two Kinds:* the *One* is matter of *Gracefulneſs*; the *Other*, of *Dignity*: and we may call them *Male*, and *Female*: It is not for a man to be Trickt out with *Fooleries:* or to have any thing that is *Phantaſtical*, or *Effeminate*: no, not ſo much as in his very *Motion*, or *Geſture*. How are we diſguſted many times, at the Conceited actions of *Stage-Players?* and the more Odious, and affected Motions of Wraſtlers? And yet we Commend that which is Natural, and Simple, both in the One, and in the Other. The dignity of the Countenance is Maintain'd by a good Colour: and that Colour by the Exerciſe of the Body: and to all This we ſhould keep our ſelves *Neat* and *Cleanly*: not to the degree *Of Dignity and Gracefulneſs.* *Affectation is Odious.*

degree of *Niceneſs*, and *Affectation*, but only ſo, as not to incur the cenſure of *Rudeneſs*, *Sluttery*, and *Neglect*. And the ſame Rule we ſhould obſerve in our *Garments*: In which particular, as well as in other things, a *mediocrity* does beſt. In our *walking* we muſt neither march ſo *Slow*, as if we were officiating at a ſolemnity: nor yet make ſuch *poſt-haſte*, as to run our ſelves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into diſorder: which is a ſign of a Light, and Unſteady humor. But we muſt take more pains, yet, to keep the *Mind* in a temper of Conformity to *Nature*: which we may eaſily compaſs, if we can but preſerve our ſelves from Falling into *Tranſports*, and *Perturbations*, and diligently attend to a Conſervation of the *Decorum* here preſcribed. The *Motions of the Mind* are *Two-fold*. *Some* are of *Thought*, and others of *Appetite*. Thoſe of *Thought* are chiefly employed in the finding out of the *Truth*. Thoſe of *Appetite* puſh a man forward to the *doing* of ſomething. We muſt be careſull therefore, *Firſt*, to apply our *Thoughts* to That which is moſt *worthy* of them: and, *Secondly*, to keep the *Appetite* in ſubjection to *Reaſon*.

A Mean does beſt.

The Motions of the Mind are Thought and Appetite.

AS to the matter of *Speech*, the Power

Power of it is *Great*; and it is also *Two-fold*. The *One* is a Speech of *Contention*, the *Other*, of *Common discourse*. The *Former* is for the *Barr*, for *Publique Assemblies*, and for the *Senate*; the *Other*, is for *Ordinary Conversation*, *Casual disputes*, *private meetings* of Company or Friends at the *Table*. The Masters of *Rhetorique* have given Precepts for the *Former*, but we have none for the *Latter*; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. But there's no body that addicts himself that way. For if men would but apply themselves to the Study of it, they would never want Masters to Teach it. And yet we are all of us Mad upon *Rhetorique*, altho', for what concerns *words*, and *Periods*, the same Rules, would serve Both. It is by the help of the *Voice*, that we *discourse*; and the *Two great advantages* of it, are to be *Clear*, and *Sweet*; We must stand indebted to *Nature* for them *Both*. And yet *Exercise*, and *Practice*, will help us in the *One*: and the *Imitation* of *Smooth* and *gentle Speakers*, may be of use to us in the *Other*. What was it but This, that gave the *Catuli* so fair a Reputation, both for Judgment and Language? They were *Learned men*, 'tis true, and so were *Others*; but These yet were lookt upon as the great Masters of

Of Rhetorique, and Ordinary Discourse.

The Voice should be Clear and Sweet.

Instances of Excellent Speakers.

the *Latin Tongue*: They had a wonderfull Sweetneſs of Voice, and their Pronunciation neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable; and without any Affectation: The Tone, without any Force, and neither too faint, nor too ſhrill. *L. Craſſus*, 'tis true, was a word-flowing Speaker, and no leſs Ingenious: but for well-ſpeaking, the *Catuli* were no leſs eſteem'd. Now for ſharpneſs, and pleaſure of Wit, *Cæſar*, the Brother of the *Elder Catulus*, went beyond them all. Inſomuch that in his ordinary Diſcourſes, he ſurpaſs'd the beſt Pleaders of his Time. All theſe things, ſeverally, muſt be diligently heeded, to make us underſtand what it is that may beſt become us in every thing.

Of Familiar Diſcourſe.

IN *Familiar Speech*, the Followers of *Socrates* are moſt worthy of Imitation. It ſhould be *Gentle*, without being too *preſſing* or *tedious*: and I would have it *pleaſant*, and *entertaining*, in all Caſes. Nor would I have any man take poſſeſſion of a Common Right, in ſuch ſort as to Talk all himſelf, to the Excluſion of Others: but in Diſcourſe, as in Other things, every man to take his Turn. The firſt thing to be heeded, is the

the ſubject Matter of the Diſcourſe. If ſerious, it muſt be ſeriouſly handled: if Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightneſs, does well enough with it. But above all things, we muſt be Carefull in the government of our Speech, not to diſcover any Vice or Defect in our Manners; wherein a man is moſt liable to betray himſelf, when he talkes ſpitefully of the Abſent; and either in Jeſt, or in earneſt, maliciouſly expoſes them to Contumely, and Reproach. The Ordinary matter of *Familiar diſcourſe*, is either about *Domeſtique Affairs*, the *Republique*, or matter of *Studies* and *Learning*. If at any time we Paſs Theſe Bounds, we muſt as ſoon as may be take up again. But be it as it will, it muſt be thought upon, how far our Diſcourſe may be Gratefull to the Company: For we are not Equally pleaſed with the ſame things, at all times. And then, as we begin a diſcourſe upon Reaſon, we muſt not continue it beyond Meaſure. But as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we ſhould keep our ſelves Clear from Perturbations or violent Motions of the Mind, that rebell againſt Reaſon, ſo ſhould we in our Speech keep a guard upon our ſelves againſt Thoſe Intemperate Motions;

Cautious.

The Subject of it.

Seaſonable and not Tedious.

Nor Paſſionate.

tions; and that we do not lay open our Diſtempers of Anger, Appetite, Lazineſs, Heartleſneſs, or the like. We ſhould be very Carefull alſo in our Converſation, to poſſeſs the Company with an Opinion of the Reverence, and Good will that we have for them. There are many Occaſions wherein we cannot avoid Chiding: and we may be allow'd ſometime, a more than ordinary Contention of Voice; and a ſharper ſeverity of Words: but yet This is not to be done neither, as if we were Angry; but we are to proceed to this kind of Reproof, as we do to *Laming*, and *Scarifying*, *rarely*, and *unwillingly*; nor ever at all, but upon *Neceſſity*; and for want of ſome other way of Remedy, but not in Anger ſtill upon any Terms: For it never does any thing either well or wiſely: And yet it may doe well enough to uſe a Temperate, and a mild way of Rebuke; but ſtill accompany'd with Gravity, that the reprehenſion may be apply'd without Reproach: It muſt be alſo ſignifi'd that the Only thing intended by the Reproof was the Amendment of him that ſuffers it. Nay, it will become us in our differences, even with our greateſt Enemies; in deſpite of all Indignities yet, to preſerve a Gravity; to keep our ſelves free from Paſſion;

Reſpectfull.

Let reproof be without Anger.

Passion; for whatsoever we doe in distemper, can neither be well done in it self, nor approved by those that are Witnesses to the doing it. It is a lewd thing likewise for a man to talk much of himself: especially with *Thraso*, to brag of things that are false, and to make Sport for the Company.

Ostentation is Odious.

BEING now to go through all the Points of *Decency* and *Duty* (as That is my design) I shall say something what kind of House I should think fit for a Person of Honor, or a Prince, so as to have it accommodate for use; for That's the Intent of Building it: and there must yet be had a regard to the State and Dignity of the Person that Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius* (the *first Consul* of *That Family*) that he was highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scaurus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd for the Enlargment of his own. The former brought the Consulship first into his Family: and the latter, (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and Famous person, and the House enlarged) brought into it,

Of Building and Palaces.

Fit the House to the Master.

not only a repulse, but Misery and Shame. It does well to have the Dignity of the Master yet farther adorned by the House, but not that Dignity to be fetch'd altogether from it. The House should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the House; and it is in a House, as it is in other Cases: a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to others. In the House of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted, there must great care be taken that it be large enough: but a large House, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a former Possessor: for 'tis an Odious thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occasion) *Here's the* Old House, *but where's the* Old Master? I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus*'s *Villa*'s (his Country-houses:) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must

Keep the Expence within Compass.

must be a *Mean* observ'd in These things, and that Moderation must be transferr'd in all Cases, to the Use, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

IN all undertakings there are three things to be observ'd. *First*, That we govern our Appetites by *Reason*, which is a sure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Estimate of our Enterprizes and allow Time, and Pains, neither more nor less than the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a Measure, even in those things that are matter of Dignity, and Reputation. We cannot doe better, than to observe the *Decorum* already spoken of, without moving one step beyond it. But the First point is the most Excellent of the Three. *Three Rules for all Undertakings.*

WE come now to the *Order of Things*, and the *Opportunity of Seasons*. Under this Science is comprehended that which the *Greeks* call Εὐταξία, by which we understand the *Harmony of Order*: and not *That Modesty*, that regards *Temperament*, and *Measure*. Now to take it as *Modesty*; the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the skill of disposing all our Words, and Actions, in their* *The Decorum of Place and Time.*

Proper Place. So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the same: for they define *Order*, to be only the *laying together of things in their due, and fitting places.* But they tell us, that the *Place* of *Action* respects the *Opportunity* of *Time*: Now That seasonable *Time* of *Action*, the *Greeks* call Εὐκαιρία, the *Latins*, *Occasio.* So that *This Modesty*, taken in the sense aforesaid, is *the Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action.* Which is a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are discoursing of *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and Virtues of that quality. Wherefore having lodg'd these matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we come now to those Virtues that refer to *Modesty*, and the Gaining of a Good opinion, and Esteem in the World: of which we have spoken largely.

Order defin'd.

IT should be in the *Order of Life*, as in That of an *Artificial*, and *well govern'd Discourse.* All the *Parts* of it should be *Equal*, and *Correspondent* one to another. Many things doe well enough over a Glass of Wine, that would be most ridiculous and shamefull, upon a Debate.

Indecencies in respect of Time and Place.

Debate. There ſhould be no fooling in ſerious matters. It was well ſaid of *Pericles*, at a Council of War, to his *Collegue Sophocles*, that was joyned with him in the Command of the Army. As they were upon a Conſultation, there happened to paſs by, a very fine Youth, *What a delicate Child is there?* (ſays *Sophocles*, in the middle of the Debate.) *Brother* (ſays *Pericles*) *a* Generals *Eyes, ſhould be as Temperate as his Fingers.* But if the ſame thing had been ſpoken at a publique Spectacle, nothing could have been ſaid againſt it; ſo powerfull is the Conſideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a man were upon a *Journey*, and going to Plead a *Cauſe*, no body would blame him for thinking of his Bus'neſs, and conning of his Leſſon, by the way; but That penſive, muſing humor, at a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon, to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the not diſtinguiſhing of Times. Now for things which are very groſs, as for a man to fall a Singing in a Court of Juſtice: or to doe any thing that is notoriouſly prepoſterous, or improper: Theſe are abſurdities ſo well underſtood by all people, that there needs no Precept, or Caution, in the Caſe. But there are certain Niceties of Converſation, which are indeed ſo minute, that ſome make

The Niceties of Converſation.

make *ſlight* of them; and *others* do not ſo much as *perceive* them. And yet theſe are the Points that require our moſt diligent conſideration. For as it is in Muſical Inſtruments, let them be never ſo little out of Tune, a skilfull Ear preſently takes Cheque at it: and that's the Caſe in the leaſt diſconſonancy of Life. Only the Offence is ſo much the Greater here, by how much the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* is of greater *value*, and *effect*, than a *Conſent* of *Sounds*. Wherefore, as there is no Jarre, or Diſcord in Muſique, ſo ſmall, as to ſcape the animadverſion of a Critical Ear; no leſs quick and accurate ought we to be in Cenſuring, and Detecting the Venial Errors of Life: Being led to the knowledge of the greateſt matters, even by the ſmalleſt. From the Motion of the Eye, from a Smooth or a Contracted Brow; from Sadneſs, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence; nay from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud ſpeaking, and a thouſand ſuch Common Circumſtances, we gather the underſtanding of Humane Duties; and of what Naturally becomes us, and what the Contrary.

By Obſerving others we may Reform our ſelves.

NOW toward the Erecting of a true Judgment upon things in This Kind, it were not amiſs for us to begin our Obſerva-

Obſervations *abroad*: And then to Avoid, or Correct That in our *ſelves*, which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For ſo it is, (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we are much better at ſpying out our *Neighbours Faults*, than our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the teaching of Children to doe better, by ſhewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to doe amiſs. In Caſes doubtfull, and hard to be reſolv'd upon, it will behove us to conſult men of Learning, and Experience, for Direction. Now it is very Natural for men to follow the Byaſs of their proper Inclinations. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *ſays*; but likewiſe to what he *Thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them. They take advice upon what's amiſs, both with themſelves and their Friends, and are induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the Opinion of Others. But for what concerns Cuſtoms, and Civil Inſtitutions, there can be no place there for the preſcribing, where the matter

it

it ſelf is a Precept. Neither let a man ſo much deceive himſelf, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the purpoſe, or *Ariſtippus*, in the ſaying, or doing of any ill thing againſt Rules of Government, muſt preſently authorize him to the ſame Licence: For This Liberty, in thoſe Great and Divine men, we are to look upon as a privilege purchas'd by their Virtues. Now for the *Cyniques* (thoſe Enemies of *Shame*, and conſequently of *Honeſty*, and *Virtue*) there's no enduring of them. To Magiſtrates, and Perſons in Authority, we are to pay all Honor, and Reverence, and ſo likewiſe to all thoſe worthy Patriots that have ſpent their Lives in Great, and Honeſt Actions; and in the ſervice of their Country. We owe a reſpect alſo to Grey hairs, and even to Thoſe that are but deſign'd to any Adminiſtration in the Government. We muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Perſon, and a Publique. But to ſum up all in a word, it is our Duty to Cheriſh, Maintain, and Preſerve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

Great Virtues are a Privilege to ſome Miſtakes.

A General Duty.

WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided

divided into *Liberal*, (or in Vulgar *English*, *Creditable*) and *Sordid*. There are some *Painfull Employments* that carry along with them a *General Odium*; as that of a *Tax gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first place, I do not like; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Dealings*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Mean*, and *Ignoble*. The very price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Covenanting* for *Slavery*. It is also *Course Business*, That of a *Retayler*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels: For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying; which is a most Unmanly submission. And so for all *Mechaniques*, they are men of Low, and Vulgar business, and we are not to expect any thing that is Clear, and Generous, from the Shop. I am likewise with *Tenelon* no friend to those Trades that Minister to Luxury; as *Fishermen*, *Butchers*, *Cooks*, *Pudding-makers*: *Fishmongers*; nor to the *Voluptuous Arts*, as *Perfumers*, *Dancing-masters*, and the whole Mystery of *Gaming*. But for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and Minister *Advantage* in Proportion; as *Physique*, *Architecture*, the furnishing of *Good Instruments*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with

Of Trade which is either sordid.

And Voluptuary,

with the Condition of him that uſes them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*, That way, is little better than *Pedling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be manag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be eſteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, ſits down (not ſatiated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himſelf, and his Poſſeſſions. Of all *Beneficial Induſtry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a Man of *Honor*, and *Reaſon*, than the *Culture* and *Improvement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Cato Major*, we ſhall refer you thither for your ſatisfaction.

Or of Candor and Credit.

Of Two Duties, which to Chuſe.

HERE is enough ſaid already upon the *ſeveral* parts of *Virtue*, and our Duties ariſing from thence. It remains now to conſider in a Caſe of *two Duties* before us, *which to chuſe*: (a thing that often happens) and of *Two Honeſt Propoſitions*, which is the *Honeſter*, is the Queſtion: (a Point omitted by *Panætius*.)

For

For since there is *no Virtue*, but what issues from One of these *four Fountains*, and has a respect either *to Knowledge*, *Society*, *Courage*, or *Moderation*; it must necessarily be, that upon a *Complication* of these *Virtues*, there must likewise ensue a *Competition* of *Duties*. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is Naturally more concerned in Offices that relate to the *Community*, than in matters that only affect the *Understanding*; which may be thus made out. Take a wise man, that has the World at Will, both for Fortune and Leisure; let him consider with himself, and contemplate all things whatsoever, that are worth the Knowing. He would be yet sick of his Life, for all this, if he were to spend his time wholly in solitude, and without a Companion.

THE Principal Virtue is (as I have said) That, which the *Greeks* call σοφία, and *We*, *Wisdom*. But their φρόνησις (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being *the skill of Judging what we are to do, and what not*: Or of distinguishing betwixt Good and Evil. Whereas *Wisdom* (which we call the Principal) *is the Knowledge of things Divine and Humane*: wherein is comprehended a certain Correspondence betwixt the Gods, and Men, and

Wisdom is the principal Virtue.

and a Society among Themſelves. Now if *This* be the moſt Eminent *Virtue*, as Certainly it is. So muſt that likewiſe be the moſt Eminent *Duty*, which refers to *Community*. For the *Speculation* and *Perception* of things; is but *lame* and *imperfect*, if it be not follow'd with *Action*; which *Action* is beſt ſeen, in providing for the *Common Benefits* of *Mankind*: And muſt therefore be reduced to the Subject of Humane Society; in preference to the naked Underſtanding of things. And this does every Good man find to be True, upon his Own Practice, and Obſervation. For where's the man, that is ſo tranſported with a Thirſt of Knowledge; or a deſire of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he ſhould be call'd upon the ſudden, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger: Where is the Man (I ſay) that in the heat and rapture of his moſt Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even ſuppoſing him to be in his Thoughts already numbring the Stars, and taking meaſure of the Univerſe? This gives us to underſtand, that the Offices of *Juſtice*, conducing to the Common Utility of Mankind (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of ſo much greater importance,

Juſtice more valuable than Science.

tance, than these of *Study* and *Science*; and never was any man so taken up in his Life, and Application, with the search of Knowledge, as not yet to have an Eye to his Duty to the Publique; and to Consult the well-being of Sociable Nature: As we see in the Instance of *Lycias* the *Pythagorean*, to the *Theban Epaminondas*; and in that of *Pluto*, to *Dion* of *Syracuse*; and divers others that train'd up their Disciples to the Love, Knowledge, and Exercise of Civil Duties. And for the service, (if any at all) which I my self have render'd to the *Republique*, I must ascribe it to my Masters, and to my Books, that instructed, and fitted Me for my Function. For great men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives*; but in their very *Graves* too: Transmitting their Precepts down to after-times, for the Use of Posterity. Now to shew how much Their Leisures contributed to our Business: These Eminent men have not slipt so much as any one point appertaining to the Laws, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth; but have still, with all their Faculties, applyed the Fruits of their Labors and Studies, to the well being of the Publique. So that a Copious Eloquence, joyned with Prudence, is much more

Our Country in the first place.

more profitable, than the most refin'd subtilty of *Thought*, without *Speaking*. For *Meditation* does only *Circulate* within it self; Whereas *Eloquence* works upon *Others*, and insinuates it self into the Affections of all that hear it. We must not imagine that *Bees* gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their *Cells*, but it is in their Nature to *Congregate*, and then they work their *Combs*. And so it is with *Men*, who are much more Sociable by Nature; when they are gotten together, they Consult their Common business. Now for That Virtue (of *Justice*) which provides for the Defence, and Conversation of Men in Society; if it be not accompanied with the *Understanding* of Things, it is but *solitary*, and *Fruitless*. And what is Courage without the softness of Humane *Courtesie*, and *Candor*, but a *Savage*, and *Outragious Brutality*! From hence we may infer the Excellency of a *Practical Justice*, in the Ordering of *Mankind*, above the force, and effect of a *Speculative Notion*.

Leagues are more for Society than Defence.

There are some people that Phansie all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say they) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after

after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing ſome Extraordinary way for the furniſhing of it; no man, of either Brains, or Virtue, would ever trouble his head about Buſineſs; but wholly deliver himſelf up to the attaining of Wiſdom. But this is a miſtake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude, and wiſh for a Companion in his very Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond queſtion, the Duties that defend, and ſupport men in Society, are more to be eſteem'd than thoſe, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.

Juſtice and Temperance compar'd.

IT may be another Queſtion whether *This Community* which is ſo Conſonant to Nature, be in all Caſes to be preferr'd to *Modeſty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are ſome things, partly ſo foul, and in part ſo flagitious, that a wiſe man (even if it were to ſave his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Poſidonius* has made a large Collection of ſuch Caſes: But ſo filthy, ſo obſcene, that a man cannot honeſtly repeat them. Now why ſhould any man doe that for the ſaving of his Country, which his Country it ſelf would rather periſh, than any member it ſelf would doe?

do? But however, this is the beſt on't; that it can never be for the Intereſt of the *publique*, to have a wiſe man doe any ſuch thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of all Duties we are to prefer thoſe that tend toward the Maintaining of Society. For a *Conſiderate Action preſumes an Antecedent Cognition, and Wiſdom.* So that it is more to *Doe Conſiderately*, than to *Think Wiſely.* But let This ſuffice; for the matter is made ſo plain, that there will be no difficulty to reſolve upon *Two Duties* in *queſtion*, which to *Chuſe.* But then in the Community it ſelf, there are ſeveral Degrees of Duties, in ſubordination one to another. The *Firſt* is what we owe to the Immortal *Gods*; the *Second*, to our *Country*; the *Third* to our *Parents*, and ſo in Order, ſucceſſively, to Others. Upon a Brief Diſquiſition of This Matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is *honeſt*; and which the *Contrary*: but of *Two honeſt propoſitions*; which is the *Honeſter*; and then, which is the *Honeſteſt of All.* This (as I have ſaid) was ſlipt by *Panætius*; but let us now proceed.

Degrees of Duties.

The End of the Firſt Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Second Book.

IN What manner Duties ariſe from Virtue, and from every diſtinct Branch of it, is ſufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in the Former Book. It remains now (my Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon ſome certain ſorts of Duty, that have a regard to the ſplendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches, Power; and a Competent proviſion of things Commodious for the Uſe of Man. The matter in queſtion was, (as I told you) *Firſt* what is *Profitable*, and what *not*. *Secondly*, What is *more Profitable Comparatively* with that which is *Leſs*: And *Laſtly*, What's *moſt Profitable* of All things, *without Compariſon*. You have here the Subject of This Treatiſe: But before I enter upon this Diſcourſe it ſelf, I muſt give

The Subject of this Book.

give you a word or two of my Purpoſe, and Intention.

The Introduction.

THERE are a great many I know that have been excited, by my Books, to the Love of Letters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but of Writing alſo: And yet Philoſophy has gotten ſo Ill a Name in the World, (verily with ſome good men too) that I am afraid ſometimes, of hazzarding my Credit with them; for beſtowing ſo much Time, and Labor upon this Study. But truly, for my Own part, ſo long as the Management of Publique Affairs paſt through thoſe hands, to which the Commonwealth had deliver'd up it ſelf: All my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way: But when One man came to Graſp all, and that there was no longer Any place for Authority, or Counſel, (thoſe Publique-ſpirited men being gone too; that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my ſelf to an Anxious, and irkſome Melancholy; or, on the other, to plunge my ſelf into Pleaſures, below the Dignity of my Profeſſion. Oh! that the Republique might have continu'd ſtill in the Former ſtate, without falling into thoſe hands;

hands; that ſought not ſo much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruine of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now ſtanding, I ſhould be doing at this inſtant juſt as I did before. Firſt, my Buſ'neſs would lie more at the Bar, than in my Study; and Secondly, I ſhould now be ſetting down my Pleadings, as formerly, inſtead of theſe Morals: But ſince the Diſſolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies; There's no more Law, or Senate-Imployment. Matters being brought to this Paſs, (and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to ſit ſtill, and doe nothing) What could I better doe, than to betake my ſelf to my Philoſophy; My Firſt Study, and the moſt Innocent, the Honeſteſt Diverſion of my Troubles? It was the Inſtitution of my Youth; and I ſpent a great deal of Time upon't: Till I came afterward to puſh my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments; and then I dedicated my ſelf wholly to the Government: But ſtill reſerving Thoſe hours for Philoſophy, which I had to ſpare from the Publique, and my Friends; and Thoſe very hours were ſpent in Reading too; for I had no Leiſure to Write. The Calamity of thoſe Times was Extreme; and yet we have drawn This

Benefit

Benefit from it, that we are now at Liberty to commit those things to Letters which our Country-men were very little acquainted with, tho' in themselves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods!*) *What is more desirable than* Wisdom? *more Excellent; more usefull to a man? or what more worthy of him?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philosophers*, from the very *Etymon* of the word: For *Philosophy*, by Interpretation, is only *the love of Wisdom.* The Ancients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humane; and of their Causes.* What will any man speak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study? if he seeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the allaying of his cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others: For it furnishes him, every day, with something or other, toward Attaining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unshaken constancy, be his Bus'ness, it is either to be compassed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing so small, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it: And shall any man be so mad then, as to think that there needs none, toward the most Important Acquisition of our Lives? But if there be any Discipline of

The praise of Philosophy.

of Virtue, where ſhall we look for it; if we depart from This way of finding it out? This Queſtion, as it falls properly under another *Topique*, So we have handled it in another place; and more accurately too; That is to ſay, in our Exhortations to Philoſophy. My preſent purpoſe is only to ſet forth, that having nothing any longer to do, in the Government, I made choice of This Subject for my private Entertainment. But I muſt expect to be here encounter'd, and that by ſome of the Learned too, with a charge of contradicting my ſelf. For how does it conſiſt, ſay they, the entring upon *Diſputes* and delivering *Precepts* of *Duty*, as things *Certain*; and yet at the ſame time, to maintain that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing?* I ſhould be glad to be a little better underſtood; For I am none of thoſe Roving, Wandring heads, that Live, and Live on; without propoſing to themſelves any Scope, or Deſign. How Miſerable were That man's mind, or rather his Life, that ſhould be debarr'd the Uſe of his Reaſon, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being? Now for thoſe Points which others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain*; it pleaſes me better, that they ſhould be *diſtinguiſhed* by calling them

An Objection anſwered.

them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what ſhould hinder me now from Embracing the One, and diſallowing the Other; provided that I keep my ſelf from being either Arrogantly poſitive; or Raſh and Inconſiderate; Two qualities that hold no fellowſhip with Wiſdom. But our people, on the Other ſide, will diſpute every thing: For (ſay they) without comparing *Both parts*, how ſhall any man know which is the *Right*? But This matter (I ſuppoſe) is ſufficiently clear'd, in our *Academical Queſtions*. Now for You, (my Son) tho' you have been train'd up in the moſt Ancient, and Noble ſort of Philoſophy, and under the Inſtitution of *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferior to the moſt Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to your Father's Writings, which you will not find differing from your Own. But now to the Point.

The Diſtribution of the Whole Work.

WE have, for methods ſake, made a Diſtribution of *Humane Duties* into *Five Parts*; *Two*, upon the Points of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; *Two more*, with a reſpect to the *Commodiouſneſs* of *Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a *Fifth*, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, than *Another*, when *ſeveral things*, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*.

We

We have already gone through the Firſt Branch of this Diviſion which I muſt recommend to your particular Attention, and Study. The Point now in hand is That which we call *Profitable*: A word, which by the Corruption of *Time*, and *Cuſtom*, is perverted inſenſibly to the ſignification of ſomewhat that may be ſeparated from *Honeſty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*, that were not *Honeſt*, or any thing *Honeſt*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the moſt pernicious conſequence imaginable to the Life of man. Theſe Three Points, how confuſed ſoever they may appear to be, are yet by Philoſophers of great Authority, very judiciouſly, and ingenuouſly diſtinguiſhed in the Imagination: concluding in This, that *whatſoever is* Profitable, *is* Honeſt, *and whatſoever is* Honeſt, *is* Profitable: And conſequently that whatſoever is *Either* of them, is the *Other*. From the not underſtanding of this matter aright, it comes often to paſs, that we have a Cunning, Artificial ſort of People, in great Admiration; miſtaking *Craft*, for *Wiſdom*. This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following perſwaſion erected in the ſtead of that, there is no compaſſing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent, and

The Word Profitable *is Corrupted.*

Profitable *and* Honeſt *are* Convertible Terms.

Craft *miſtaken for* Wiſdom.

Indirect Courſes, but only by juſt Dealings, and honeſt Counſels.

Things Inanimate. NOW the things appertaining to Conveniencies for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, and the productions of the *Earth*; or *Animated*, and indu'd with *Impulſe*, and *Appetite*; And thoſe again are divided, into *Unreaſonable*, and *Reaſonable*. Of the former kind, we may reckon *Horſes*, *Oxen*, and other ſorts of *Cattle*; *Bees*, &c. whoſe labor Contributes in ſome meaſure, to the Uſe and Neceſſities of Life: and then for *Reaſonable*, we may account the *Gods*, and *Men*. By Piety and Holineſs, we make our ſelves acceptable to the Gods; but in the next place to the Gods themſelves, it is in the Power of Men to render themſelves moſt Beneficial to one another. And thoſe things which may be hurtfull, or Injurious to us, do fall likewiſe under the ſame Diviſion. But in This Caſe the Gods are excepted; as preſuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greateſt miſchief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we ſpake of, are moſt of them, the Effects of Humane Induſtry and Labor. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art,

Animate.

Unreaſonable.

Reaſonable.

One man is the greateſt Benefit or Miſchief to another.

The Neceſſity of Mutual Help and Society.

Art, to the very *preparing* of them; and then there muſt be Humane Application to the *Uſing* of them: For neither Phyſique, Navigation, Tillage, the Reaping and Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conſervation of them, could be effected without the labor of *Man.* There would be no Exporting what we have to ſpare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How ſhould we fetch up Stones out of the Quarries for our neceſſary uſe: or Iron, Braſs, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labor, and the Hands of men? whence came our Houſes, at Firſt; to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold? or How ſhould we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruines, either by Tempeſt, Earthquakes, or even by Age it ſelf: If the Obligations and Neceſſities, of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another? Our *Aquaducts*, Our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbours, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Induſtry? From theſe Inſtances; and a thouſand more it appears undeniably that the very ad-

vantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally loſt to us; but for that Labor and Endevour that gives us Profit of them: and to which we are likewiſe indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beaſts themſelves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man too: the Application of them to the Uſe of Mankind; nor can we at this day either Feed, Reclaim, or Pre erve what we have occaſion for, or make our Beſt of their Service, without the Aſſiſtance of one another. Is it not by the help of Men, that we deſtroy thoſe Creatures that are hurtfull to us; and take others, that we may be the better for? What ſhould I ſpeak of thoſe Innumerable Arts, without which we are little better than *Dead*, *Living?* What *Cure* for the *Sick?* What delight for the *Sound?* What *Food*, or *Clothing*, without the help of *Arts*, and *Trades*, to ſupply us? This is it that furniſhes, and Sweetens Humane Life: and in our manner of Feeding, and Covering, raiſes us above the Condition of Beaſts. How ſhould *Cities* have been either *built*, or *peopled* without *Correſpondence*, and *Commerce?* And hence come *Laws*, and *Cuſtoms*, the *Equal* and *Univerſal Bounds* of *Common Right*, for the *Comfort*, and *Regulation* of our Lives. And this Communication

munication produces *Gentleneſs of Manners*, and *Modeſty*, and This is it that ſupports us in a State of Security, and furniſhes us in all our Wants, by the Intercourſe of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchange of Good Offices, and Conveniencies. A great deal of this might have been ſpar'd; For it is clear to every man, That which *Panætius* has ſo much enlarg'd upon; Which is, that never any Prince or General, either in War, or in Peace, atchiev'd any Great, and Profitable Exploit, without the Concurrence of Humane Aid. He makes his Inſtances in *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, *Cyrus*, *Ageſilaus*, *Alexander*; who could never have done thoſe mighty things (he ſays) without the help of Others. But there was no neceſſity of Witneſſes in ſo evident a matter. Now as the Advantages are very Great, which we receive by Communication, and Agreement; So there is no Miſchief ſo deteſtable, which one man does not bring upon another. *Dicæarchus*, a Famous, and an Eloquent *Peripatetique*, has written an expreſs Tract *of the Deſtruction of Men*. He ſumms up all the *Fatalities* of *Mankind*; as *Inundations*, *Plagues*, *Deſolations*; the ſudden *Incurſions* of *Wild Beaſts*, and *Serpents*; which, according to his Relation, have ſome-

The great Miſchiefs are from one man to another.

times devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he ſays) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought *one* upon *another*. Now ſince it is without diſpute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our ſelves it muſt be the Bus'neſs, as it is the Property of Virtue, ſo to mould and faſhion mens minds, as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward the Common good of Mankind. Now for thoſe Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind ſoever, in the uſe and ordering of Beaſts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather than of the *Mind*. But thoſe Studies, that fit, and diſpoſe us for the Emprovement of our Fortunes, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men: For almoſt all Virtue moves upon *Theſe Three Points*. Firſt, the *Accurate Perception*, of every thing in its Naked *Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correſpondence of Circumſtances, and the Conſequences of things, with the Riſe and Cauſes of them. *Secondly*, the Moderating of our *Paſſions*, and *Appetites* (which the *Greeks* call (πάθη, and ὁρμὰς) and ſubjecting them to the Government of Reaſon. The *Third*, is, the Skill of managing our *Converſation* with

Of Prudence and Virtue.

with ſo much *Courteſie*, and *Diſcretion*, as to gain the kindneſs and aſſiſtance of our Acquaintance, toward the furniſhing of us with all things that our Nature requires, in competency and plenty; Defending and Protecting us from Violence, revenging our ſelves upon thoſe that affront us, by inflicting ſuch puniſhments only as may ſtand with Humanity, and Juſtice. As to the Means, and Faculty both of Making Friends, and Keeping them, (which we ſhall ſpeak of in due Time, and Place) only a word, in paſſage.

The Power of Fortune.

WE are all of us ſenſible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Proſperity*, and *Adverſity*: When ſhe gives us a Fair Gale, our Courſe is ſmooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our deſired Port. But when the Wind blows ſtrong againſt us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thouſand hazards. Now there are ſome Caſualties, leſs frequent than Others: which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. *Firſt*, from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempeſts*, *Shipwracks*, *Ruines*, *Canflagrations*; from *Beaſts*, as *Strokes*, *Bitings*, *Trampling under foot*, &c. Theſe are *Accidents*, as I ſaid, that fall not out *often*. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no leſs

Unhappy Caſualties.

than Three lately:) the Loſs of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Perſon but the other day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*, and a World of Gallant, and Deſerving Men, by *Preſcriptions*, *Impriſonments*, and *forced Eſcapes*, ſacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honors*, *Empire*, *Victory*; tho' theſe things are All look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to paſs, without the Interpoſition of Labor and Induſtry. Now ſince thus it is; let us conſider by what fair Means we may make ſuch Intereſts, and Friendſhips in the World, as may turn to our Advantage. If you ſhall think the Diſcourſe over-long; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wiſh there had been more on't.

The Grounds of Honor and Eſteem in the World.

WHAT good Office ſoever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, or Credit, he does it either upon the Account of *Good Will*, and *Perſonal Affection*; or of *Reſpect*, as wiſhing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or *elſe*, upon the ſcore of *Truſt*, and *Confidence* in him: as one that is able to give us good *Advice*: Or *otherwiſe*, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*.

Power. Or in hope of a *Reward*: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular Pretenders, to ſcatter their *Donatives.*) Or *Laſtly*, Many Men are mov'd by the bare Obligations of *Money*, and *Reward*. The *fouleſt*, and the *baſeſt* of all *Conſiderations*, both to Him that *entertains* the Addreſs, and to the Other, that *makes* it. For Matters are at an ill paſs, when that which ſhould be obtain'd by *Virtue*, is attempted by *Money*. But ſince there is, many times, a *Neceſſity* of *That Proviſion*, we will give ſome Directions for the *Uſing* of it. Only ſomething muſt be ſaid in the Firſt place, of Thoſe Things that have a neater Affinity with Virtue. There are ſeveral Reaſons for which One Man puts himſelf under the *Power*, and *Government* of *Another*; Either *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency of Endowments*, *Hope of Profit*, *Fear* of being *forc'd* to't: Or Men are Inveigled by liberal *Promiſes*; or in fine, by *Corruption*, and *Reward*; which we find to be a common caſe in *our Republique*. *Mercenary Natures.*

THERE is nothing that *ſecures Power*, and *Greatneſs*, like *Love*: Nothing that *endangers* it, like *Fear*. Wherefore *Ennius* ſays very well, *He that is Fear'd, is Hated; and they that hate a Man,* *Love is the beſt Security of Power.*

Hatred is the certain effect of Fear.

Man, wish him Dead. But when it comes once to a *General Hatred*, there is no force that is able to encounter it: As we have found by late, and dear Experience, even if the thing had been unknown to us before. And it is not only in the Violent Death of that *Tyrant*, *Cæsar*, (whom this Oppressed City was forc'd to bear, for want of Power to make Resistance) but we may read it also in the common fate of our Oppressors; scarce any of them coming to a Natural End. *Fear* is a *False*, and *short-liv'd Security*; but *Love* on the contrary, and *Benevolence*, are Firm, even to the *Death*. In the Case of a *Conquer'd People*, I must confess; if nothing else will keep them in Order; I should advise the same Rigor, and Authority to be exercis'd over them, that a *Master* uses over his *Servants*. But for any Man to pursue the same course in a *Free City*, of making himself *Fear'd*, were a direct Madness. For let the Laws be never so much Oppress, by Might, and Faction, and the very Foundations of the Common Liberty shaken, there will be secret contrivances yet, private Consultations, and Inrolling of Parties; that will some time or other put Life again into the Government. For Men are more sensible of the Want of Liberty, than of the Enjoyment

ment of it. Let us therefore imbrace that which moſt conduces, not only to our *Security*, but alſo to *Wealth*, and *Power*. The Ready way to the attaining of our Deſires, either in Publique Affairs, or in Private, is, to caſt out Fear, and to preſerve and maintain Charity. For whoſoever would be Fear'd, muſt neceſſarily be afraid himſelf of all that are afraid of him. What ſhall we think of the condition of the *Firſt Dionyſius*, under the horror and the torture of his Terrors? that ſindged his very Beard, becauſe he would not venture his Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander* the *Pheræan*; that durſt not truſt himſelf with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded Slave, with his drawn Sword, for his Conductor; and his Guards ſent before him to ſearch all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and nen, for conceal'd Ponyards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durſt venture himſelf only from his Table, into his Bedchamber? O miſerable wretch, that could put more confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his own *Wife!* But his Fears fell upon him, for ſhe kill'd him with her own Hand, upon the jealouſie of a private *Amor*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that

The Condition and Fate of Tyrants.

that can long maintain it self against a preſſing and an Univerſal Fear. And this we may ſee in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant celebrated for his Cruelty: who was cut off, not like the *Pheræan Alexander*, by ſecret *Treachery*; nor yet like *Our Cæſar*, by a particular band of *Conſpirators*: But he was put to Death, by the Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*; in the very *Market-place*. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrrhus*? Were not the *Lacedemonians*, for their Iniquity, and Miſ-government, almoſt totally deſerted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battel of *Leuctra*? where they ſtood looking on, as Idle Spectators, till the *Lacedemonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces. I had rather make uſe of Foreign Inſtances, than Domeſtique upon This Subject: But This however let me ſay, ſo long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleneſs*, more than of *Violence*: ſo long as they fought only for their *Friends*, or for *Empire*; the Iſſue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worſt, a Manner of Unneceſſary Rigor. The Senate of *Rome* was in thoſe days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppreſſed Kings, People and Nations. And the Magiſtrates

The End of Phalaris.

Rome *was formerly the Sanctuary of the Oppreſſed.*

and

and Captains of thoſe Times, had no Other Ambition, no other Pique of Glory in proſpect, than to defend their Provinces, and to ſupport their Aſſociates with Truth and Equity: ſo that *Rome* did rather affect the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This cuſtom, and Diſcipline began ſometimes ſince by little and little to decline; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct: And in Truth, it would not have lookt well after ſuch Barbarities exercis'd upon the *Citizens Themſelves*, to have kept Touch in any point of Faith and Juſtice, with their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cauſe attended with a moſt Impious, and Shamefull *Victory*. The Goods of ſo many Honeſt, Worthy, and Eminent Citizens expo'd to Sale in the Market-place: And to heighten the Affront, under the very Title of *Sylla*'s *Booty*. There was another that came after him, whoſe Cauſe it ſelf was bad, and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction*; and after infinite Vexations, and Ruines wrought abroad, we liv'd to ſee the Image of *Marſeilles* born in Triumph: *Marſeilles*, I ſay without

The Miſeries that befell Rome for Cruelty and Injuſtice.

out which, we our ſelves could never have carry'd a Triumph beyond the *Alps*; and This was the condition too of the loſt Empire. I might reckon up Hiſtories without end, of our perfidious dealings with our *Allies*: but This One ſhall ſuffice; being the baſeſt perhaps that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us is Juſt: For the Sufferance of *many Criminals* made way to the boundleſs Licence of *This One*; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And there ſhall never want either Diſpoſition, or Matter for a Civil War, ſo long as *Sylla*'s Succeſſes ſhall ſtand upon Record, for an Encouragement to deſperate Wretches to inrich themſelves by his Example. Thoſe bloudy, and proſperous Uſurpations of *Sylla*, which, as they were formerly Acted in the *Dictatorſhip* of his near Kinſman, ſo they were now renew'd ſix and thirty years after, with more Outrage, and horror. He that had been but a *Clerk* under the former *Dictatorſhip*, was now preferr'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treaſurer*. Why ſhould we expect now, ever to be quiet, when Sedition meets with ſuch Rewards? 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet ſtanding, and in Being, tho' in continual dread of the utmoſt of Extremities:

Proſperous Cruelties are dangerous Preſidents.

mities: But the Government it ſelf is abſolutely ſunk already. And to return to my Subject, all theſe Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our bus'neſs rather to be Fear'd, than Belov'd. Now if the Power of *Rome* could not ſupport it ſelf under *Tyranny*, and *Oppreſſion*; how ſhould any particular perſon expect to eſcape? It is ſufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much ſtronger than thoſe of *Fear*. We ſhall now debate upon the Faireſt means of obtaining that Affection, which we ſo earneſtly deſire, with Honor and Juſtice. But we do not all of us ſtand in need of it alike: ſo that we muſt accommodate the Matter to every Mans condition, and courſe of Life; to ſee whether it be neceſſary to procure a General Eſteem, or that the kindneſs of ſome few may do the bus'neſs. We may however conclude upon This, as the Firſt, and principal point: That we contract Faithfull Friendſhips; and make acquaintances with thoſe that Truly Love, and value us. And this is a *Common Medium*, almoſt indifferently, betwixt Great, and Small. And a Rule that holds with Both alike; not as if all men ſtood equally in need of Glory, and Reputation, but they are good Helps yet (whoever

How to gain a fair Reputation in the World.

(whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other advantages, and the making of Friendſhips: which in my *Lælius* I have expreſly handled. And I have written two Books alſo upon the Subject of *Glory*; which yet I muſt touch over again, as a thing of great moment in the Conduct even of our moſt Important affairs.

What is perfect Glory.

WE are then arrived at the higheſt pitch of Glory, when we have gained Theſe Three Points: The *Love*, the *Truſt*, and the *Reverence* of the *People*: When we can hear them ſay; *That Man is worthy of Honor.* Now to ſpeak Short, and plain; The Method is well nigh the ſame, of Ingratiating our ſelves with a *Single Perſon*, or with the *Multitude.* But yet there is another manner of addreſs alſo, toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favor.

Bounty and Gentleneſs, work much upon the People.

TO ſpeak in Order now, to the three Points before mentioned; Nothing works ſo much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberality* or *Bounty.* And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination*: even without the Means of expreſſing it in *Effects.* For the very *Fame* and *Opinion* of a Mans Frankneſs, Bounty,

Bounty, Juſtice, Faith: and briefly of all thoſe Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetning, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderfull power over the hearts of the people. There is ſuch a Charm in That *Gracefulneſs* and *Decorum*, which we have already Treated of, that the very Nature, and bare Appearance of it does move us ſtrangely. Beſide that as it receives its Luſtre from the aforeſaid Virtues; whereever we find thoſe Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the perſon that poſſeſſes them. Theſe are the moſt powerfull attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives alſo, tho' of leſs moment.

The Power of Juſtice and Prudence.

AS to the Matter of *Truſt* and *Credit*; if we can get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Juſt*, our Bus'neſs is done: For we have naturally a confidence in thoſe that we think Wiſer than our ſelves; In men of *Providence*, and *Foreſight*, upon whom we may depend for our ſeaſonable direction, and advice; as thoſe that in Caſe of any difficulty, are able to help us out. This is the True, and Profitable *Wiſdom*: As to the *Truſt* now which we repoſe in *Juſt*, *Good*, and *Faithfull* Men; we muſt not entertain ſo much as the leaſt ſuſpicion

ſuſpicion in it, of Fraud, or Injury: Theſe being the men into whoſe hands we do reaſonably commit our Lives, our Children, and our Fortunes. But it is *Juſtice* yet, that creates the greater Confidence of the Two: For *Juſtice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wiſdom*; but *Wiſdom* can do nothing without *Juſtice*. For take away the Opinion of a mans *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtle* he is, by ſo much is he the more *Hatefull*, and *Suſpected*. *Juſtice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit*, he pleaſes; but taking them *Apart*, *Juſtice*, even without *Wiſdom*, may do very much; but *Wiſdom*, without *Juſtice*, is nothing Worth. Let not any man wonder now at my dividing One Virtue from Another, as if it were poſſible for a man to be *Juſt*, and not *Prudent*; when the Philoſophers are all agreed upon't (and my ſelf too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philoſophical Deciſion; and another thing to make a Diſcourſe in Words accommodated to Vulgar acceptation: And that's my Intent in this place, when I ſay that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wiſe*. For theſe are popular Opinions, and muſt be clothed in Common

Wiſdom without Juſtice, is Craft.

Common and popular Terms; which was alſo *Panatius*'s way of expreſſing himſelf. But to reſume my purpoſe.

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory, is This: So to behave our ſelves that people may hold us in Admiration, and account us Worthy of all honor. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that are Great, and beyond their Underſtanding: And ſo they are in particular Caſes too: Where they find more Good in a man than they expected. But where they phanſie any Virtues peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extoll men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration, deſpiſing, and vilifying ſuch, on the other ſide, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Strength or Courage. But they cannot yet be ſaid to *Deſpiſe* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Couzening, Quarrelſom Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Diſlike*, they do not yet *Contemn*: For thoſe Only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy*, *Droning*, *Heedleſs Life*; without any Benefit, either to Themſelves, or Others. The Admirable Spirits are ſuch as have the Repute of a Preeminence

Admiration produces Eſteem.

Great Virtue produces great Admiration.

nence in Virtue; and keep themſelves not only from doing Mean and Diſhonourable things, but clear even of thoſe Vices, which others cannot eaſily reſiſt. For by the Charms of pleaſures, our Minds are Diſſolv'd, and withdrawn from Virtue; and we are as much diſcompoſed and ſhaken, on the other hand, with the Burnings, and Tortures of Pain. It is a prodigious power that the Conſideration of Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, has over the Weakneſs of Fleſh and Bloud. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable muſt That Virtue be, that takes ſo abſolute a poſſeſſion of the Soul of man, in the Contemplation of Great and Honorable things; As in that elevated ſtate of mind, to make him look down upon all the Circumſtances of Fortune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*. This Bravery of mind never fails of moving great Admiration: Eſpecially accompany'd with *Juſtice*; which ſingle Virtue conſtitutes the very Character of a *Good man*; and makes him wonderfull in the Eyes of the people; and not without reaſon neither. For no man can be *Juſt*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pain*, *Baniſhment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before *Equity*, the Comforts that ſtand oppoſed to theſe Calamities. But the higheſt veneration of all is

As Magnanimity.

Juſtice.

is paid to him that holds out againſt *Mony*: And whereſoever they find ſuch a man, they think they can never do enough for him. So that by *Juſtice* we gain all thoſe points that lead to *Reputation*; As *Benevolence*, by Obliging as many as we can; *Repute* and *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of thoſe things which the greater part of the World purſues with *Greedineſs* and *Paſſion*. *Contempt of mony.*

NOW in my Opinion, there is not any Deſign or Condition of Life wherein one man does not ſtand in need of Another; and eſpecially, as to the matter of *Familiar Diſcourſe*, and *Converſation*: which a body ſhall hardly find to his ſatisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honeſt man*. Nay, the very *Opinion* of *Juſtice* will ſtand a man in great ſtead, even in the ſtricteſt ſolitude, and retirement imaginable; and more perhaps in that State, than any other, as living, in ſome ſort, out of Protection; and more expoſed to affronts; which, under the Notion of an Impious perſon, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Buſineſs* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Juſtice*. Nay ſo great *The very Opinion of Juſtice gives a man Reputation.*

Justice is sacred, even among Thieves & Pirates.

great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and those that support themselves only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet subsist without it. Insomuch that if one Thief does but Steal from another of the same Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith. And if the Captain of the Band shews but any partiality in the Distribution of the Booty, he is at least deserted by his Party, if it does not also cost him his Life; For there is a Discipline even among Pirates themselves: And their Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompus* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bargulus*) that was celebrated for his Justice to his Partners, and made himself a great Fortune by't; but not so great a one yet as *Viriatus* the *Portuguese*; of whose Power, and Courage some of our *Armies*, and Generals felt the sad Effects; till the *Prætor Lelius* (surnamed the *Wise*) defeated and scattered his Forces; and finally put such a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for Those to do that came after him. How great now must the force of *Justice* be in a *Regular*, and *well order'd Government*, which of it self alone is able to Advance, and Establish even a *Piratick Power*, without any other support?

HERODOTUS

HERODOTUS tells us that the *Medians* choſe their Kings Originally, for the Probity of their *Manners*, and in hope of enjoying the Benefits of *Common Juſtice:* Which I am perſwaded was the End, and Practice likewiſe of our Predeceſſors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppreſſed by the Stronger, the people preſently betook themſelves to one more Excellent than the reſt, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the diſtreſſed, and to make ſuch Proviſions, that common right might be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making of their *Laws*, they had the ſame Proſpect, as in the choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*, and in Truth, it could be no Right, without being ſo qualifi'd. If under the Adminiſtration of ſome *One man* that was *Juſt*, and *Good*, they attained that End, they were well contented There to Reſt: But in Caſe of failing, there were Laws Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, ſhould ſtill pronounce one and the ſame ſentence. This now is clear, that in all Elections, the people have ſtill had a Care to pitch upon him for their *Governor*,

Kings choſen for their Virtues.

vernor, that was moſt reverenc'd for his *Juſtice*: Always provided, that he were a Man of *Prudence* too. And what is it that a Nation would not believe it ſelf able to compaſs, under ſo Auſpicious a Conduct? We are therefore obliged to cheriſh, and to preſerve *Juſtice* by all manner of Means. *Firſt*, for its Own ſake, (for otherwiſe it were not *Juſtice*;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honor*, and *Glory*. But it is in *Glory*, as it is in *Mony*; there muſt care be taken, both in the *Getting*, of it, and in the *Laying of it out*; for we ſhall have perpetual Occaſions for it; and we muſt provide for Uſes of *Dignity*, as well as thoſe of *Neceſſity*. It was a great thing ſaid, That of *Socrates*; *The neareſt way to Honor* (ſays he) *is for a Man ſo to live, that he may be found to be That in* Truth, *which he would be* Thought *to be.* 'Tis a groſs miſtake, for any Man to think of getting a laſting Reputation in the World, by falſe Appearances of Things. Vain Oſtentation, or ſtudy'd Forms of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted in the very *Soul*, and brings forth fruit in our *Actions*. All Diſguiſes paſs away, and ſhed like Flowers; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Inſtances in abundance; but

A Notable Saying of Socrates.

but for Brevity ſake, I ſhall content my ſelf with an Obſervation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son of *Publius*, ſhall be famous to Poſterity, ſo long as there ſhall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it ſelf: But for his *Sons*, they were neither beloved, *Living*, nor Lamented, *Dead*; All good Men agreeing in a Deteſtation of their Lives; and approving the Juſtice of their Executions: He that would make himſelf truly Eminent for the Love of *Juſtice*, muſt diſcharge the *Duties* of it; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But how eaſily ſoever we may make our ſelves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point reſts in being ſuch Men, as we would be thought to be) it will not be amiſs yet to lay down ſome certain Precepts concerning this Matter.

Some are Born remarkable.

He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumſtance to make him taken notice of, either in reſpect of Fortune, or Family; as the Son for the purpoſe of ſuch or ſuch a Father, (which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Caſe:) All mens Eyes are preſently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and manners: He lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made

Publique. Now for Thoſe, who by reaſon of their Obſcure Extraction, are in their tender age not ſo much known in the World, I would have them prompted Early toward great Undertakings; and bend their Endeavours directly That way; which they will do the more Vigorouſly, in regard that Young Men are ſo far from being *Envy'd* that they are rather cheriſhed, and Encourag'd in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

Others make themſelves ſo.

Let a young Man Study the Uſe of this Arms.

THE Firſt Leſſon that I would give to a *Young man* for the advance of his Credit with the people; ſhould be to addict himſelf to the Study, and Practice of *Arms*; at leaſt where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues.* Our Predeceſſors, that were almoſt Continually in War, made themſelves Famous by This Profeſſion: But it has been Your Lot, (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broils of a Divided State, where the One ſide was Extremely Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under *Pompey*; even in This very War, you acquitted your ſelf as *a Man at Arms* to all purpoſes; an Excellent Horſeman, a perſon of Indefatigable Induſtry: and all This to the

the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth it ſelf ſunk here, and ſo did your Glory. It is not upon your particular, but a general account, that I have taken up this Diſcourſe: Wherefore I ſhall now proceed to that which remains.

The Virtues of the Mind are more Noble than thoſe of the Body.

AS the Operations of the *Mind*, are in all Caſes much more Noble than thoſe of the *Body*; ſo are the things that we compaſs by the Faculties of our *Reaſon*, and *Underſtanding*, of much greater value than thoſe things that we bring to paſs by *Corporal Force*. The *Firſt* point that recommends us to a good Eſteem in the World, is *Modeſty*; after that, comes *Piety*, and *Reverence* to our *Parents*; and then follows a Tenderneſs of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*. It is a promiſing Sign, when a Young Man applies himſelf to perſons of Eminence for Wiſdom, Authority, and Good affection to their Country: For it Creates an *Opinion*, and *Expectation* of *Great Matters* from him that propoſes to himſelf the Imitation of *Great Examples*. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rutilius*, that if he liv'd, he would make a *Famous Civilian*, and an *Honeſt Man*. And what

Of Modeſty and Piety.

It is a good Sign when a man loves good Company.

was This grounded upon, but the frequent Converſation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius*? But *Lucius Craſſus*, I muſt confeſs without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his own Fame, and dignifi'd himſelf in that Generous and Memorable accuſation of his. He was at that time of an age to be rather held by Flatteries and fair Words to his very Exerciſes, than left to himſelf. And yet at that age, with *Demoſthenes*, the things which he had ſo happily conceiv'd at Home, he did with no leſs Honor Execute in Publique.

Of Speech. WE may divide *Speech* into *Familiar Diſcourſe*, and matter of *Argument*, or *Pleading*. The *Latter* undoubtedly is of the greater Efficacy toward the purchaſing of *Glory*: And this is it which *Affability.* we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a certain *Affability*, and *Gentleneſs* of Faſhion too, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet extant ſome Epiſtles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Caſſander*; and of *Antigonus* to *Philip*; (Three perſons highly eſteemed for their Wiſdom:) And they do all of them preſcribe the Uſe of *Courteſie*, and *Fair Language* to him that would Ingratiate

tiate himſelf with the *Multitude*; and only the Careſs of ſome Frank and Familiar *Name*, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow Soldier*, or *Camarade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himſelf to the *Souldiery*. But then it has another kind of force, the Faculty of *Haranguing* the *Multitude*; when with *One Speech* ſometimes a Man gets an *Eternal Fame*. It is wonderfull, the Tranſports that are wrought by the Power of *Eloquence*, and *Wiſdom*: And the Veneration that is paid by the Auditory to a perſon whom they take to be ſo much Wiſer, and Intelligent, than other Mortals. And yet there is a *Mixt way of ſpeaking*, that does wonders too; Eſpecially with a Concurrence in it of both *Weight* and *Modeſty*; which, in a Young Man, makes it ſtill the more admirable. There are many Occaſions that require *Eloquence*; and many of our Countrey-men, (and Young Men too) that are highly eſteemed for it, both at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which I look upon to be the moſt *Effectual*, and *praiſe worthy*, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar*; and the Subject of it, is either *Accuſation*, or *Defence*: the *Latter* is the more *Laudable* of the Two, and yet in many Caſes, the *Other* is likewiſe to be *Approved*. As in what I ſaid juſt now of

Eloquence the Power of it.

The Subject of it.

Craſſus; and *Anthony* alſo, when he was a Young man, did the ſame thing. *Publius Sulpitius* raiſed the Glory of his Eloquence by his Charge againſt *C. Norbanus*, a Seditious and an Unprofitable Citizen. But this is not a thing to be done often; nor, in Truth, is it to be done at all, unleſs on the behalf of the *Government*, as the *Two Lucullus*'s: or in favour of the *Oppreſſed*, as I my ſelf did for the *Sicilians*: *Julius Caſar* did as much for the *Sardinians*; and *Fuſius* ſhew'd his Skill too againſt *Marcus Aquilius*: ſo that it may be once done, but no more; unleſs a Man be call'd to it by his Duty to the Commonwealth. And in the very Caſe of *Publique Enemies*, there may be an excuſe for *Frequent Accuſations*: But even There too, we muſt keep within the Bounds of Moderation: For it is the part of an Ill-natur'd Man, (or I might rather ſay, ſcarce of a Man) to make a Trade of hunting People to death. And beſide the danger that it brings upon the Perſecutor, it is an Infamous, and a Raſcally *Character*, that of an *Informer*. It was the *Nick-name* that was given to *Marcus Brutus*, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian) and it caſt a blemiſh upon the very Luſtre of his Family. And moreover, be ſure to obſerve this Duty, as

It is a buſie Office that of an Informer.

as Inviolable, and *Sacred*; *Never to have any thing to do in the Expoſing of Innocent Bloud.* For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the World can juſtifie; for what can be ſo Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reaſon, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conſervation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Deſtruction of Honeſt Men? But it does not follow yet, becauſe we muſt not upon any terms perſecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in ſome Caſe defend the Wicked, and the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Cuſtom, and to Humanity, ſo to do. It is the part of the *Judge*, conſtantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not ſo ſtrictly ty'd up to the *Preciſe Truth*, as not to make his beſt ſometimes of that which carries ſome near *Reſemblance* of it. I ſhould not take This Freedom upon this Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Panætius*, (one of the ſoundeſt of the *Stoiques*) to ſupport me in it. The greateſt Favour and Renown, is gotten by a *Defenſive Eloquence*, and it is ſo much the Greater, as the Power, and Oppoſition of the Adverſary is the Stronger; and according to the Straits, and Exigencies of the Party reliev'd. We have brought off

Have a Care of Innocent Bloud.

many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roſcius Amerinus* againſt the Force and Authority of *L. Sylla* himſelf: The Oration you know is ſtill Extant.

Liberality is Twofold Labor and Mony.

HAVING already ſet forth the Methods by which a Young man may advance his *Reputation* in the World; we ſhall now diſcourſe that matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Twofold*; For we oblige thoſe that ſtand in need of our Help, either by our *Labor*, or by our *Mony*. The *Latter* is the *Eaſier* way; eſpecially where the *Benefactor* is Maſter of an *Eſtate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honorable* and *Splendid*, and better becoming a Clear and Generous Mind. For tho' the will may be Frank enough in Both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his *Fortune*, but the other to his *Virtue*. And then by Theſe Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry, and one Bounty is deſtroy'd by another; and in the very act, we loſe the Means of Obliging. But he that is Liberal of his *Pains*, that is to ſay, of his *Induſtry*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to aſſiſt him toward the doing of more: and then by the Cuſtom and Practice of doing good Offices a man

man does not only learn the *Way* of *Obliging*, but gets the very *Habit* of it. It is a Notable Reprehenſion, that of *Philip* in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*, for endeavouring to ingratiate himſelf with the *Macedonians* by the Force of *Mony*, *What is it*, (*with a miſchief*) ſays he, *that ſhould make you expect Faith from thoſe People whom you your ſelf have Corrupted? Is it that inſtead of their Prince, you would be looke upon only as their Servant or Purſe-bearer?* An Office ſo much below the Dignity of a Monarch! Such a Bounty could not have been better expreſt, than by calling it a Corruption: For the very Receiver is the worſe for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epiſtle was written only to his Son; but it may ſerve as a Precept to Mankind. *A generous Reproof.*

NOW as there is no queſtion, but that the Bounty which conſiſts in *Labor*, and *Induſtry* is the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extenſive*, becauſe more men are the better for't; we meet with ſeveral Occaſions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exerciſe alſo of the *Other ſort* of *Bounty*, which in ſome Caſes muſt be put in Practice, but with Choice, and within Compaſs: For there are many people that ſquander away their whole *The Bounty of Labor is the fairreſt of the Two.* *Give within compaſs.*

whole Estates upon Inconsiderate Gratuities. Nor can any thing be more senseless, than for a man to take pains to put himself out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do. And these unadvised Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Over-giving, they fall to the repairing of their *Profusions* upon *Some*, by *Violence* upon *Others*: and the Friends they get by *Giving*, on the *One* side, will not ballance the Enemies they raise, by *taking away* on the *Other*. Wherefore, as I would not lay my Fortune in Common, so neither would I refuse a part of it to my Friend, but still in proportion to the whole. We have a common saying which is grown by use into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembring. For what Mean can be There expected, where by the Custom of *Giving*, and of *Receiving*, both the *Giver* and the *Receiver* come to desire the *same thing*?

Prodigality.

OF *large Givers* there are *Two sorts*; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they lash out upon Treats, Popular Doales, Prizes, Publique Sports, and Spectacles, and other Entertainments, which are no sooner past, than forgotten.

forgotten. The *Liberal*, they employ their Expences upon Redeeming of Slaves, ſetting a Friend out of Debt, or helping him out in the beſtowing of a Daughter, in the Getting of a Fortune, or the Encreaſing of it. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theophraſtus*'s head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among ſo many Excellent things, he ſhould be guilty of one ſo very groſs an abſurdity. His Diſcourſe runs much upon the Honor, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Preſents; and he makes this to be the great advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furniſhes a man with means to be at That Expence. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more certain, and Conſiderable, in the few Inſtances I have before mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Ariſtotle*'s, upon This Subject: *We make nothing* (ſays he) *of our Profuſions upon the Humouring of the Common People, but to hear of* Ten Crowns *given in a Siege for a* Bottle of water, *what a wonderment is made of it*, as a thing Incredible; till upon ſecond Thoughts, we find the price excus'd by the Neceſſity? But in the Other Extravagant Spoil, and Exceſſive Prodigality, where there is neither Honor, nor Neceſſity conſulted in it, and the very pleaſure

True Liberality.

pleaſure paſſes with the Spectacle; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but the weakeſt of the people that ſtand affected with this vanity? and no ſooner are they ſatiated, than the Delight it ſelf is forgotten. And who are they that are ſo much taken with theſe Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves, that is to ſay, people either of Servile Condition, or of Servile Minds, ſcarce any man of Senſe, Judgment, or Conſideration, approving of them? I know very well that it is an Ancient Cuſtom in This City, for the *Ædile* to exhibit Shews to the People, upon entring his Office; and that very good men expect it from him. *P. Craſſus* the *Rich* (as well in his *Fortune*, as in his *Name*) made a very *Magnificent Entry*; and ſo did *L. Craſſus*, after him; tho' joyned with *Q. Marius* too, a man of ſingular Moderation. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*, with a great many more; as *Lucullus*, *Hortenſius*, *Silanus*; which were all out done by *P. Lentulus*, in my Conſulſhip, and *Scaurus* Emulated him. But the moſt Pompous, and Expenſive Solemnity of all, was that of our Friend *Pompey*, in his *Second Conſulſhip*; This is enough to ſhew you my opinion in all theſe Caſes. But yet however, we muſt have a care on the

Fine ſhews are only for Women and Children.

the other hand, not to incur a ſuſpicion of *Avarice*. *Mamercus*, (a very Rich man) was repulſed when he ſtood for *Conſul*, becauſe he had refuſed the Charge of *Ædile*. Wherefore, if the people call for it, on the One ſide, and wiſe men be not againſt it, (tho' they do not deſire it) on the Other; the thing ought to be done: But according to our Abilities, as it has been my own Caſe: or otherwiſe, where we may reap ſome advantage by it, that will more than Countervail the Charge. As it turn'd much to the reputation of *Oreſtes*, not long ſince, the publique Dinners that he expos'd in the Streets, to the Multitude, under Colour of Dedicating his Tenths to *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for ſupplying the people in a great Scarcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Buſhel: when by ſo doing, he delivered himſelf from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude; and (being *Ædile* too) by a Liberality, that was neither Diſhonorable nor Burthenſome. But it was a moſt Glorious, and Memorable action my Friend *Milo's* engaging of the *Sword-players* for the *Publique ſafety*, which in my own particular I was not a little concern'd in: and by means whereof, all the attempts and outrages of *Claudius* were

In what Caſe Profuſion may be allowed.

Cruſhe

Cruſht and diſappointed. So that Bounties ſhould be grounded either upon Neceſſity or Profit; and even in Theſe Caſes too the beſt Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a perſon of great Worth and Underſtanding) was wont to make it his Vaunt, that it never coſt him one peny of Mony to the people, the obtaining of all the Favours that were ever conferr'd upon him. *Cotta* ſaid the ſame thing, and without Vanity, ſo might we our ſelves too, in ſome degree; for the expence of my *Ædileſhip* was ſo ſmall, that it could not ſignifie any thing toward the gaining of thoſe Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon me as by a Common Conſent; and That in my own year too: which is more than any of thoſe beforenamed, can boaſt of. I take that mony to be beſt laid out which is employed upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquaducts, and other works, for the good of the Publique. Thoſe Bounties give more of preſent ſatisfaction, I muſt confeſs, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may ſay; but the Other will find better acceptation with poſterity: As for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I ſhall ſpeak the more Favourably of them, for *Pompey*'s ſake: But Learned men, I perceive,

But ſtill within Bounds.

perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panetius*, for one, whom in this Diſcourſe I have rather Followed, than Interpreted: and then there is *Phalereus Demetrius*, who was very ſharp upon the famous *Pericles*, for his Extravagant Profuſion upon the Porch of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Diſcourſe of a *Common-wealth*. Now for a Concluſion; This kind of *Liberality*, upon the whole matter, is ſtark naught; and yet by the Circumſtances of Times, and the like, it may be render'd Neceſſary; But in all Caſes there muſt be obſerv'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion*.

Of Privater Liberality.

AS to the Other ſort of a *Bounty* that ariſes from *Liberality*, we muſt accommodate our ſelves to the Occaſion, and in Differing Caſes uſe Differing Methods. One man lies under the pinch of a preſſing Calamity: another man's Condition is not much amiſs perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My Charity binds me in the Firſt place, to aſſiſt the Miſerable perſon; at leaſt if he did not make himſelf ſo by his own fault. And yet I would not be ſo hard neither as not to help him alſo, that is Well already, in order to his Farther advantage: but this is a point that

How to beſtow them.

that requires ſingular Care and Judgment in the Choice. It was well ſaid of *Ennius*, *A Benefit miſplaced turns to a Crime.* But in that which is beſtow'd upon a good and a Gratefull man, there's, Firſt, the Conſcientious Comfort of the Virtue it ſelf; and then the Satisfaction that it brings us in other reſpects: For the moſt acceptable thing in the World is a diſcreet Liberality, and the Reputation of it muſt needs be great, when the Goodneſs of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind.

A Regard to the Benefit as well as to the Perſon.

WE muſt have a regard alſo to the Benefit as well as to the perſon; and that it may be of ſuch a Quality as to Deſcend in the memory of it to the Children and Poſterity of the perſon Obliged, that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Deteſtation for it, and every man looks upon himſelf as Injur'd in the diſcouragement of Bounty: And the Guilty in this Caſe, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Beſide the Benefit that this piety of Diſpoſition brings to the Publique, in the Enriching of the poor, and the Redeeming of Captives, which, as *Craſſus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the Work of the Senate it ſelf. And is not

not this now a Nobler way of Obliging than the Caſting of our mony away upon *Pageantries*, and *Popular Spectacles?* This is an Expence for a man of Senſe, and Honor; whereas the other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the phanſies of the Common people.

Our Obligations ſhould be Frank.

AS we are to Oblige with Frankneſs; ſo we are not to Exact any thing again with Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, ſelling, letting, hiring, *&c.* to behave our ſelves toward our Neighbor and acquaintance, with Candor, and Reſpect: tho' to the prejudice ſometime of our Own Right: avoiding Law-ſuits as much as may be, and a little more perhaps than needs; for it is not only Generous, but profitable too, for a man in ſome Caſes to remit ſomewhat of the ſtraitneſs of his juſt due: but in ſo doing he muſt have an Eye yet to his Family, or Eſtate, which it were Impious not to defend: but in ſuch a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harſhneſs, or Greedineſs in the Diſpute. For a man cannot employ his Mony better, than to do others good with it, with a regard ſtill to the maintaining of his Own.

Of Hospitality.

IT is with great Reason that *Theophrastus* recommends *Hospitality*: for in my Opinion it is a very Honorable fashion for the Houses of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illustrious Guests: and it gives no small Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That sort of Beneficence in This City. But then for those that would make an Honest Interest abroad in the World, it is a very great advantage, the Favour, and Recommendation which they get among Foreign Nations through the friendship of those they meet with upon this Occasion. *Theophrastus* writing of the Hospitality of *Timon* of *Athens*, tells us that he gave strict Order to his Servants in the Country that his House should be still Open, to whatever *Lacian* (or *Townsman* of his) past that way.

Obligations of Care and Industry.

NOW for Those Obligations that are only the Effect of *Care*, and *Industry*, without *many*, they are both *Publique*, and *Private*: Extending from the *Commonwealth* it self, to every *Particular Member of it*: For what readier way can there be in This World to Eminent *Wealth*, and *Preferment*, than the Skill of Directing, and Advising in Difficulties

Difficulties of *Law*: together with the Power of Obliging ſo many upon That Score? Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of our Forefathers, the Knowledge, and Interpretation, as well as the Conſtitution of the *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Eſteem: and reſerved (until this Confuſion of Affairs) as a Matter Sacred, in the Poſſeſſion of Men of Higheſt Authority and Wiſdom. But the Glory of this Science, as well as That of our Ancient Nobility and Virtue, is now quite Extinct: and to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a perſon not inferior in *Honor* to all that went before him, but in *Letters* much their Superior. So that This is a Study generally acceptable, beſide that it puts us in the way of doing a thouſand Good Turns.

The Reputation of the Civil Law.

AND there is ſome Affinity or Reſemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and that of an *Orator*: Only the *Latter* has more in it of *Vigor*, *Agreeableneſs*, and *Elevation of Spirit*. There is not any thing that moves the Soul, like *Eloquence*. It fills the Hearers with *Admiration*: it gives *Hope* to the *Miſerable*: it creates as many *Friendſhips* as there are Perſons that it Defends, and our Predeceſſors accounted of it as the moſt

Some Affinity betwixt a Civilian *and an* Orator.

The Force of Eloquence.

moſt Honorable of all Profeſſions. It is a General and Publique Bleſſing, when men of Eloquence, and Induſtry, (after the Example of our Forefathers) undertake the Patronage of ſo many as ſtand in need of it, without either *Grudging* or *Reward.* I ſhould take Occaſion here, over and over to Lament the Diſcontinuance, if not the utter Loſs and Deſtruction of this Divine Faculty, if it were not for appearing over much concerned in my own Intereſt and Caſe. And yet we cannot but take notice how many brave Orators we have loſt; how few we have any hope of, among thoſe that are growing up; and the ſmaller number yet, of thoſe that are left; tho' 'tis true that we have men of Boldneſs without Knowledge in Abundance. Now ſince we cannot be all of us either *Orators*, or *Lawyers*, (having indeed but few great men in either Faculty) we may do a world of good ſervices yet, by Recommending, or Solliciting on the Behalf of Petitioners, or Clients; and by Employing our Intereſts either with the Bench, or with the Counſel, for their Behoof. Whoſoever takes This Courſe, ſhall be ſure to Oblige a great many men, and conſequently by a great many to be well ſpoken of. But then we muſt have a Care (which every man will look to in

The Decay of Orators.

in his Own Diſcretion) that while we would Oblige one man, we do not Offend another. For it happens many times that either through Heedleſneſs, we diſoblige ſome body that does not deſerve it, or out of Raſhneſs provoke ſome Other body that may make us rue it. In which Caſe, we ought to excuſe our ſelves, as well as we can, for the leaſt offence given to any man, even where we never intended it; by ſhewing him the Inevitable Neceſſity that forc'd us upon it, and the deſire we have, upon any favourable Occaſion, to make him ſome favourable amends.

Diſoblige no man.

IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have uſually a regard either to peoples *Manners* or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common ſaying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the* Man *only that we conſider, and not the* Eſtate. This is a handſom flouriſh, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly beſtow his Time and his Pains, upon the ſervice of a powerfull, and a Wealthy perſon, than in the ſupport and protection of the beſt Poor man that ever was born? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our ſervices where we may reaſonably hope for the ſpeedieſt, and the moſt Certain Return.

In Benefits conſider the Man, *not the* Fortune.

And

And This proceeds from a Miſtaken Eſtimate of the Nature of things. For what if *That Honeſt poor man* cannot requite us in *Kind*, He may do it yet in *Thankfulneſs of Heart*, and in *Juſt Acknowledgments*? It was well enough ſaid, (whoever ſaid it) *He that* Has *my Mony, has not* Reſtor'd *it*; *and he that has* Reſtor'd *it*, Has *it no longer*. *But in the Caſe of* Good Will, *he that has* Paid *it* Has *it ſtill*; *And he that* Has *it ſtill, has* Paid *it*. Now for thoſe men that value themſelves upon their Titles, or Poſſeſſions, and have the World at Will; they are ſo far from accounting themſelves under any Obligation for a Benefit Received, that they look upon the very acceptance of it, (let it be never ſo great) as an Obligation laid upon the other ſide. Nay they will not ſtick to be Suſpicious, and Jealous of it, as a Prologue to ſome Petition, or farther Deſign. But to tell them, *that ever they ſtood in need of, or were Beholden to any man*, is to ſtrike them to the very *Heart*. Whereas the *Poor man*, that takes all Friendly Offices to himſelf, without any reſpect to his Condition; *This Poor man*, (I ſay) makes it his Buſineſs, not only to expreſs his Gratitude to thoſe that have already obliged him, but to ingratiate himſelf likewiſe to thoſe which

The Pride and Vanity of Great Men.

The Poor mans Gratitude.

which he hopes hereafter may be kind to him; as having Occaſion for many Friends. And if it be his Good Hap to render his Patron a profitable ſervice, his Humility makes the Value of it to be Leſs than it is, rather than Greater. And it is farther to be Obſerved, that upon the Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledgment terminates either in Himſelf alone, or, at the Utmoſt, in the Effect it may have upon his Children, and Family. But in the protection of a poor Creature, that is yet Virtuous, and Modeſt, a man makes to himſelf an intereſt in all the poor honeſt men in Nature; which is no Inconſiderable party out of the Body of the Common people. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the *Good*, than the *Fortunate*. We ſhould do our beſt however to leave no ſort of men unſatisfied; and if This point ſhould come in queſtion, let *Themiſtocles* decide the Controverſie. It was put to him *Whether a man ſhould rather beſtow his Daughter upon a* Poor man *that were* Honeſt, *or upon a man that had* More Wealth *but* Leſs Integrity. And his Anſwer was This; *I had rather beſtow her upon a* Man *that wants* Mony *than upon* Mony *that wants a* Man. But our Minds and Manners are now-adays corrupted and depraved

A Wiſe ſaying of Themiſtocles.

depraved with the Love of *Mony*: and yet, as to the matter of *Superfluity*, what is any man the *Better* for't? it may be of ſome uſe perhaps to him that has it; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Caſes* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it ſerves only to make a man the more powerfull, but not one jot the more Honeſt. Not that I would ſerve a good man ever the leſs, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would ſtill ſerve him for his *Virtue*, and not becauſe of his *Wealth*: and govern my ſelf by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with one Precept more I ſhall Conclude: We muſt never Employ our Faculties and Endeavours, either to *uphold Iniquity*, or to *overthrow Juſtice*. For *Juſtice is the Foundation of an Everlaſting Fame, and there can be nothing Commendable without it.*

Juſtice is the Foundation of a Laſting Fame.

Of Publick Bounties.

HAVING already treated of Benefits with a regard to *Particular Perſons*; we ſhall now Diſcourſe of That ſort of Bounty, which reſpects the *Univerſality* of the *Commonwealth*: Of this Bounty there are Two Kinds. The *One* concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community*; the *Other*, the *Particular Members*

Members of it: And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both: or however, to take Care of Particulars: but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it; Or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus*'s *Excessive Largesse* of *Corn* to the people, was *Mischievous*; for it exhausted the *Treasury*; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People*; and consequently both the Republique it self, and the Citizens were the Better for't.

The Propriety of Particulars must be protected.

IT should be the Principal Care of him that has the Administration of Publique Affairs, to see that every Individual be protected in his Propriety; and that private men may not be dispossess'd of their Rights and Estates, under the pretext of a Publick Good. It was a pestilent proposition, That of *Philip*'s, in his *Tribuneship*, about *an Equal Partition of Lands*; But then it was a great Instance of his Modesty, the letting of it fall so easily again. He did many Ill things, to curry favour with the people; and he dropt one lewd speech too, *that there were not Two thousand men of Estates in the whole City*. What a desperate

The danger of Levelling Principles.

rate Hint was That toward the bringing of all things to a Level, and all Conditions of men to a Parity: One of the greateſt Plagues that can befall a State? For it was the main End of the Founding and Eſtabliſhing of Cities and publick bodies, that particulars might be ſecur'd in their Poſſeſſions, and every man ſafe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though men Aſſociate by an Impulſe of Nature, it was Deſire and Hope yet of keeping what they had gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the charging of the people with Extraordinary Taxes: which happened either through the Lowneſs of the Treaſury, or the Expence and Burthen of a Continual War. This is a Courſe by all means poſſible to be avoiding, by laying in of Proviſions beforehand; but if ever any Commonwealth ſhould fall under This Neceſſity (for I had rather foretell it of any Other, than Ours; as I ſpeak This only by way of General Diſcourſe) it will be highly neceſſary that the people be punctually enformed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to ſubſiſt, but by complying with ſuch a Neceſſity. It behoves all Governors to furniſh

No Extraordinary Taxes.

furnish the Publique Stores with Necessaries, before the Danger presses them; in what Proportion and of what Kind, is a matter so well known, that it is sufficient the bare mention of the thing thus by the Bye.

Corrupt Magistrates are the Bane of any Governments.

BUT above all things, let all men in Publique Administration keep themselves clear from the least suspicion of *Avarice*. *I would to the Heavens* (says C. *Pontius* the *Samnite*) *that Fortune had reserved me for another Age, and kept me from coming into the World, till the* Romans *had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I should quickly have put an end to their Empire.* Truly he must have staid a good while then; for 'tis but of late that *Rome* has been tainted with This Evil. Now if *Pontius* was a man of such a Resolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The first Law that ever we had against the *Corruption of Magistrates*, is not as yet of *a hundred and ten years standing*; and That was *Piso*'s. But we have had a great many Others since That time; and every One still more severe than the Other. How many Criminals have we had? How many Condemn'd? What a Confusion upon the *Social War* in *Italy*?

And That War excited too merely by the *Guilty*, to ſave themſelves from *Puniſhment*? There was no longer any Courſe of Law, or Juſtice; but our Friends and Allies, lay expoſed to Seiſure and Pillage, without Relief: And if we are not totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakneſs of Others, than from our own Virtue.

The Abſtinence *of* Africanus.

PANÆTIUS extolls *Africanus* for his *Abſtinence* in the matter of *Mony*: And why not? But ſtill he might have found greater Virtues in him than That: For That Abſtinence of his was not the Virtue of the *Man* only, but of the *Times*. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Perſeus*, made himſelf Maſter of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite value; and brought ſo much Mony into the Publique Treaſury, that One Captains Booty deliver'd the People from any farther need of Taxes. And This he did without any other Advantage to his Family, than the Honourable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Action. *Africanus* the Younger (in imitation of his Father) got as little by the Deſtruction of *Carthage*; and his *Fellow-Cenſor*, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the Magnificent City

City of *Corinth*. But his Bus'neſs was rather the Ornament, and Luſtre of his *Country*, than That of his *Houſe*. Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left.

THERE is not certainly a more Deteſtable Vice (eſpecially in Princes, and Publique Magiſtrates) than Covetouſneſs: And it is not only a Mean thing, but an Impious, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That which the *Pythian Oracle* deliver'd in the Caſe of *Sparta*, looks like a Prediction; not only Applicable to the *Lacedæmonians*, but to all Opulent Nations alſo whatſoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Deſtroy that Commonwealth. There is no ſurer way in Nature for men in Power to gain upon the affections of the multitude, than by *Frugality* and *Moderation*. But yet when out of an affectation of Popularity they come to propound ſuch a *Levelling Diviſion of Lands* as is above mentioned; and either to Force the Right Owners out of their poſſeſſions, or to the remitting of Juſt Debts, theſe people ſhake the

Avarice a Deteſtable Vice.

The Power of Frugality in Publique Adminiſtrations.

very Foundations of Government; In the first place Dissolving the Bonds of Concord and Agreement, which can never consist with This way of taking Monies from some, and discharging others. And what's become of common Equity then, when no man is left the Master of his own? For it is a Privilege Essential to a Community, that it be Free, and every Man secur'd in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Interest and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine: for it makes the Loser still your Enemy; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither: Or at best, so coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to: Especially dissembling the Inward satisfaction of being forgiven a Debt; for fear of being thought unable to pay it. Whereas the Injur'd party will never forget it, but carry the purpose of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there should be more to whom we Unjustly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjustly take away? This does not mend the matter one jot: for we are not to judge in This case by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never had an Estate, to

The danger of Invading Proprieties.

to diſpoſſeſs another of an Eſtate that has been many years (nay Ages perhaps) in the poſſeſſion of it, himſelf and Family; and that he that hath an Eſtate, ſhould have it taken from him? It was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedemonians* Baniſh'd *Lyſander*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all Precedent of former times. And there follow'd ſuch Broils upon it, that their beſt men were Baniſh'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place of an *Ariſtocracy*, even to the utter diſſolution of one of the beſt Conſtituted Republiques upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither, but the Contagion of Thoſe Tumults ſpread it ſelf ſo far, that the reſt of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd by That Example. What ſhall we ſay of our *Gracchi*? (the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Africanus*) It was this very point of Controverſie about *Lands*, that deſtroy'd them too. But on the contrary; how much Honor has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himſelf, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon*? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Poſſeſſion of *Uſurpers*, when he recover'd it by a ſurprize from *Argos*, ſuppreſs'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Reſtor'd ſix hundred of the Wealthieſt Citizens

A Generous account of Aratus.

that had been Baniſh'd, and ſet the City it ſelf at Liberty. But finding great difficulty at laſt how to accommodate the buſineſs of Lands and poſſeſſions; and conſidering that it would be hard on the One ſide for thoſe that he reſtor'd to their Town to live ſtill in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Eſtates; and little Better, on the Other ſide, to break in upon, and take away Poſſeſſions of Fifty Years ſtanding; wherein ſo many ſeveral Intereſts were concern'd, by Purchaſes, Portions, Settlements, and the like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners: He concluded it Unreaſonable either to take from the One what they were poſſeſs'd of, or not to ſatisfie the Other, in ſome degree, for their juſt Pretenſions. Wherefore he bethought himſelf, and reſolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria*; giving Orders that all things ſhould continue in the ſame ſtate he left them, untill his Return: So that he preſently poſted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolomy the Second King* of *Alexandria*; He had no ſooner informed that Generous Prince of his Buſineſs, with the Deſign he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country; but without any difficulty, this Illuſtrious perſon prevail'd upon him for a large Sum of

of mony. This Treaſure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal perſons of that place, to adviſe with upon This Affair, and to take a ſtrict account, as well of thoſe that were poſſeſs'd of Other Mens Eſtates, as of thoſe that had Loſt their Own. The matter was ſo handled, that upon a reaſonable Eſtimate of the Lands, ſome were perſwaded to content themſelves with the value in Mony, and to yield the Land; and Others choſe rather to take Mony for their Land, than to conteſt for the Recovery of it. So that in the Concluſion, the Controverſie was Compounded; and Both parts abundantly ſatisfi'd with the Accord. What Pity was it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of *Rome!* This is the right way of proceeding in ſuch Caſes; without expoſing the perſons and goods of Citizens (as it has been Twice in our days) to *Proſcriptions*, and *Outcries*. This *Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wiſe man, conſulted the Common welfare: And it is the higheſt point of a Good, and a prudent Magiſtrate, to Maintain the Properties of the people, and not to Invade them; but keeping all within the bounds of common equity. Why ſhould any Man dwell *Gratis* in my houſe?

houſe? as if I were to purchaſe, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for Another (in deſpite of my heart) to reap the Fruits of my Labor, and Expence? For This is the Caſe in taking away from me That which is my Own, and giving to another That which does not Belong to him. And what's the End of theſe *Letters of Protection*, (if I may ſo call them) but that you ſhall buy Land with my Mony; you keep the Land, and I loſe my Mony?

No Debts to be permitted, that may endanger the Publique.

IT is a matter therefore of great Moment, that no Debts be permitted, which may endanger the publique. And this may be ſeveral ways prevented, if ſuch a Courſe be taken, that Prodigals and Debtors may not raiſe their Fortunes upon Defrauding their Creditors; the One loſing their Own, and the other getting what belongs to another Man. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth like Faith, and Credit: which can never be expected where people do not lie under a Neceſſity of paying their due Debts; a thing which was never ſo violently preſt, as when I was Conſul: All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it: And yet I reſiſted all Motions tending That way, to the very Rooting of this Evil out

out of the Commonwealth. There was never more mony ſtirring, nor ever was there ſurer, or better Payment: For where the Hope of Deceiving is cut off, Men muſt neceſſarily keep Touch. It is true, that *Caſar*, (who was in Thoſe days ſubdu'd, though now a Conqueror) that *Caſar*, I ſay, did put his former purpoſes in Execution, even when he had no need ſo to do: His very Appetite being ſo Vitious, that he took pleaſure in the Evil it ſelf, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good Patriots to keep themſelves clear of this ſame perverſe ſort of Liberality, that takes from one, and gives to another: and in the firſt place, to provide that all men may be equally ſupported in the Enjoyment of their own, by Law, and Common Juſtice. And that the poor, and ſimple may not be Circumvented, or Oppreſs'd by Power, nor the Wealthy obſtructed in the holding or receiving of their Dues, by the Envy and Malignity of the people. And moreover, they ſhould by all means endeavour both in War, and Peace to advance the Republique, in Empire, Poſſeſſions and Revenue: Theſe are the proper Offices and Atchievements of great men, and this was the Study, and the Exerciſe of our Forefathers.

fathers. Those that addict themselves to these Duties, gain great Glory and Good will to their Own particulars, beside the profit that they bring to the Publique. *Antipater* the *Tyrian* (and a *Stoique*) that lately deceased at *Athens*, charges *Panatius* with leaving out Two Branches touching Health, and Mony in these Precepts concerning Benefits. But I suppose that they were rather pass'd over by That famous Philosopher, as things well enough understood, and needless to be farther inculcated, how advantageous soever.

A Caution in matter of Health and Estate.

IT is a good means of preserving *Health*, for every man to understand his own Constitution; and to observe what agrees with him, and what not. To live Temperately in all respects, as well in our Diet, and the care of our Bodies, as in our pleasures: Using the common helps of Physique also, in case of need. In the gathering of an Estate, we must do nothing but what is warrantable, and honest; And when it is fairly gotten, it may be preserv'd, and improv'd by Parsimony, and caution. This Point is excellently well handled by *Xenophon* (the *Socratist*) in his *OEconomiques*; which I my self at about your Age turned out of *Greek* into *Latin*.

THE

THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things in compariſon, (which was the Fourth Conſideration, omitted by *Panatius*) is a caſe which very often happens: For ſometimes *Bodily Goods* fall into Competition with the Goods of *Fortune*: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Thoſe of the *Body*: And ſometime again, One of either of them is compar'd with Another of the ſame Kind. As in the *Firſt* inſtance, I had rather have *Health*, than *Mony*: In the *Second*, I had rather have a *Great Eſtate*, than a *Robuſt ſtrength* of *Body*. And ſo forward: I had rather enjoy *Health*, than *Pleaſure*; I had rather be *Strong* than *Nimble*. And then in the Collation of *External things*, I had rather have *Honor*, than *Wealth*: and a Fortune in the *City*, rather than in the *Country*. The Compariſon that we find in the *Elder Cato*, was of This Quality. The Queſtion was put to him, What he look't upon as the greateſt convenience in a *Country Life*? His anſwer was, in the *Firſt place*, *Good Paſturage*. What *next* then? *Paſturage* that was *Indifferently Good*. And what *then*? *Paſturage* ſtill, tho' a Degree *worſe* than the Other. And what again? *Tillage*. What do you think of *Uſury*? (ſays the *Enquirer*.) And what do you think of *Murther* (ſays *Cato*.)

Two Profitable things meeting in compariſon.

Cato.) By This and abundantly more, we cannot but understand that Things Profitable came often in Competition: And that This Fourth enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting, Disposing, or Using of monies, it is a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philosopher; and better understood by the Good Men upon the *Bourse*, than by the Learned Men in the *Schools*. It is a thing needfull however to be known, as appertaining to the Bus'ness of *Profit*: of which having discourst sufficiently in This Book, we shall now proceed to what remains.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Third Book.

IT was the saying (my Son *Marcus*) of *Scipio Africanus* the *Elder*, (as we have it from *Cato*, his Cotemporary) that *he was never Less* Idle, *or* Alone, *than when he most* appeared *so to be.* It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Business; his Solitudes, in Discourses to himself, without any Loss of Time: and without need some whiles of any other Company. Insomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Listless, and Heavy, did even set an Edge upon him: That is to say, *Solitude*, and *Leisure.* Now tho' I cannot come up to the Imitation of that Illustrious person, I am not much behind

A famous saying of Scipio Africanus.

behind him yet in my *Good Will* (I would I could ſay as much of my ſelf, as he does in *Effect*.) For ſince I have been driven by the Force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Buſ'neſs of the Bar; I have apply'd my ſelf to a Life of Leiſure too: upon That very Conſideration, quitting the Town, and betaking my ſelf to the Privacy and Solitude of a Country Life. Not that I compare either This Leiſure, or Solitude with that of *Africanus*. For his was only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himſelf ſome Reſpite from the Honorable Charges he ſuſtained in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Receſs, as a man ſometimes puts into a Port: But my Leiſures proceeded not from a deſire of Reſpite, but from want of Employment. For ſince the Diſſolution of the Senate, what is there to be done, either in the Palace, or in the Hall, that is worthy of us? The world ſwarms every where with Criminals; and after a life ſpent in ſo Eminent a Poſt, and in the Open View of the people, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, and live (in a manner) quite alone to avoid the very ſight of them. I have heard Wiſe men ſay that we are not only to chuſe the leaſt

Cicero's *Retreat*.

of

of necessary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themselves to extract somewhat of *Good*. I shall therefore make the best of my Repose, tho' not such perhaps as he has deserv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed so much to Their Quiet. And though this be a Solitude wholly of Necessity, not Choice; I would not yet have it absolutely Fruitless. *Africanus* (I must confess) gained to himself a fairer Reputation, but we have no Monuments of his Thoughts, committed to Writing: No Remains of his Leisures, and Solitude that we find extant. But we may conclude however, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, from his Glorious Actions, which were only the Product of Deliberation and Thought. But Alas! I have not that strength of Mind to *Think* away my Solitudes; and supply the want of Company with bare Meditation. So that My whole Diversion is to pass away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that way now, in a little while, since the overturning of the Government, than I did in many years before, while it was in a flourishing Estate.

Cicero compares himself with Africanus.

NOW (my Son) tho' Philosophy be Profitable and Fruitfull from one end of

of it to the other, without any Waſte, or Deſert: there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields greater advantage, and benefit, than that part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus*'s care in the inculcating of this Leſſon daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiſs yet to be often minded of ſo neceſſary a point; and (which way ſoe'er you turn your ſelf) to have this voice ſtill ſounding in your Ear, even, if it were poſſible, without hearing any thing elſe. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himſelf an Honeſt Courſe of Life; and it is your Intereſt perhaps as much as any bodies; becauſe the world expects it from you, that you ſhould ſucceed to the Induſtry, the Honors, (and if I may ſo ſay) in ſome Meaſure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to anſwer for upon the ſcore of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Diſhonorable than after ſo ample a Commiſſion granted you to the famous *Staple* of the whole World, for *good Manners* and *Letters*, to come back empty; to the

Of Civil Duties and a Virtuous Life.

the Diſparagement both of the Maſter, and the City? Wherefore you muſt Labor with all the Faculties of your Soul, and Body, to make good This expectation: (if I may call that a Labor, which is ſo great Pleaſure) and let it never be ſaid that after all other ſupplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your ſelf: But let this ſuffice: having written ſo much, and ſo often to you already, upon This Subject. We ſhall now return to the remaining part of the Diviſion propounded.

PANÆTIUS is the man, without Diſpute, that has the moſt accurately handled This queſtion: and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with ſome amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propoſitions*, that men are wont to deliberate and adviſe upon, in the Caſe of *Duty*. *Firſt* whether the matter in queſtion be *Honeſt*, or *Diſhoneſt*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honeſt*, and the *Other profitable*; how to diſtinguiſh. He has written Three Books upon the Two former Heads; and promiſed a Diſcourſe upon the Third; Panætius *of Civil Duties.*

Third; but he has not been so good as his word: which I do the more wonder at, because I find in his Scholar *Posidonius*, that he liv'd Thirty years after the Publishing of these Books. And I am in some Admiration too, that *Posidonius*, in his Commentaries, should pass the matter over so slightly; especially making This Remark upon it, that of the whole Body of Philosophy, This is the most necessary part. There are some that will not have This to be an *Oversight* in *Panætius*; but a point left out upon Consideration; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reason they give, is this. *Honest*, and *Profitable* (they say) are *Convertible Terms*; and not to be so much as Imagined in Opposition. From hence there may arise another Question, whether the Third Branch of *Panætius*'s Division should not have been absolutely rejected, without any mention of it at all. But it is Certain however, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall. He that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes through with Two parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third: And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the

Cicero excuses an Omission of Panætius.

Authority

Authority of *Poſidonius* himſelf to Witneſs as much; writing in a certain Epiſtle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panætius*) was wont to ſay. As there was never any Painter (ſays he) that durſt venture upon Finiſhing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (ſuch was the Delicacy of the Face, that there were no hopes of matching it with a ſuitable Body) ſo in the Caſe of *Panætius*, the Excellency of thoſe things which he did perfect, was ſo Tranſcendent, that no man after him durſt ever attempt the ſupplying of what he either Omitted, or left Imperfect. So that of *Panætius*'s Intention there can be no longer any doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Diviſion, may perhaps bear a diſpute: For taking it either according to the *Stoiques*, that nothing can be *Good* but that which is *Honeſt*; or with the *Peripatetiques*, that *Honeſty* is the *Soveraign Good*, to ſuch a degree, that all other Goods are as nothing in the Ballance againſt it; they do both of them however agree in This, that *Profit* can never be admitted into a Competition with *Honeſty*. How does *Socrates* Curſe the Firſt dividers of *Honeſt*, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*, which are ſo *Inſeparable* by *Nature*? And the

Nothing can be Profitable, but what is Honeſt.

Stoiques

Stoiques go ſo far along with him too, as to hold that nothing can be the One, without being alſo the Other. But if *Panætius* were one of thoſe that will have *Virtue* to be *Therefore* Eſteem'd for the *Profit* that ſhe brings us; meaſuring things *Deſirable*, either by *Pleaſure*, or *Freedom* from *Pain*; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Poſſible Repugnancy* of *Profit*, to *Honeſty*. But being of Another Opinion, and that the *Only Good* is That which is *Honeſt*: and that whatſoever ſtands in Oppoſition to it, under the ſhew of *Utility*, a mans life is neither the *Better* nor the *Worſe* for it, either With it, or Without it: He ſhould not ſo much as have put the Caſe, methinks, where *Profit* and *Virtue* ſhould appear in the *Compariſon*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoiques* account for the *Soveraign Good*: is nothing elſe (as I underſtand it) than to lead a life Congruous to *Virtue*: And in all Caſes whatſoever, to follow the direction of *Nature* in a Conformity thereunto. The matter ſtanding Thus; ſome men are of opinion that This Compariſon was not properly introduced; and that there was not any need of preſcribing in This Kind, at all.

NO

NO man can be *Truly Honeſt*, but He that is *Truly Wiſe*; and there is no ſeparating the One from the Other. There may be an *Imperfect Honeſty*, 'tis True, with an *Imperfect Wiſdom*; which is rather the *Reſemblance* of *Honeſty*, than *the thing it ſelf*. And therefore all thoſe Duties that we treat of in this Diſcourſe, the *Stoiques* call *Middle Duties*: which are Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a large extent: and ſome people attain the knowledge of them by a Felicity of Nature; others, by a Progreſſion, and advance upon Study. But thoſe which they call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Conſummate in all the parts (or numbers as they expreſs it) and This perfection is only to be found in a Wiſe man. But he yet that acquits himſelf in the Diſcharge of theſe *Middle Offices*, goes for Current with the *Multitude* for a *good* and *Wiſe man* in the *Abſtract*: They not being able to diſtinguiſh betwixt what is *Perfect*, and *Defective*. Wherefore ſo far as They underſtand the Buſineſs, there is nothing wanting. We ſee many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of other Inſtances, how ſtrangely the unskilfull are delighted with them, and yet for the moſt part commending the leaſt

True Honeſty and True Wiſdom are Inſeparable.

Middle Duties.

masterly stroke in the piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several parts; But when they come to be better instructed, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion.

THE Duties here Treated of, are with the *Stoiques* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not *peculiar to wise men*, but *Common* to *Human Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature, or Virtue. Now when we speak of the *Magnanimity* of the *two Decii*, or the *Scipio's*, or of the *Justice* of *Fabricius*, or *Aristides*; we do not propose their Example as the Standard of that *Courage*, and *Equity* that is required in a *Wise man*. For I do not look upon either of them to have been *Wise* to the Degree of *Wisdom here intended*; no, nor those very Persons upon whom the World has bestowed both the *Reputation*, and the *Name* of *Wise men*. I speak of *Cato*, *Caius Lelius*, or the *Seven Sages* themselves. But by the Frequent exercise of *Middle Offices* they had somewhat of the *appearance*, and *Resemblance* of *Wise men*. So that we must

No man Good or Wise in the Abstract.

muſt neither Compare *Profit* in Oppoſition to that which is *truly Honeſt*; nor oppoſe any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Virtue*; whereupon theſe people value themſelves, that would be accounted *Good men.* And we muſt as well uphold and preſerve That Practical Honeſty that falls under our Capacities; as that which in Strictneſs and Truth, is only the Honeſty of Wiſe men (For otherwiſe, how ſhall we know what progreſs we make toward Virtue? And ſo much for thoſe that by doing *Good Offices* get themſelves the Reputation of being *Good men.*

The Epicureans *meaſure* Honeſty *by* Profit.

BUT for thoſe that Meaſure all things by the Common intereſt of *Gain* and *Benefit*, and will not allow *Honeſty* to take place; it is ordinary for them to put *Mony* in the Scale againſt *Virtue*; which no good man will ever do. I ſuppoſe therefore, that *Panætius*: when he ſays that men are wont to make ſome doubts upon the compariſon, means only (as he ſays) that they are *Wont* to do ſo; and not that they *do well* in *ſo doing.* For not only the Preference of profit to Honeſty, but the very comparing of them, and the making a doubt in the Caſe, is a ſhameſull Bus'neſs. But what is it that we doubt upon?

Circumstances alter the Case.

Or what's the Ground of our Consideration? It is (I presume) upon the Quality of the Point in Question: For that which is Dishonorable at one time, may be Warrantable at another. As for Example, upon a supposition more at large; what fouler Villany can be imagined than the Killing not only of a Man, but a Familiar friend; and yet the people of *Rome* do not only Absolve any man that destroys a *Tyrant*, tho' his Familiar friend; but they reckon upon it as the most Glorious action of an Honorable Life. Is it in This Case that *Profit* prevails over *Honesty*; or rather that the *Honesty* follow'd the *Profit*?

A Rule keeps us Right.

THE Certain way to keep us Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of *Profitable*, and *Honest*, will be the Establishment of such a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: which Rule I would have to be squar'd to the Reason and Discipline of the *Stoiques*: And This is the Rule which I shall observe in this Treatise; Because tho' the Ancient *Academiques*, and the *Peripatetiques* also, (which were formerly all one) give a preference to that which is *Honest*, before that which seems to be *Profitable*; the matter

matter is yet more Generouſly handled by the *Stoiques*, that make *Profit* and *Honeſt* *Reciprocal*, than by thoſe that Imagine a thing may be either *Honeſt*, and not *Profitable*, or *Profitable*, and not *Honeſt*. Now our *Academy* allows great Liberty, and gives us a Right to defend That which appears moſt *Probable*. But to Return to my Rule, to take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make my Own Fortune by the empoveriſhing of another, is more Contrary to *Nature*, than Death, Beggary, Pain, or whatever elſe can befall a mans Body, or Eſtate. For at Firſt Daſh it deſtroys all Neighborhood and Society: For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his own advantage may Aſſault, or make a Prey of another; there follows neceſſarily an Abſolute diſſolution of Human Society, and a Violation of the moſt Certain and powerfull Dictate of Nature. Put the Caſe that one Member ſhould draw to it ſelf the Health, and Good Blood of the Member next unto it; the whole Body muſt, of neceſſity, Conſume and Periſh: In like manner if every man ſhould take from another what he can get, and apply his Neighbors Goods to his Own Uſe, this would undoubtedly put an end to all

In our Judgments of Profitable *and* Honeſt.

Friendlineſs, and Fellowſhip among men. It is natural enough for a man to provide Neceſſaries for himſelf. in the Firſt place; But it is yet againſt Nature for him to furniſh himſelf with Mony or Proviſions, by Spoil and Rapine: And it is not only by the dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Conſtitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawfull for One man to do any Miſchief to Another for his proper Benefit. It is the expreſs Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws to maintain the Duties of Society, Safe, and Inviolate: and they puniſh the Tranſgreſſors of theſe Rules with Death, Baniſhments, Priſons, and Fines: And much more does Nature her ſelf exact this from us: *Nature* (I ſay) which is the *Law Divine* and *Humane*; *Both in one.* Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propoſe to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a Reaſonable Being) will never agree to the Coveting of what is Another mans, or to the taking away from his Neighbor, and Giving to himſelf. For Greatneſs of Mind, Gentleneſs, Juſtice, and Liberality are much more Conſonant to Nature than Pleaſure, Life, or Riches: which, in compariſon with the Common good, are by all men of Brave and

Fraud and Rapine are againſt the Laws of Nature & Nations.

and exalted Minds, neglected and deſpiſed. Whereas on the Other ſide, to Spoil my Neighbor for my Own Advantage is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Torments, and the like. And it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all ſorts of Labors and Troubles for the Service and Conſervation, (if it were poſſible) even of the whole World: After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of *Men* has placed for his Virtues among the *Gods*: All this (I ſay) is more Agreeable to Nature, than to live in Solitude; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleaſures, and Plenty; with all the Advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above. This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, ſo much to prefer difficulty and action, before a Life of Idleneſs and Sloth. From hence it comes to paſs, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And beſides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not againſt Nature; or elſe he ſuppoſes that Death, Poverty, Pain, Loſs of Children, Kindred and Friends, are more to be avoided, than the doing of Injuries. But if he conceives that one man man may do an Injury to another

without an offence to Nature, there's no diſpute with One that has loſt his Reaſon; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of himſelf. But what if he thinks the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other*, *Worſe?* He is in a Grievous Miſtake, to phanſie any Calamity of Body or Fortune comparable to the diſorders of his Mind.

The Intereſt of the Whole, *is the intereſt of every* Part.

WE ſhould all of us therefore agree upon this common propoſition, That the Intereſt of the *Whole*, is the intereſt of *Every part*; and that whoever draws more to himſelf than belongs to him, is an Enemy to the Publique. Now if it be the very preſcript of Nature, that for Humanity ſake, one Man ſhall take Care of another; it does neceſſarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publique, is the Intereſt of every particular, according to the ſame Principle. Let but This be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of the ſame Law: And then taking That for granted; to do an Injury to any Man is againſt the Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and ſo is the Other, by Conſequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to ſay, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my

Own

Own Pocket; but to take from other People, is quite another caſe: as if every Individual were not concerned in the Protection of the whole: An Opinion utterly Inconſiſtent with the Rules of Government.

THERE are ſome again will have the *Citizens* provided for, but not *Strangers*: And Theſe Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society. For take away That once, and there will be no longer any Good Nature, Liberality, Honeſty, or Juſtice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth. And whoſoever brings Matters to That paſs, is to be accounted an Enemy to the *Gods Themſelves*, for breaking that Union among men, which was no other than a Conſtitution of *Divine Appointment*. It is the ſtrongeſt Band of Society, a General Agreement in This Poſition, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from another, for my own Advantage, than to ſuffer all the Miſeries that can poſſibly befall any Man in his Body or Eſtate: Nay, that can befall the very Mind it ſelf; ſaving the ſingle point of Juſtice, which one Virtue is the Miſtreſs, and the Princeſs of all the reſt. But what? (will ſome ſay) Shall a Wiſe Man rather Periſh

Better ſuffer any Calamity, than do any Injury.

for want of Bread, than take a Loaf from another Man that's good for nothing, to keep himself from Starving? This must not be done yet?. no not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my own Benefit. Suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloudy Tyrant) should he not do it? This is a Case easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthless person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publique; and to take it purely upon That Consideration, it is not blame-worthy: But otherwise, I must rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my self by what I force from another Man: so that it is not more against Nature to be Sick, or Necessitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of another: But the abandoning of the Common Good is an Offence to Nature; for it is Unjust;

and

and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and Provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Tranſlation of Neceſſaries from a ſlothfull and unprofitable wretch, to the behoof of a Wiſe, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whoſe Loſs might be of great damage to the Government: Provided that it be done merely out of ſuch a reſpect, without any Vanity, or Self-love, or making uſe of a Publique Pretext for a Colour to a particular Injuſtice. In ſo doing, I keep my ſelf ſtill upon my Duty, conſulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

AS to the Caſe of *Phalaris*, the deciſion is Obvious: For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, than a Member of Human Society; and there can be no Crime in the deſpoiling of an Uſurper, whom it is Lawfull to Kill; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and peſtilent ſort of men were exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Bloud and Spirits have in a manner forſaken them, and that they grow dangerous to the Reſt: ſo ſhould that fierce and outragious Brutality be ſeparated, if

if I may ſo ſay, from the Common Humanity of the Publique Body. Of this Quality are all thoſe Queſtions of Duty, whereof the Reſolution depends upon the Circumſtances of Times: which I preſume, *Panætius* would have perſu'd, if ſomewhat of accident or bus'neſs had not taken him off from his purpoſe. We have ſaid enough in our former Books upon This Matter; to ſhew what we are always to ſhun, as evil and ſhamefull in it ſelf, and what we are not obliged always to avoid, becauſe it is not *always*, either *Miſbecoming*, or *Diſhoneſt*.

Certain Principles to be given for granted.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work we have begun, I muſt deal with You, (my *Cicero*) as the Mathematicians do with their Diſciples. They lay down certain *Poſtulata*, to be taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of diſcourſing the Points; to the end that they may make themſelves more eaſily underſtood. So muſt I require of You (my *Cicero*) to yield me this point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is deſirable for it ſelf, but what is Honeſt.* Now if *Cratippus* will not allow of the Propoſition whole as it lies; This yet, I preſume, will not be deny'd, That *Virtue* is *Chiefly*, if not *Only* to be

deſired,

deſired, and *for its own ſake*. It is all one to me, which of the Two you take, for they are Both of them more probable than any thing elſe: And Firſt, let me vindicate *Panætius*, in This, that he never ſuppoſed a *Competition* of *Utility*, and *Virtue*; (nor could he have juſtifi'd it if he had) but he is not to be underſtood of things that *ſeem* profitable; for over and over in all his Diſcourſes he ſtill makes *Utility*, and *Virtue* to be *Convertibles*, and repreſents it to the moſt peſtilent Error that ever enter'd into Human Life, the Opinion that divided them. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, betwixt *Appearances*, and *Truths*; not as *ſeparating* the *Profitable* from the *Honeſt*; but for our Caution, and Inſtruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We ſhall therefore diſpatch this remaining part without any help from others; and upon our own account, (as we ſay:) For ſince *Panætius* left This Subject, I have ſeen nothing yet that has given me any ſort of ſatisfaction.

WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that preſents it ſelf unto us, under the appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is diſhoneſt, or ſhamefull, *Nothing can be beneficial, that is diſhoneſt.*

ſhamefull, annexed thereunto; we are not to leave it then, as a thing *Profitable*, but as conſidering that *Utility*, and *Diſhoneſty* cannot ſtand together. For if there be nothing ſo *Contrary* to *Nature* as the *One*, or ſo *Agreeable* to it, as the *Other*; (for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Conſtant, and deſpiſes the contrary) it is impoſſible that they ſhould both meet in the ſame Subject. Again; If we are born for *Virtue*; either (according to *Zeno*) *Virtue is to be deſired for it ſelf alone*, (according, to *Ariſtotle*) *it weighs down all other things*: then does it follow, of Neceſſity, that *Virtue* muſt be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*. So that whether way ſoever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable*; and that which is *Profitable*, is certainly *Good*. Thoſe Men therefore are very ſhort-ſighted, that preſently lay hold of that which *appears Profitable*, and conſider it *apart* from that which *is Honeſt*. From Hence come Murthers, Poyſonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publique Cheats, Oppreſſions, Squeezing of the People, or our Confederates: From Hence come the Intolerable Inſolencies of Men of over-grown Fortunes; and finally, Ambition, and the Thirſt of Dominion; than which nothing can be more

more Ruinous, or Pernicious in a Free City. They take falſe Meaſures of the *Value* of things, without ſo much as dreaming of the *Puniſhment*; not the *Puniſhment* of the *Laws*, (for That they can with eaſe break through) but That of the *Conſcience*, which is the bittereſt of all. Wherefore this ſort of men ſhould be excluded Human Converſation, (as moſt execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they ſhould either follow That which they ſee to be *Honeſt*, or knowingly pollute themſelves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the Act it ſelf. Wherefore we ſhould never deliberate at all, where the very deliberation it ſelf is Shamefull.

The great puniſhment is that of Conſcience.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we ſhould not entertain any Hope or Deſign, of Concealing, or diſguiſing Matters; for we ſhould take up This for a Maxim; (at leaſt, if we be ever the better for our Philoſophy) that *if we could carry things ſo Private, as that neither God nor Man ſhould diſcover us, we ſhould yet have ſuch a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of Injuſtice, Uncleanneſs, or Immodeſty, eſcape us.* *Plato*'s Fable *of Gyges*, is not impertinent.

A Divine Precept.

The Fable and Moral of Gyges's Ring.

nent to our purpoſe. The Story has it, that a Torrent having eaten a Hollowneſs in the Ground, *Gyges* went down into it, and there obſerv'd a Brazen Horſe, with doors in his Sides. Upon the Opening of theſe doors, he diſcover'd the dead body of a Man, of a Prodigious Size, with a Golden Ring upon his finger. *Gyges* boldly pluckt it off by Force, and put it upon his Own; and being the King's Shepherd, he went his way, and joyn'd himſelf with Other Shepherds. Finding, that upon turning the Stone of the *Ring*, *Inwards*, he became Inviſible to *Others*, and yet ſaw every thing *Himſelf*; and that upon turning it *back again* he became *Viſible*, as *before*; by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Aſſiſtance, Murther'd the King, his Maſter; and in a ſhort time remov'd all out of the way that he thought ſtood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this Lewdneſs he Committed by the help of this *Ring*, and ſo made himſelf King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wiſe Man were the Maſter of ſuch a Ring, he would reckon himſelf no more Privileg'd to do an Ill thing with it, than without it; for an Honeſt man conſiders the *Goodneſs* of the *Action*, not the *Privacy* of it. It is objected by ſome (that ſhew themſelves

themſelves to be better *Men*, than *Philoſophers*) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any Man would report it for a thing either True, or Poſſible: but ſee however the Force and Scope of this Ring, and of this Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Luſt, that no body knows of, or ſo much as ſuſpects? Suppoſe that this Impiety could be kept ſo ſecret, that neither God nor Man ſhould come to know it: Would you commit it? *'Tis a thing impoſſible*, (they ſay, whether it be ſo or not.) But what would they do (ſay I) if they could do the thing, which they ſay they cannot? They return you the ſame ſenſeleſs Anſwer over again: they ſay 'tis *Impoſſible*; and there they ſtick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Queſtion. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or *no*: But I put the Queſtion, as if it were in Caſe of the *Torture*. If they make anſwer, that *if they were ſure to eſcape Puniſhment, they would do what they found moſt Expedient*, they confeſs themſelves to be *Criminals*; and if they *deny* it, 'tis a Conceſſion that *all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themſelves*. But to return now to my purpoſe.

THERE

The appearance of Profit oftentimes diſtracts us.

THERE fall out divers Caſes, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times diſorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Reſolutions: not as upon a Deliberation whether a man ſhould ſtrain a Point of *Honeſty* in regard of the *Greatneſs* of the *Benefit* in proſpect; (for That were *Mean*, and *Diſhoneſt*) but whether That which ſeems ſo *very Profitable* may be done without *Diſhonor*. It might look like an unjuſt thing in *Brutus*, the Depoſing of *Collatine*, his *Fellow Conſul*, who in the Expulſion of the Kings, was both his *Partner* in the *Advice*, and his *Aſſiſtant* in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the Whole *Family*, and the *Relations* of that proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquins*; (which was a Reſolution of publique Advantage) This was ſo Honeſt, and Juſt an Action, that *Collatine* himſelf was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: ſo that this Utility was valu'd for the Honeſty ſake, without which, in truth, it had not been Profitable. But This did not hold in the Caſe of that Prince that founded our City: For he was ſo wrought upon by the ſhew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the

the appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone than with Company. He caſt off all Piety and Humanity, for the obtaining of that which ſeemed unto him to be Profitable, tho' it proved the clear contrary. The *pretended Honeſty* in the Action, was to puniſh the Affront of his Brother's leaping in ſcorn over the Wall: but it was neither Competent, nor likely. Wherefore under favor of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*; (no matter whether) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

How far we may look to our ſelves.

AND yet we are not to neglect our own advantages neither: or part with any thing to Others, when we want it our ſelves. But every man ſhould attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to Another. *Chryſippus* had many Witty ſayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Courſe,* (ſays he) *a man may be allowd to ſtrive, and contend his Utmoſt: but to trip up his Antagoniſt's Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So for any man to get That which may ſerve for the uſe of Life, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawfull.*

IN

Many Niceties in Friendships.

IN Friendship, 'tis true, there are many Niceties as well in the not doing of any Office which may Honestly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend contrary to Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon This whole Matter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable; as Honors, Riches, Pleasures, and Other Circumstances of the like Kind; these things are never to be preferr'd before Friendship; But no Good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either against the Commonwealth, his Oath or his Word: No not if he were himself to be a Judge in his Friends Case; for he lays down the person of a *Friend*, where he takes up that of a *Judge*. I would have him wish that his Friend may have *Justice* on *his side*; and I would have him allow him all the Favor in point of *Time*, that the Law will permit; but when he comes to pass his *Sentence*, let him remember, and consider, that he calls God to Witness; or (as I suppose) his Own Conscience, the Divinest thing Heaven it self ever bestow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practice of our Ancestors; They never ask'd any thing of a Judge (and I wish we did so at this day) but upon

upon Condition that it might consist with Justice. This Request has relation to those things which (as I said e'en now) a Judge may fairly allow to a Friend; for if a man must of Necessity do all things that a Friend would have him do, this is no longer a Friendship, but a Confederacy. Let me be understood only of Common Friendships: For among men that are Wise, and Perfect, there can be no such thing. The Story goes of *Damon* and *Pythias*, (*Pythagoreans*) so great was the Kindness they had for one another, that when *Dionysius* had sentenced one of them to death, the Party Condemned only desired a few days respite to put his Affairs in order; and the Other became Surety (Body for Body) for his Appearance. The Prisoner return'd at his day, and the Tyrant fell into such admiration at their *Generosity*, and *Justice*, that he requested them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendship. Wherefore in all Friendships, where the Profitable and the Honest meet in Comparison, we should never consider the Profit, but square our actions according to the Honesty. But whersoever any thing shall be required in *Friendship*, which does not stand with *Honesty*, in that Case *Religion*, and *Faith*, must take place of *Friendship*.

The Generous friendship of Damon *and* Pythias.

Friendſhip. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choice of the Duty here in Queſtion.

Publique Miſtakes under the appearance of Profit.

WE are Liable alſo to many Publique Miſtakes under the Appearance of Profit; as our Countrymen were to blame in the Irrecoverable Deſtruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worſe, in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only becauſe they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, becauſe of the Neighborhood of *Ægina* to one of their principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel*; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary* to *Nature* than *Cruelty*.

Humanity to Strangers.

THEY do very ill alſo, that either Prohibit, or Baniſh Strangers from among them; as *Petronius* did of Old; and *Papius*, not long ſince. It is well enough not to ſuffer him that is *no Citizen*, to paſs *for a Citizen*, (according to the Law of our Conſuls *Craſſus* and *Scævola*, who were Wiſe men.) But it is undoubtedly moſt Inhuman, abſolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourſe in a City, to Strangers. Thoſe are Great and Remarkable

Remarkable Caſes wherein the *Shew* or *Colour* of *Publique Utility* is deſpiſed, in compariſon with *Honeſty*. We have in the Story of our Commonwealth, a World of Eminent Examples. How many times have we (and eſpecially in the *Second Punique War*, after that Miſerable Diſaſter at the Battel of *Canne*) ſhew'd greater Courage in our Diſtreſs, than ever we did in our Proſperity? There was not the leaſt ſign of Fear among us, nor any mention of peace; ſuch is the Power of Honeſty, that nothing of Profit can appear againſt it! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to reſiſt the force of the *Perſians*, came to a Reſolve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Trazen*; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrcilus* that advis'd them rather to ſtay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counſel. He gave them the advice which he took to be moſt profitable; but it ceaſes to be *Profit*, when it ſtands in oppoſition to *Honeſty*. *Themiſtocles*, after his Victorious War againſt the *Perſians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of ſomething that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth; but it was not

not convenient to be made Publique, and therefore desir'd them to appoint some body to whom he might impart the matter in private. They named *Aristides*; and he told him that the *Lacedæmonian* Fleet, which was laid up at *Gytheon* might easily be Fir'd by surprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedæmonians*. *Aristides*, when he had heard it, came into the *Senate* where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themistocle*'s Counsel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honorable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not likewise *Honest*; and so rejected the proposition, only upon the Report of *Aristides*, even without hearing it. How much did these people go beyond us; that suffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*, while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries?* Let it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Dishonorable*; no, not in the very possession of that which we account so to be. Nay it is a great Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagine that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Dishonest*.

A scrupulous point of Honor.

BUT there fall out many Occasions (as I have said before) wherein the *Profitable*,

Profitable, and the *Honeſt* may fall in *Competition*: in which Caſe we ſhould conſider, how far they ſtand in direct Oppoſition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for Inſtance, upon theſe Queſtions. An Honeſt man ſets ſail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodians* in great diſtreſs for want of it; and the Commodity bearing an Exceſſive price. This perſon knows that there are other *Alexandrian* Ships under way, and bound for the ſame Port, and with the ſame *Cargo*: whether or no ſhall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other Merchants coming with Relief, or ſay nothing of it, and make the beſt Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Caſe, ſuppoſing him to be a *Good* and a *Wiſe man*, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to *Conceal* this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes ſome doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*. In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babylonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoique*) is of One Opinion; and his Diſciple *Antipater* (a very acute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumſtances laid open; ſo that the Purchaſer may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the Other knows.

Some nice Caſes of Conſcience.

Diogenes says that *the Vender is bound to discover all the Faults*, so far as he i obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and to manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to sell the Commodity, he may without Deceit make the best on't. *Here* (says he) *I have brought my Corn; I have run the Risque on't, and I set no higher a rate upon the Commodity than Others do; nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper: If you can have it any where else, where's the Injury?* Now *Antipater*, on the other side, Reasons it thus. How is That? (says he) It is our Duty to Consult the Good of Mankind, and to serve Humane Society; and we come into the World under That Obligation. We have Principles of Nature; which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing *Profitable to our selves*, that is not so to the *Publique*: And likewise, to account of the *Publique Profit*, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of Men, which so much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply? Diogenes* will reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this instant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or the end of Good men; which are things much more Profitable to be known, than the price of Wheat?

And

And yet you will not ſay that I Conceal This from you. But it is not abſolutely neceſſary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is neceſſary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (ſays the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be ſuch a Society then, as that no man ſhall have any thing particular in it of his Own? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You ſee in this whole Diſpute, that it is not ſaid, tho' This or that be *Diſhoneſt*, I will yet do it, becauſe it is *Expedient*: But it muſt be ſo *Expedient*, that there be nothing *Diſhonorable* in it. Now (on the Other hand) out of that very Conſideration that it is *Diſhonorable*, it is therefore *not to be done*. Suppoſe an Honeſt man has a mind to put off his Houſe for ſome fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himſelf: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the purpoſe) tho' it may (perhaps) paſs for *Healthfull*; all the Rooms annoy'd with Vermin, Ill-built, or Ruinous, which is only known (as I ſay) to the Maſter of the Houſe. The Queſtion is, if he Conceals theſe faults to get a better Rate for his Houſe than he could

otherwiſe have done, whether he does *well*, or *ill*, in That *Concealment? Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the Caſe of *not ſetting a man Right that's out of his way.* A Crime which was puniſh'd at *Athens* by a Formal Solemnity of Publique Execrations. Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaſer to ruine himſelf, and to fall into the worſt of Snares, by a Miſtake? Nay it is worſe yet, than the *not ſhewing of the way*, for one man to lead another knowingly and wilfully into an Error. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other ſide, who forc't you to buy it? Nay he did not (ſays he) ſo much as Adviſe you to't. That which did not pleaſe the One, he expoſed to ſale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he ſhall not be taken for a Cheat, that ſets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much leſs ſhall he be accounted one, that does not ſo much as Commend his Houſe; for where the Purchaſer uſes his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not obliged, in all Caſes, to make good every word we ſay, how ſhould we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not ſay? Nor can any thing be more

Ridiculous

Ridiculous than for a Merchant to publiſh the Faults of the Commodity he expoſes to Sale. What would be more ſenſeleſs than to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer; *Here's an Infected Houſe to be Sold?* Now ſo it falls out, that in ſome doubtfull Caſes, the *Honeſty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it ſo qualifi'd on the Other; that it may not only be *Honorable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Diſhonorable*, to *Omit* it. This is a Point that comes often into queſtion betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honeſt*.

Reſolutions upon the former Caſes.

THESE Difficulties muſt be ſet right: for it is not our *Buſineſs* to ſtart a queſtion, but to give a Reſolution. It is my Opinion, that neither in the Caſe of the *Rhodian Corn-Merchant*, nor in that of the *Houſe* offer'd to *Sale*, the *Concealment* there ſuppoſed was *Juſtifiable*. For it is not properly the *Concealing* of a thing, to ſay nothing of it; but the keeping of another man, for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a Concealment This is, and the Quality of the man that uſes it, who does not diſcern? This is not the Practice undoubtedly of an

Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Juſt or Good man: but rather of a Shifting, a Cloſe, a Deceitfull, a Malicious, a Sly ſhuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to get by the Bargain, that wears theſe foul Names, and lies under all theſe Reproaches?

A Pleaſant Cheat.

BUT if the ſaying *Nothing* in this Caſe be ſo Blameable; what ſhall we think of them then that ſpeak *Falſe*? *Caius Cannius* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor Learning) going ſometimes to *Syracuſe*, not upon Bus'neſs (as he was wont to ſay) but for his diverſion; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy ſome Gardens there, where he might enjoy his Friends when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of, there was one, *Pythius*, in *Syracuſe*, that drove the Trade of a *Banker*. *I have Gardens here* (ſays he) *tho' not to be Sold, but however if* Cannius *pleaſes, he may uſe them as his Own.* And ſo he invites *Cannius* to thoſe Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Cannius*'s promiſe to come, *Pythius* (whoſe bus'neſs gave him a great Intereſt there, among all ſorts of people) ſent for the Fiſhermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fiſh juſt before his Gardens; and

and ſo gave them their Leſſons what to do and how to behave themſelves. *Cannius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fiſh he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius*'s Feet. What's the meaning of all this (ſays *Cannius*) ſo many Fiſhes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fiſh (ſays he) in *Syracuſe*, which is not to be had in this place. They take in their Water here, and the Town cannot be without this Convenience. This ſet *Cannius* agog upon the Purchaſe, and nothing would ſerve but *Pythius* muſt ſell him the place; He ſeem'd, at Firſt, very unwilling to part with it; but without more words they came at laſt to an Agreement: *Cannius* was a Rich man, and preſently ſtruck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own price: Security was given for the Money, and the bus'neſs finiſh'd. *Cannius* invited ſome of his Familiar Friends thither the next day: and he himſelf coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighborhood whether the Fiſhermen kept Holy-day

that day, becauſe he ſaw none of them There. Their Anſwer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any Fiſhermen that us'd to be There: Inſomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thither the day before. This put *Cannius* into a Rage: But what Remedy? For my Friend and Collegue *Aquilius* had not as yet made any Proviſion againſt *Dolus Malus*, or *Couzenage*. Upon my Demand to *Aquilius* what was intended by that ſame *Dolus Malus*, he told me, that it was *the pretending of one thing, and doing another*. Which truly was a full and Clear Definition of it, and worthy of a Wiſe man. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that *Pretend one thing*, and *do another*; are to be accounted *Perfidious*, *Wicked*, and *Deceitfull*; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by ſo many *Crimes*. But if *Aquilius*'s Definition be True, there muſt be no Feigning or Diſſembling allow'd of in Humane Society: And a Good man will neither do the one nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. And That Deceit was puniſhable alſo by the Laws: As in the Caſe of *Guardianſhip*, by the *Twelve Tables*. And ſo was the *Circumvention* of *Minors* puniſhable by the *Latorian Laws*. And ſometimes by *Arbitration*,

Arbitration, even *without a Law*; where the Queſtion was matter of Faith, and Truſt. But of all other Judgments the Words that are uſed in the *Formulary* of an *Arbitrement* upon a *Marriage-Agreement* are moſt remarkable: As * *MELIUS, ÆQUIUS*, the *Better*, the *Juſter*: and in matters of *Contract*, or *Confidence*, *INTER BENE AGIER*; *Fair Dealing among Good Men.* Can there be any Mixture of *Fraud* now in *BETTER*, and *JUSTER*? Or what place is there for *Colluſion*, or *Iniquity*, in *Fair Dealing among Honeſt Men?*

* *Words of Form.*

NOW the *Dolus Malus*, or Deceit appears either in *Simulation*, which is a pretence of ſomething that is *not?* or *Diſſimulation*, that is to ſay, a *Diſguiſe* or *Concealment* of ſomewhat that *Is.* Wherefore there muſt be no *Lye* admitted in any Bus'neſs, or Contract; nor ſhould there be any Underhand ſubſtituting of a Buyer, or a Seller, to enhance, or to bring down the price; but Both parties ſhould ſay *at a Word* what they will *Give* or *Take*. *Q. Scævola*, the Son of *Publius*, being upon a Purchaſe, bad the Proprietor tell him in One Word what he would have for the Eſtate: He did ſo: And *Scævola* told him he had undervalu'd it, and ſo gave him

Simulation and Diſſimulation.

A Generous Scruple of Scævola's.

him *Two Thouſand Crowns* more than his Bargain. There is not any Man but will confeſs that This was the part of a *Good man*, tho' in the Opinion perhaps of ſome People, not of a *Wiſe Man:* As if the Other had ſet it lower than he could afford it. This is a Miſchief therefore, that *Some* Men are accounted *Good*, and *Other* men *Wiſe*, as if they could be *ſeparated*. *Ennius* ſays that a Man's *Wiſdom* ſerves him to little purpoſe, if it be not *Profitable* to *himſelf*. This may be true enough, if it were but agreed with *Ennius* what it is to be *Profitable*. I find *Hecaton* the *Rhodian* (*Panætius*'s Scholar telling *Q. Tubero* in his Books of *Offices*, that *It is the part of a Wiſe Man to do nothing againſt Publique Cuſtoms, Laws, and Inſtitutions; and withall, to take good heed to his Fortune, and Family*: For we ſhould not propound to be Rich, only to our Selves, but to our Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly, for the Service of the *Republique*. For the Eſtates and Proviſions of particulars, are the Wealth of the City. The proceeding of *Scævola* abovementioned would never ſuit with *Hecaton*: For he only ſays that he would not do any thing for his own Profit that were Unlawfull: and truly he deſerves little Thanks, or Commendation for his

his pains. But allowing both *Lying*, and *Diſſembling* to be this ſame *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceit*, there are very few things clear of That Fraud. Or if he be only the Good Man, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no body; ſuch a Good man will not be eaſily found. It can never be *Profitable* to do an *Ill thing*; becauſe it is always *unallowable*, and *ſhamefull*. And it muſt ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, becauſe it is always *Honeſt*.

Concealments puniſhable in Bargains for Eſtates.

IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the Matter of *Eſtates*, that the *Vendor* ſhould ſtill tell the *Purchaſer* the *Defects*, or *Inconveniences* of the *Eſtate*; for it being ſufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man ſhould make good what he promiſes or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the penalty of *Double Damages* for *Denying*, it. The Civilians have alſo ſet a Puniſhment upon *Concealments* too, by enacting, that if the Seller of an Eſtate knew any Fault or Errour in it, without expreſly acquainting the Purchaſer with it, he ſhould be obliged to make it good. As in the caſe of the *Augurs Tower*; where they were to take their Obſervations from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having ſome Houſes upon the

the Hill *Celius*, the *Augurs* commanded him to pull them down, becauſe they hinder'd their proſpect. *Claudius* expos'd Thoſe Houſes to Sale, and ſo put them off; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaſer. The *Augurs* found the ſame fault ſtill with the Houſes, when they were in His Poſſeſſion ſo that he pull'd them down. And coming afterwards to underſtand that *Claudius* had made ſale of thoſe Houſes, after that the *Augurs* had appointed the demoliſhing of them; forc'd him upon an Arbitration, what in point of Conſcience was to be done in That Caſe. *Marcus Cato* paſt the Sentence, (the Father of This *Cato*, of ours) For as we denominate Others from their Fathers, we ſhall make mention of the perſon that gave this Light to the World, as accounting from the Son.) The Sentence was This, That ſince upon the Sale of that Eſtate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to; he ſhould Indempnifie the Buyer of it; concluding that the Proprietor was bound in Conſcience to tell the Purchaſer wha damage might enſue upon it. Now if This was a Juſt Judgment, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that ſold the *Infected Houſes*,

to

to conceal as is above ſuppoſed. But it is not poſſible for any Law to reach all the various Caſes of theſe *Concealments*: And yet however, ſo far as they go, they are diligently obſerv'd, *Marcus Marius Gratidianus* ſold to *Caius Sergius Orata* thoſe very Houſes which he himſelf had bought of him but a few years before. Theſe Houſes paid a Duty to *Sergius* (which was out of his mind.) But *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cauſe was brought into the Court; *Craſſus* was for *Orata*, and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*: *Craſſus* inſiſted upon the *Law*, becauſe the Seller knew that he ought to have acquainted the Purchaſer with this Incumbrance, but did not do it. *Anthony* inſiſted upon matter of *Equity*, becauſe That Incumbrance, was not unknown to *Sergius*, who ſold the Houſes, and ſo there was no need to ſay any thing of it; neither could he be ſaid to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but to ſhew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with Wiles, and Shifts?

Laws and Philoſophers provide ſeveral ways againſt Fraud.

BUT Laws and Philoſophers provide againſt Frauds ſeveral ways: The Laws regarding only matter of *Overt Act*, whereas Philoſophers judge according

cording to *Equity*, and *Reaſon*: which Reaſon does it ſelf require of us, that we do nothing perfidiouſly, or with Falſe Pretence, or Deceit. But ſhall we call it a Treachery to contrive a Pit-fall, or ſet a Toyl, without either driving or hunting any thing to it? Well, but the Beaſts, many times fall into it, without a Purſuer. He that offers a Houſe to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaſer? His Houſe is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and ſome body is caught at unawares. Now tho' I underſtand that according to depraved *Cuſtom*, and *Manners*, this is not accounted *Diſhonorable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* againſt it: It is nevertheleſs yet forbidden by *the Law of Nature*. For, as I have often ſaid already, and muſt ſay oftner, *Society*, in the *largeſt Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under That is the *Society* of thoſe of *the ſame Nation*, and after That, of the *ſame City*. Wherefore our Fore-fathers diſtinguiſh betwixt the *Law* of *Nations*, and the *Law Civil*. For the *Civil Law* is not conſequently the *Law* of *Nations*, but the *Law* of *Nations* does neceſſarily comprehend the *Civil*. Now to ſay the Truth, we have not among us any ſubſtantial or expreſs Image of the *True Law*,

The Law Civil, and the Law of Nations.

Law, or *ſincere Juſtice*: So that we are fain to make uſe *of ſhadows*, and *Figures*; and it were well if we could keep up, even to Them too: For they are Tranſlated out of the *beſt Originals*, of *Truth* and *Nature*. How glorious is that Proviſional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honeſty, I may not be deceived and brought into a ſnare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *We muſt live Honeſtly among good men, and without Fraud.* But then who are *Good men*, and what it is *to do well*, is a Great queſtion.

Of Good Faith.

Q. Scævola the High Prieſt was wont to aſcribe a very great force to all thoſe Arbitrations that were grounded upon *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name* it ſelf to be of a Large Extent: As having a reſpect to *Guardian ſhips*, *Societies*, *Truſts*, *Mandates*, things *bought*, or *ſold*, *hired*, or *let*, relating to the Community, and Entercourſe of Life. He muſt be a great Judge, that in theſe Caſes can determine (eſpecially meeting in moſt of them with Contrary Opinions) how One man is to behave himſelf towards Another, under theſe Circumſtances. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices ſhould be avoided; And That

Craft

Craft alſo which impoſes upon the World for *Wiſdom*; how far from it ſoever. For *Prudence* is placed in the *Choice* of *Good*, or *Evil*; but *Craft* prefers *Evil* before *Good*; at leaſt if things that are *Diſhonorable* be *Evil*. And 'tis not only in *Lands*, and *Houſes*, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to that of Nature, forbids Fraud and Cicumvention; but even in the very dealing for *Slaves*, the Seller ſhould act as frankly as in Other Caſes. For he that is preſum'd to know whether the *Slave* be *Healthfull*, *Honeſt*, a *Fugitive*, or the like; the *Ædiles Law* makes *That Maſter* anſwerable for the *Servant*. But this does not hold in the Caſe of an *Heir* that found ſuch a *Slave*, or *Servant* in the *Family*. From hence it may appear, ſince *Nature* is the Fountain of *Juſtice*, that it is alſo according to Nature, that no man ſhould make Advantage to himſelf of another man's Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Peſt in Humane Society, than a perverſe *Craft*, under the Maſque of *Simplicity*: And from thence proceed thoſe Innumerable Caſes, where the *Profitable* comes in Concurrence with the *Honeſt*. For, where's the man that would ſtick at any *Injuſtice*, if he might but hope for *Impunity*; or come off, under a pretence of *Ignorance*? Let us examine

No Peſt like Craft under the Maſque of Simplicity.

examine the Matter if you pleaſe; and in Thoſe Inſtances where the Common people, perhaps, are ſcarce ſenſible that they do amiſs: For we do not ſpeak in This place, of *Murthers*, *Poyſonings*, *Forgeries*, *Robberies*, or *Embeſilments* of the *Publique Treaſure*, which ſhould rather be ſuppreſt by *Priſons*, and *Fetters*, than by *Words*, and *Philoſophical Precepts*: But let us here rather conſider what we find commonly to be done, even among thoſe that have the Reputation of *Honeſt* men. There were ſome people that brought out of *Greece* to *Rome* a forg'd *Will* of *Q. Minutius Baſilius*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'neſs paſs the better, they put into the Teſtament, *M. Craſſus* and *Q. Hortenſius*, two of the moſt conſiderable men of the City; as *Joint-Heirs* together with *Themſelves*, They did, Both of them, ſuſpect it to be a *Counterfeit*; and yet having no hand in it themſelves they were well enough content, to make advantage of Other peoples Wickedneſs. And what then? Is it ſufficient that they themſelves had no hand in it? I am of Another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, *I lov'd* him while he was alive, and I do not *hate* the *Other* now he is dead. But when *Baſilius* had made his Siſters Son *Marcus* (*Satirius*) his

A caſe of Conſcience about a Forgery.

his *Heir*, and would have had him take his *Uncles* Name upon him; (I ſpeak of that *Satirius* that to the Shame of the Age had the Patronage of the *Picenians*, and *Sabines*) it was a moſt unreaſonable thing that the Chief men of the City ſhould carry away the *Teſtators Eſtate*, and leave nothing to the Right Heir but his *Name*. Now if he ſtands guilty of an *Injuſtice*, that neither *keeps off* an Injury from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulſes* it when he may, (as we have ſaid in our Firſt Book) what ſhall we think of him that does not only not Repell an *Injury* but even Helps it on and promotes it? Nay, for my Own part, let the *Inheritance* be never ſo *Lawfull*; yet if it be gain'd by *Craft*, *Flattery*, *Servile Offices*, or *Falſe Pretenſes*; even That *Lawfull Succeſſion* I cannot approve. But in ſuch Caſes men are many times extremely miſled, in taking One thing to be *Honeſt*, and Another *Profitable*, for the ſame Rule holds in both; and He that is not ſenſible of This, lies open to all ſorts almoſt of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whoſoever ſays thus to himſelf, *This is Honeſt*, 'tis true, but the *Other* is *Expedient*; he takes upon him, to *divide* thoſe things by a *Miſtake* that are *coupled* by *Nature*; which opinion is the fountain of

No Dividing of what Nature has Coupled.

of all Deceits, Crimes, and Evil Deeds. Wherefore if a Good man, for the very holding up of a Finger, could get himſelf made Heir to a Conſiderable Eſtate, which he has no Title to; he ſhould not do it, tho' upon a Certainty that no man could ever ſo much as ſuſpect him for it. But if *M. Craſſus* could get an Eſtate upon the ſame Terms, upon my Credit he would leap out of his skin at it. But a *Juſt*, and ſuch a one as we can allow for a *Good* man, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and tranſferring it to *himſelf*; and whoever wonders at This, does as good as confeſs himſelf Ignorant of what a good man is.

Who is a Good man.

BUT he that will throughly examine the Secrets of his Own Soul, will be able to tell himſelf that only He is a *Good* man, who does as much good to *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without ſome Injurious provocation. How's That? He that ſupplants the Right Heir, to get himſelf into his place, has not that man as much to anſwer for as if he had remov'd him by Poyſon? But what (will ſome ſay) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes, yes, If he will take This along with

with him, that it is not possible for any thing to be *So*, that is *Unjust*. He that has not learn'd This Lesson, can never be a *Good* man. I remember, when I was a Boy, I heard my Father speak of *Fimbria* the *Consul*: who was appointed Judge in the Case of *Marcus Luctatius Pythias*, (a Knight of *Rome*, and a very *Honest man*) who undertook, upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Mony, to prove himself a *Good* man: but *Fimbria* did absolutely refuse to pass Judgment in That matter; lest he should either derogate from the Reputation of a person so much Esteemed, if he gave it against him, or appear on the other side, to pronounce any man to be Good, considering the Infinite Circumstances of Qualities, and Offices to make him so. So that neither *Fimbria*'s *Good man*, nor *Socrates*'s, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honest*: And such a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare so much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in Publique. Is it not a Shame now, for *Philosophers* to *Doubt*, where the *Common people* themselves are *Resolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare *Proverb* is *Their*'s; when they would express a man of an exact Sincerity and Justice, *You may play at* * Love *with him in the dark*, they say; and what is the meaning

* *A little Play with the Fingers.*

meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honeſt*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiſer for't? In the Moral of this *Proverb*, we are taught, that neither *Gyges*'s way is to be endur'd, nor ſo much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the caſe formerly ſuppoſed) tho' a man might make himſelf Maſter of the whole World by ſo doing. For whatſoever is *Shamefull* and *Diſhonorable*, let it be never ſo *Secret*, nothing can make it *Honeſt*; and that which is *not Honeſt*, it is as impoſſible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Oppoſition* to *Nature*.

BUT where Criminals find great *Rewards*, there is alſo a great *Temptation* to *offend*. When *G. Marius* appeared out of all hope of the *Conſulſhip*, and (having lain ſtill, for ſeven years after his *Prætorſhip*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: *Q. Metellus* (a great man, and an Eminent Citizen) ſent *Marius* (being his Lieutenant) to *Rome*. Where *Marius* publiquely charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they had made Him *Conſul*, he would in a very ſhort time have deliver'd up *Jugurtha*, either Alive or Dead,

A Mean Action of C. Marius.

Dead, into the Power of the people: whereupon they made him *Conſul*. But This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Juſtice*; by a falſe Suggeſtion to draw an Envy upon ſo Brave a man, and ſo Famous a Citizen: Eſpecially *Marius* being *Metellus*'s *Lieutenant*, and by his order ſent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinſman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Prætorſhip* diſcharge the Office of a *Good* man. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Conſulted the College of *Prætors* about ſome Common Standard for the Valuation of their *Monies*, which were then ſometimes up, ſometimes down, at ſuch a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They joyn'd unanimouſly in a *Decree*, with a *Penalty* upon any man that ſhould not ſubmit to't; and ſo they *Adjourn'd* for That *Morning*, reſolving to meet again *After noon* for the publiſhing of it. When they were gone, ſome, one way, ſome another; *Gratidianus* ſtept preſently from the *Bench* to the *Tribunal*; and there made *Proclamation* by *Himſelf alone* of that which was the *Common Act* of the *Court*: which you will find (if you obſerve the Story) to have given him great Reputation; the people ſetting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incenſe* and *Tapers*: in one word,

no

no man ever render'd himſelf more *Popular*. Theſe are Points that may puzzle a man ſometimes in his Deliberations; eſpecially when the Matter is but ſmall, wherein any Violence is offer'd to Juſtice, but yet the Conſequence ſeems to be of great Importance. It did not appear to be ſo very foul, for the *One Marius* to Prepoſſeſs himſelf of the Favour of the People, by preventing his *Collegues* and the *Tribunes*: And then it was, in appearance, a matter of great Advantage to the *Other Marius* to advance himſelf to the *Conſulſhip* by the means he had propounded. But there is *One General Rule* that I would have you take ſpecial Notice of; See *Firſt* that what you account *Profitable*, be not *Diſhonorable*; and *Then* if it be *Diſhonorable*, let nothing perſwade you that it is *Profitable*. But what then? Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or the *Other* to be an *Honeſt man?* Set your Wits at work, and try, and conſider with your ſelf what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *Notion* of a *Good Man?* Will a *Good man* tell a *Lye*, *Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive?* Certainly nothing leſs. Is there any thing then on the Other ſide, ſo *Profitable* or ſo *Deſirable*, as that a man would forfeit the Reputation and the Glory of a *Good* and a *Wiſe* man

Small matters may be of great Importance.

A Good man will not do an ill thing.

man to gain it? Can That thing which we call *Profit*, bring us an Advantage to Countervail what it takes *from us*, in depriving us of the very *Name* of *Good men*, and diveſting us of *Faith*, and *Juſtice*? What difference is there betwixt the turning of *Man* into a *Beaſt*, by a *Real Metamorphoſis*, and the bearing the *Figure*, and *Fierceneſs*, of a *Brute* in his *Mind*, under the *Shape* of a *Man*? They that neglect and make light of all things that are *Hôneſt*, for the Acquiring of *Power*, do they not do the ſame thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cæſar*'s Daughter to make himſelf *Great*, under the Boldneſs and Protection of his *Father in Law*? But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himſelf, to augment his *Own* Power by the envy that was born to the Other: but how *Unjuſt* This was to his *Countrey*, and how *Diſhonorable* to himſelf, he did not conſider. His Father in Law had often in his Mouth thoſe *Greek* Verſes of the *Phœnicians* out of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not ſo gracefully perhaps, but ſo as to be Underſtood.

To get a Crown, *a man would* break *a* Truſt,
If break't at all: *Every where elſe, be* Juſt.

IT

IT was a Lewd and Horrible thing done of *Etheocles* (or rather of *Euripides*) to make That the *Exception* of a Crime, which of all Crimes is it ſelf the moſt *Abominable*. But what do we talk of Petty things, as Inheritances, Traffiques, Fraudulent Bargains? What do you think of Him rather, that having the Ambition to make himſelf the Maſter of the People of *Rome*, and the Emperor of the World it ſelf, accompliſh'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to juſtifie This Ambition: for in ſo doing he paſſes an Approbation upon the Subverſion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honor*, that *Ignoble*, and *Deteſtable Oppreſſion*. But he that confeſſes the Unlawfulneſs of any mans Uſurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought ſo to be; and yet ſuppoſes it a thing Profitable to him that can compaſs it; I would ſpare no Reprehenſion; nor, in truth, any Reproach, to reclaim ſuch a man from his Error: For (I appeal to the Immortal Gods) what *Profit* can any man find in the Foul and *Execrable Deſtruction* of his *Country*; albeit he, that is Guilty of it ſhould come afterwards to be ſtil'd the *Father* of it, by the *oppreſſed People*? *Utility*

The Ambition of Julius Cæſar.

Utility should be guided by Honesty.

should therefore be guided by *Honesty*; and in such manner, that tho' the *Words differ*, the *Thing* should be still the *same*. I do not find any thing more *Profitable*, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, than *Power*, and *Empire*: Neither, when I look narrowly into the Matter, do I find any thing more *Unprofitable* to him that *Unjustly attains it*. For what *advantage*, can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulness*, *Fears*, Day and Night; and to lead a Life that is beset with *Snares*, and *Dangers*? There are more treacherous, and unfaithfull men in a Kingdom (says *Accius*) than there are good. But of what Kingdom does he speak? even of That which is reported unto us of *Tantalus* and *Pelops*; a Kingdom that proceeded by a Lawfull Descent. How much greater then is the Number of the Unfaithfull to That Prince, who having oppreſt *Rome* it self by a *Roman Army*, and a City, not only *Free* in its own Constitution, but giving Laws to others; brought That City, at last into subjection to himself? How ulcerated a Conscience do you think This man must needs have? What wounds in his Soul? Or how is it possible that This mans Life should be Profitable to himself, when such was the Condition of it, that Posterity will ever have a Veneration,

on, and Eſteem for thoſe that took it away?

NOW If thoſe things that carry the Faireſt Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they ſeem to be, becauſe they are full of Shame and Diſhonor; This, methinks, ſhould Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewiſe *Honeſt*. Now as this has, in many Caſes, been determin'd; ſo moſt remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his ſecond *Conſulate*: For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerfull*, and a *Generous Prince*; there came a *Fugitive* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius*; and promiſed him, upon Condition of a Conſiderable Reward, that he would convey himſelf back, as privately as he came; and Poyſon the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carry'd back to *Pyrrhus*; and the *Senate* applauded the Reſolution. Now if a man ſhould regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion* of *profit*, This one *Fugitive* might have put a Period to That hazardous War, in the removal of the moſt Conſiderable Enemy of the Empire. But where the point in Controverſie was *Honor*, it would have been

Fabricius's *Generoſity* to Pyrrhus.

a Scandalous and an Impious practice to have encountered a Noble Enemy with *Baseness*, and *Treachery*, instead of *Resolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who was as Eminent in *Rome*, as *Aristides* was in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never separated Profit from Honor) to subdue an Enemy by *Arms* or by *poyson*? If *Empire* be desirable for *Glories* sake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injustice* in the Attempt: For therein can be no *Glory*. And we must have a care too how we compass *Wealth it self*; for it can never be *Advantageous* to us with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable Advice, that of *I. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to Tax those Cities over again, which *L. Sylla* had discharg'd, for a Sum of Mony, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And this, too, without their Mony again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counsel, to the Scandal of the Empire. At this rate there's more *Faith*, to be found among *pyrates* than among *Roman Senators*. Well! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long shall we dare to call any thing *profitable* that is not *Honest*? How is it possible that *Hatred*; or *Infamy*, should ever be *profitable*

Wealth it self may be Unprofitable.

profitable to any Government, that muſt ſupport it ſelf by its *own Reputation*, and the *good will* of its *Confederates*? Nay, I have had many a diſpute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* himſelf, for inſiſting too rigorouſly upon the Intereſt of the *publique Treaſury*, and *Revenue*: He was too hard methought to the *Officers*; for we ought to be Bountifull to the *One*, and treat the *Other* as we were wont to treat our *Colonies*: And ſo much the rather, becauſe the Connexion of the *parts* did much contribute to the preſervation of the *Whole*. And *Curio* did very Ill too: who, tho' convinced that the *Tranſpadans* were in the Right, ſtill concluded, *Vincat Utilitas*, *Let* Utility *carry it*. Now he ſhould rather have ſaid that it was not *Juſt*, becauſe it was not *profitable* to the *Commonwealth*, than allowing it to be *profitable*, to conclude that it was not *Juſt*.

IN *Hecaton's Sixth Book* of *Offices*, we find a great many Queſtions to our purpoſe. As for Inſtance, he puts the Caſe, *Whether in a great Scarcity of* Corn, a Good man *be not oblig'd to maintain his Servants*? He Reaſons it *Pro* and *Con*; but at laſt, concludes the *Duty* with a regard rather to *profit*, than to *Humanity*. He puts another Queſtion, *Whether*,

Inſtances of Good *and* Profitable *in Competition.*

Their Servants *were* Slaves.

ther, in the Extremity of a Storm at Sea, a Man ſhould rather throw over a Serviceable Horſe, or a Servant of little value? And here his private *Intereſt* draws him *One* way, and *Humanity*, *Another*. And again, *Suppoſe that, upon a* Shipwrack, *a* Fool *ſhould get hold of a* Plank; *whether or no may a* Wiſe man *take it from him, if he can*? He's upon the *Negative* becauſe the thing is *Unjuſt*. But what if it were the *Maſter* of the Ship? Shall not he take his *Own?* No, by no means: He may as well throw a Man over-board, that is at Sea in *his Ship*, becauſe the *Ship* is his *Own*: For till they come to the End of the Voyage, the *Ship* is rather the *Paſſengers* than the *Maſters*. *But what if there ſhould be but* One Plank, *and* Two men *equally* Wiſe, *and* Deſerving, *in danger to be Drown'd? Whether ſhall* Neither *of them take it, or ſhall* Either *of them yield it to the* Other? I would have it yielded to him that may do moſt Good; either in the *Republique*, or in his Own *particular*, by *Living*. *But what if they be* both alike? I would have no Contention; But let the One render to the Other as if the point had been decided by Lot. *What if my* Father *ſhould Riſle a* Church, *or Dig a paſſage under ground to Rob the Treaſury*? Whether or no ſhould the *Son* give an Information of

Caſes of Conſcience.

of it to the *Magiſtrate*? This were an Unhappy Caſe; but I would however *Defend* my *Father*, if he were *Accuſed*. *But is not my* Duty *to my* Country *above* all other Duties? Yes, it is. But then my *Country* it ſelf is concern'd, that the people in it ſhould bear a Reverence to their *Parents*. *But what if a* Father *ſhould Deſign the betraying of his Countrey; or the getting of the* Government *into his own hand? Shall the* Son Conceal *it*? I would have him earneſtly deſire his *Father* to *deſiſt*; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuſe him. But I would have him threaten him Firſt; and in the Concluſion, if he finds his Countrey in danger, he is to value the ſafety of it before That of his *Father*. He puts another Queſtion, *if a* Wiſe, *and* Good man, *ſhall by over-ſight take* Falſe mony, *whether or no may he put it off again in payment, after he knows it to be* Counterfeit? *Diogenes* ſays he may: *Antipater* is againſt it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. *Suppoſe a man ſells, a Piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep; Is he bound to tell this or no? Diogenes* ſays he needs not; but *Antipater* ſays that a Good man will tell it. Theſe are the Propoſitions in Controverſie, among the *Stoiques*. *In the ſelling of a* Slave, *whether or no am I bound to diſcover all his faults?*

Only those which the *Civil Law* obliges me to discover, or to take him again. But for discovering him to be a *Lyer*, a *Gamester*, a *Thief*, a *Drunkard*; *Some* are *For* the telling of it, and *Others* not. *What if a man should sell* Gold, *believing it to be* Copper? *Is* a Good man *that knoweth it to be* Gold, *bound to tell him it or no? Or whether can any man Justifie the buying of That for* One peny *which is worth* a Thousand? I have now clear'd my own Opinion; And what are the Points in Controversie among the Philosophers before-named.

Conference in Contracts.

WE come now to consider how far *Those Offices* and *Contracts* are to be observ'd, that are neither Extorted by *Force*, nor (as the Law has it) *Dolo malo*, or by *Circumvention. I have a Remedy given me for the* Dropsie, *upon This Condition*, *that if it Cures me, I am never to use that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapse into the same Disease, and the person with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any farther Use of it: What am I to do in this Case? It is an* Inhumanity, *in him to* refuse *me*; *besides that my Using of it does Him no Hurt*: In this Case, we must Consult the Means of *Life*, and *Health*. Well! *Suppose a Wise*

Wiſe man ſhould be made Heir to a great Eſtate, *upon This Obligation from the* Teſtator, *that before he touches one peny of the Profits of it, he ſhould dance publiquely before a Court of Juſtice, or in the Market place? He promiſes accordingly ſo to do; and without paſſing That promiſe, he could never have been entitled to that Eſtate:* Should he do it or no? I could with he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has paſt his Word, if he accounts it a *Shamefull*, and *Diſhonorable* thing to diſcharge That Condition he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the *Eſtate*, than *Otherwiſe*; unleſs peradventure the Benefits of it might be converted to ſo Great and Publique an Advantage, that it would be no longer *Diſhonorable* ſo to do, as being *Profitable* to his *Country*. A

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Neither is a man (*always*) bound to keep thoſe Promiſes that are of no Advantage to thoſe to whom the Promiſe is made. *Phœbus* (to come back to Fables) having promiſed his Son *Phaeton* a Grant of whatever he ſhould ask; *Phaeton* demanded the Government of his Father's Chariot; he had his Deſire, and in his full Carriere *Jupiter* caſt him

Some Promiſes better broken than kept.

down with a Thunderbolt. Had not this *promiſe* of his Father's now been better *broken* than *kept*? And then the Promiſe that *Theſeus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it? *Neptune* accorded to him *Three wiſhes*: *One* was the Deſtruction of *his Son Hippolytus*, upon a ſuſpicion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law, and the Granting of That Wiſh was the greateſt Affliction that ever came near to *Theſeus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnon's vow* to *Diana*, in promiſing her the moſt beautifull Creature that ſhould be born within his Dominions that year? which proved to be his own Daughter *Iphigenia*; whom he accordingly ſacrific'd, as the faireſt Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promiſe had never been made, than ſo horrible a Crime admitted? Wherefore ſometime we ſhould not paſs a Promiſe: Nay a *Depoſitum* it ſelf is not in all Caſes to be reſtor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Truſt with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad*; Now to *Reſtore* it, in ſuch a Caſe, were a *Crime*, and the *Refuſal* of it, a *Duty*. *What if I ſhould lay up Mony for him, and then find that he's about to make War upon his Country? Shall I render it?* I think not; becauſe it is againſt the *Republique*, which

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we ought to prefer. So many things that ſeem *Honeſt* enough in *their Own Nature*, are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time* and *Occaſion*: to make good a Promiſe, ſtand to a Bargain, deliver up a Truſt; when it comes to be rather *Hurtfull*, than *Profitable* becomes *Diſhoneſt*. This is enough ſaid of thoſe *Utilities* againſt *Juſtice* that are cover'd with a *pretext* of *Reaſon*. But as we have drawn all Duties from the four Fountains of Duty in our Firſt Book, we'll keep ſtill to our Subject; and Shew, how thoſe things that *ſeem* to be *profitable*, and *Are* not, ſtand in the greateſt Oppoſition to Virtue. Here is enough ſaid of *Prudence*, and of the *Counterfeit* of it, which is *Craft*: and likewiſe of *Juſtice*, which can never fail of being *profitable*.

THE *Two Remaining parts* of *Honeſty* follow, the *One* is ſeen in the *Greatneſs* of an *Excellent Mind*, the *Other* in a Conformity and Moderation of *Continence*, and *Temper*. It ſeemed *profitable* to *Ulyſſes*, the Counterfeiting himſelf *mad*, to avoid the War, as the *Tragœdians* would perſwade us. (For there appears no ſuch ſuſpicion of him in *Homer*, who was an Eminent Author.) This was no *Honeſt* Counſel, but it may be ſaid perhaps, that it was a *Profitable* one, *Of Fortitude.*

one, to ſtay at Home, and Govern, in an Eaſie, Lazie Life at *Ithaca*, with his Wife, his Son, and his Relations, but do you Imagine, that in *daily Labors*, and *Hazards*, there can be any *Dignity* that is to be compar'd with *This Tranquillity of Life*? And yet I cannot but have a Contempt for ſuch a *Retreat*, becauſe thoſe things that are not *Honorable*, I cannot allow to be *Advantageous*. But what do you think the World would have ſaid of *Ulyſſes* if he had gone on in that Diſguiſe; who notwithſtanding all his *Brave Exploits* in the *War*, did yet ſuffer theſe reproaches from *Ajax*, in the *Tragedy*?

He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us take it,
Was th' only man, himſelf, you know, that brake it:
Playing th' Mad, Driv'ling Fool, under That Blind
To ſleep in a whole skin, and ſtay behind:
And the bold Cheat had paſt, without all doubt,
But for ſly Palamede *that found it out.*

NOW it was much better for him, to encounter, as he did, not only Enemies, but likewiſe Seas and Tempeſts; than to abandon *Greece*, which was then by

by one Conſent carrying a War among the *Barbarians*. But to paſs over things Fabulous and Foreign. Let us now come to our own Country, and Affairs. *Marcus Attilius Regulus*, in his ſecond *Conſulſhip*, when he was ſurpriz'd, and taken priſoner in *Africa*, by *Xantippus* the *Lacedemonian*, a Commander under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*: (who was then General) he was ſent to the Senate, under an Oath of rendring himſelf again at *Carthage*, unleſs certain *Carthaginian Noblemen* ſhould be releas'd in exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as the Story makes it out, he found it *Vain*, and *Idle*. The condition of it was, that he might ſtay in his Country, live at home with his Wife and Children, ſuffering the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of the War, and ſtill retaining the Honor of his *Conſulary Dignity*. Will any man deny theſe things to be *Profitable?* or what ſhall we ſay, when *Courage*, and *Magnanimity* oppoſe it? What Greater Authority or Security would a man deſire? For it is the Property of theſe Virtues not to fear any thing; to deſpiſe all accidents; and to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befall a man. *The Caſe of* Regulus.

BUT

His Honor and Juſtice.

BUT what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his Buſneſs; but refuſ'd to give his Opinion; for ſo long as he was under an *Oath*, he was in the Condition of a *Priſoner* to an *Enemy*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as ſome will ſay) and one that ſtood in his own light) that which he did ſpeak was againſt himſelf: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Intereſt* to exchange their Priſoners; for the *Carthaginians* were young men (he ſaid) and good Soldiers, but himſelf waſted with Old age. His Authority prevailing, the Priſoners were detained, and himſelf return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquiſite Torments he expos'd himſelf, by his Return; only he was reſolved not to violate his Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death; his Condition was yet more Honorable, than if he had ended his days in his Own houſe; a *decrepit Captive* and *Forſworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Priſoners, but alſo to diſſwade it? But what? ſhall we call *That*, *Fooliſh*, that

that conduces to the *Good* of the *Commonwealth?* Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publique*, that is not ſo to the *Whole?* It is a ſubverſion of the *Fundamentals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honeſty*, for we do all of us deſire that which is *Profitable:* It is an Attractive that draws us to it, whether we will or no. Is there any man that avoids it; or rather that does not vigorouſly purſue it? But ſince *Profit* is not any where to be found, but in that which is *Praiſe-worthy*, *Honorable*, and *Honeſt*, therefore do we account theſe Conſiderations as moſt Noble, and Excellent; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather neceſſary than Splendid.

BUT what is there, you'll ſay, in an *Oath?* are we afraid that *Jupiter* ſhould take offence at us? Now this is a point common to all Philoſophers, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us: and not only to thoſe that take God himſelf to be *Idle*, and wholly careleſs of us, but to thoſe alſo that will have God to be always in *Action*, and doing of ſomething: But what greater harm could even an Angry *Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, than *Regulus* did to *Himſelf?* So that there was nothing of *Religion* in the perverting ſo great a *profit*. Was it left *The Sacredneſs of an Oath.*

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he ſhould do a *mean* thing? Firſt, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuſe the *Leaſt*. But was that Diſhonorable Propoſition then an Evil Equal to the Torment? And *then*, That of *Accius*: *Haſt thou broken thy Faith? To any man that does not believe me, I neither have given, nor Do give it.* Now tho' this was ſpoken by a Wicked King, it was yet well enough ſaid: And moreover; as we ſay that ſome things appear *profitable*, which are *not* ſo; ſo do they ſay on the Other ſide, that ſome things *appear Honeſt* too, which are *not* ſo: As in this caſe of *Regulus*'s returning to the *Torment*, to ſave his *Oath*: For it is rendred *Diſhonorable*, becauſe it was done under a *Force*, and by an *Enemy*, and ſo ought not to be made good. And they go farther, that whatſoever is *very profitable*, becomes *Honeſt* upon That Conſideration, tho' it was not ſo before. This is it which is commonly urg'd againſt *Regulus*. But let us *examine what it amounts to*. *Jupiter* was not to be fear'd, leſt he ſhould *hurt* us in his *Anger*, becauſe he does not uſe to be either *Angry* or *Miſchievous*. This Reaſon lies as ſtrong againſt all other Oaths, againſt This of *Regulus*. But the queſtion is not in an *Oath*, the *fear* of being *puniſh'd* for *breaking it*, but the *Conſcience*

ence and the *Obligation of* keeping it. Now an *Oath* is a *Religious Affirmation*; and whatſoever we promiſe poſitively, as in the preſence of *God*, we muſt keep it: for this does not concern the Anger of the Gods, which is none at all; but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Juſtice! It is a glorious Exclamation of* Ennius,

O Holy Faith! the Tye o'th' Gods;
And fit to have thy Manſion in their
Bleſt Abodes.

H E therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Divinity of *Faith* it ſelf, to which our Forefathers aſcribed *Divine Honors*; placing her in the *Capitol*, as (*Cato* tells us) next unto *Jupiter himſelf*. *But even an Angry* Jupiter (you ſay) *could not have hurt* Regulus *more than he did himſelf*. That were true, if there were no evil but *Pain*: But we have the Authority of the greateſt Philoſophers for it, that Torment is ſo far from being the *Greateſt Evil*, that it is *None at all*. And let me recommend *Regulus* to you upon this point, as no Ordinary Teſtimony; Nay, perhaps none more convincing. For what nobler inſtance can be deſir'd, than to ſee ſo Illuſtrious a *Roman* ſubject himſelf voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather than forego his *Duty*? for in ſaying the *Leaſt* of *Evils*, it is meant by ſuffering

Pain is no Evil.

ſuffering rather *Diſhonorably*, than *Miſerably.* Is there any *Greater Evil* than a *Shamefull Diſhoneſty*? How offenſive is it to the *Eye*, and Deformity of the Body? But how much greater then ſhould we account the *Pravity*, and *Corruption* of a *Polluted Mind*? Wherefore they that argue theſe things with the greateſt Generoſity and Vigour, as the *Stoiques*, pronounce *That* Only to be *Evil* which is *Shamefull*: Nay, the *Peripatetiques* themſelves (who are not ſo Maſculine as the other) make no difficulty of unanimouſly pronouncing it to be the *Greateſt Evil.* As for that ſaying, *I have neither given, nor do I give, my Faith to a Faithleſs man*: It was well enough ſaid of the Poet, in the Caſe of *Atreus*; becauſe it was accommodate to the *perſon*: But if they take up This once for granted, that a man is not oblig'd to *keep Faith* with him that has *no Faith*: let them have a care not to make uſe of that Shift as a Cover for Perjury.

AS to the Rights and Cuſtoms of *War*, and keeping *Faith* with an *Enemy*, they are points we muſt be very *Tender of*: For whatſoever we ſwear, upon a full Perſwaſion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That muſt be obſerv'd: But Otherwiſe, a man may diſpenſe with what

what Obligation without *Perjury*. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Thieves*, ſhould promiſe them a certain Sum of Money for the ſaving of his *Life* : 'Tis no deceit, the receding from it, tho' I had given my Oath for the performance : for we are not to look upon *Pirates* as *Open* and *Lawfull Enemies*; but as the Common *Adverſaries* of *Mankind*. For they are a ſort of men with whom we have neither *Truſt*, nor *Oath* in Common. For *Perjury* is not the *Swearing falſe*, but the not *performing* of That which we ſwear, with an *Intention* to do it; as may be gather'd from the very form of our Oath. It was wittily ſaid of *Euripides*, *I ſwore with my Tongue, but not with my Heart*. But it was not for *Regulus*, however to embroyl the Conditions, and Rules of *War*, with *Perjury*; having to do with a *Juſt*, and *a Lawfull Enemy*; in which Caſe, all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For if it were otherwiſe, the Senate would never have ſent and deliver'd up ſo many famous men in Chains to their Enemies. Which was the Caſe of *Titus Viturius*, and *Spurius Poſthumius*, in their *Second Conſulſhips*: Who when they were beaten at *Caudium*, and our Legions diſarm'd, for concluding a Peace

A Pagan Diſpenſation.

The Rigour of the Roman *Diſcipline.*

Peace with the *Samnites*, were deliver'd up to them as their Priſoners, becauſe they had done it without the *Order*, and *Conſent* of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the ſame time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes* of the *Common people*, were deliver'd up likewiſe, to Evacuate the Peace concluded, becauſe it was done by Their Authority; and *Poſthumius*, himſelf, that was deliver'd up, was the man that adviſed and propounded it. And the ſame thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the *Carthaginians*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perſwaded the repreſenting of it to the People, himſelf, that he might be deliver'd up to the Enemy; which propoſition being ſo recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Attilius*, was accepted, and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was more Honorable yet, than that of *Q. Pompeius*, who in the ſame caſe, upon his ſupplication that ſuch a *Decree* might not be paſt againſt him, prevail'd, *and was diſcharg'd*. Here that which ſeem'd *Profitable*, was more conſider'd than the *Honeſt*; but in the *Other Example*, *the falſe Appearance* of *Profit*, was overcome by a Dignity of *Honor*, and *Virtue*. But in the Caſe of *Regulus*, the

the Promiſe was made under a Force, and he was not oblig'd to Perform it. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: Why did he go to the Senate then, expreſly to move againſt himſelf, and diſſwade the Releaſe of the Priſoners? This is to reprehend the moſt Generous point in the whole caſe, he would not reſt upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cauſe, that the Senate might paſs judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interpoſed, the Priſoners had been certainly reſtor'd to the *Carthaginians*; and then, *Regulus*, might have continu'd ſafe in his own Country. But as he did not account that courſe *Profitable* to his *Country*, ſo he took the *Honeſter* Part, in chuſing rather to ſuffer, and undergo what he did. Now as to their ſaying, that when a thing is very *Profitable*, the advantage juſtifies it, tho' it were not *Honeſt* otherwiſe: Let me tell you, that it muſt *Be* ſo, and not be *Made* ſo: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honeſt*, and it is not *Honeſt*, becauſe it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, becauſe it is *Honeſt*. So that out of many Wonderfull Examples, a man ſhall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Inſtance than This. For in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the moſt Worthy

and

and Generous part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Prisoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now adays, he could not yet at That time do otherwise: So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather than of the *Man*: For our Forefathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the most Sacred Obligation in Nature. And this we find in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacratæ*, shew as much: And so do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an Enemy; and so do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Censors*; who were not so strict in any thing, as in the bus'ness of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Aulus*) in his *Dictatorship* was summon'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people* for Exercising the Power of a *Dictator*, some days beyond his time; And was farther accus'd for Banishing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is said to have gone presently to *Rome*; and the next morning by daylight, to *Pomponius*'s house. To whom it was suggested that *Torquatus* being very ill us'd, had probably brought him some

The Tye of an Oath.

ſome Complaint againſt his Father. *Pomponius* preſently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and ſo order'd the young man to be brought unto him. He was no ſooner in the Chamber, but *Titus* drew his Sword, and ſwore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not preſently give him his *Oath*, that his Father ſhould be diſcharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehenſion of his preſent danger, paſt his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the people; telling them he was forced to deſiſt, and the reaſon of it: Whereupon *Manlius* was let go. Such a Veneration had they in thoſe times, for the Tye of an Oath! This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a *Frenchman* in a *Duel* upon a Challenge, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*, which the *Latins* call *Torquis*, took the *Sirname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Conſulſhip* the *Latins* were routed and diſperſed at *Verſeris*, near the Mountain *Veſuvius*. He was a man of the higheſt rank of Brave men, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, than he was afterward ſevere to his Son.

The Severity of the Romans *in caſe of Perfidy.*

BUT as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath, ſo were

were thoſe *ten men* after the Battel of *Cannæ* as much to be deſpiſed. *Hannibal* ſent them to the Senate, upon an *Oath* to render themſelves again in the Camp of the *Carthaginians*; if they could not obtain ſuch an exchange of Priſoners as was propounded. But this Story is variouſly reported: *Polybius* (an Author of ſingular Credit) ſays that *Nine* of the *ten Noblemen* that were ſent, delivered themſelves up without prevailing for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the Ten never went back again; Having Returned to the Camp, ſo ſoon as he was out of it, upon pretence that he had left ſomething behind him; by which *Return*, he would underſtand himſelf to be diſcharg'd of his Oath: But without reaſon; For the *Fraud encreaſes* the *Iniquity*, without *diſſolving* the *Perjury*. Wherefore it was a fooliſh piece of Cunning, and a moſt perverſe Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this ſhifting Jugler ſhould be ſent bound to *Hannibal*. But the moſt glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Priſoners; not taken in the Battel, or that had run any hazard of their lives, but they were only ſuch as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Conſuls*, *Paulus* and *Varro*. They might have been

been redeem'd for a ſmall Sum of Money: but the Senate would not agree to't: for a Leſſon to the *Roman Soldiers* that they muſt either *Conquer*, or *Die*. This reſolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him than any thing elſe (as the ſame Author has it) to ſee that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greateſt Adverſity, ſhould ſtill uphold ſo generous a Reſolution. So that things *ſeemingly Profitable* are ſtill overcome by things that are *really honeſt*. Now *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to *Hannibal*'s *Camp*, under the ſame Colour, to deliver themſelves from their Oath; and that they were branded for it with all ſorts of Ignominy by the *Cenſors*. We ſhall now put an end to This matter; for it is clear, that whatſoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, becauſe it is Flagitious, Diſhonorable, and Shamefull: as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather conſulted his *Own Intereſt*, than that of the *Publique*, in the buſineſs of the Priſoners; or rather choſen to have ſtaid at home.

Of Temperance.

THE Fourth part yet remains, conſiſting in *Decency*, *Moderation*, *Modeſty*, *Continence*, and *Temperance*. Now can any thing be *profitable*, in oppoſition to this Catalogue of ſuch Virtues? But *Ariſtippus*'s *Cyrenaiques*, and the *Annicerian Philoſophers* place all *Good* in *pleaſure*, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Laudable*, for the *pleaſure* it produces. As theſe grew out of date, *Epicurus* came on; the Supporter, Improver, and in a manner, the Author of the ſame Opinion. With theſe we muſt contend (as they ſay) for Life; If we are reſolv'd to defend, and to maintain the Cauſe of Honeſty: For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happineſs of Life* reſts in a *Sound Conſtitution* of *Body*, or in the ſearch and hope of ſuch a Conſtitution (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the higheſt degree too (for ſo they underſtand it) will be found to claſh with *honeſty*. For firſt, what Province ſhall we aſſign to *prudence?* If the ſearch and enquiry after delights; How wretched a *thing* is *Virtue*, when it comes to ſerve *pleaſure*? But what is the *Office* of *prudence*? To judge learnedly of *pleaſure*? Suppoſe that nothing could be more *Delightfull* than That: There is nothing

nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Diſhonorable*. Now for him that pronounces *pain* to be the greateſt of *Evils*; what place is there in ſuch a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that Exerciſes it ſelf in the Contempt of *Labors*, and *pains*? For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places ſpeaks Generouſly enough (as he does in This) of *pain and Affliction*; We are not yet ſo much to conſider what he ſays, as what may be reaſonable for him to ſay, upon the Foundation of Terminating all *Good* and *Ill*, in *pleaſure* and *pain*: As to hear him now ſpeak of *Continence* and *Temperance* he ſays many very good things in ſeveral places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we ſay) For how can any man commend *Temperance*, and yet place our *Chiefeſt Good* in *pleaſure*? For *Temperance* is the *Enemy* of *Senſual pleaſures*, and our *Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Followers* of them. And yet in theſe Three kinds, they ſhuffle as well as they can, and their Evaſions are not without ſome Colour. They make *prudence* to be the skill of ſupplying or procuring *pleaſures*, and keeping away *pains*: And then they make a ſhift too, to acquit themſelves in the point of *Fortitude*: which they ſay enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *pain*. And in ſpeaking of *Temperance*;

Epicurus *places Good and Ill in Pleaſure and Pain.*

perance; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themſelves after a faſhion; for they ſay that the *Greatneſs* of *pleaſure* ariſes only from an *Abſence* or *Detraction* of *pain*. And as for *Juſtice*, it is with Them, either *Tottering*, or rather *Grovelling* upon the *Ground*; and ſo are all thoſe Virtues that are exercis'd in Common, and in the Society of Mankind. For there can neither be any Goodneſs, Liberality or Gentleneſs (any more than Friendſhip) if theſe things be not deſirable for *Themſelves*: or elſe deſirable only in relation to *pleaſure* and *profit*. But let us bring the matter into a Narrow Compaſs: For as we have laid it down, that nothing can be *profitable*, in Oppoſition to *honeſty*, ſo we do here affirm that all Pleaſure is directly contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Dinomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controverſie, by coupling *pleaſure*, with *honeſty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beaſt*. Whereas Virtue does not admit of that Conjunction, but deſpiſes and rejects it. And then for the end of *Good* and *Evil men*, which muſt be *Simple*: it cannot be *Temper'd*, and *Compounded* of *diſagreeing things*. But of this elſewhere more at large:

And

And it is a weighty bus'neſs. But to my purpoſe now in hand, Concerning any matter to be determin'd in the Caſe of a *Concurrent Oppoſition* betwixt *profit*, and *honeſty*, we have ſaid enough already. But if *pleaſure* ſhall be ſaid to carry ſome ſhew of *profit* alſo, there can be no Conjunction of it with Honeſty. For allowing the moſt we can to *pleaſure*, it does but ſerve us for *Sawce*, without any Profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Preſent*: in *My Opinion* a *Great* one: but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow Theſe Three Books of Mine, an Entertainment in your Study, among the Commentaries of *Cratippus*. If I my ſelf had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had not Commanded me back, even when I was half way through) you ſhould ſometimes have been your Father's Diſciple too. So that I am now fain to ſpeak you in theſe Writings. Beſtow as much of your time upon them as you can: and what you have a mind to do, you may do. When I ſhall underſtand that This Study pleaſes you, I hope it will not be long before I be with you my ſelf. And however, at this diſtance,

though in abſence, I ſhall ſtill be ſpeaking to you. Wherefore my *Cicero* farewell: And aſſure your ſelf that you are exceeding dear to me: And yet much dearer you will be, if I ſhall find that you take delight in theſe Memorials, and Precepts.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

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THE END.